The air war over Vietnam has not revealed a winnerOf the four components of the Vietnam War ("The echo of the Vietnam War is heard in Ukraine", "HBO", 17.02.23), two became the most noticeable for an external observer.
At the same time, one of them, "mutineer war" ("The myth of the invincibility of the partisans has long been time to reconsider ", "HBO", 10.03.23), was, and remains, not quite adequately evaluated. In fact, this component was not decisive; at the same time, the Vietnamese Communists did not win the guerrilla war at all – on the contrary, they lost it.
The high-tech component, that is, the war of American aviation against the air defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), was outwardly the most spectacular. In fact, no one won it: its influence on the outcome of the war as a whole turned out to be quite limited. But it has had an extremely strong impact on the development of aviation and air defense of all countries of the world in the future.
THE AMERICANS ARE ATTACKING FROM THE AIRGround Invasion of North Vietnam (DRV)
The United States has not organized, although this could theoretically ensure that they win the war as a whole. It is difficult to say what they were more afraid of: direct support of the enemy from China and the USSR (that is, "Korea-2"), or they were not happy with the idea of "doubling" Vietnam proper, since they already had enough anti-guerrilla warfare in the south.
Most likely, Americans were scared of both to about the same extent. Therefore, they limited themselves to air strikes.
Although the word "limited" does not really fit here: Vietnam got more bombs than any country in the history of wars (7.5 million tons).
True, the American political leadership endlessly pulled its pilots, then imposing various restrictions on them on the choice of targets and places of possible strikes, then removing these prohibitions. Moreover, between March 1968 (when Operation Rolling Thunder was completed) and April 1972, the Americans did not bomb the DRV at all.
The reasons for this inconsistency were both domestic political reasons and significant losses of American aviation, which met with the latest Soviet technology.
RUSSIAN WINGS OVER VIETNAMThe Soviet Union has been helping the Vietnamese Communists since the late 1940s, making a significant contribution to their victory over the French ("Indochina Catastrophe", "HBO", 05/24/19). Moreover, it could not help them in the war with the Americans.
When the US Air Force's air offensive against North Vietnam began, the Soviet Union began supplying Hanoi with air defense systems. At first, they were subsonic MiG-17 fighters, which had only cannon armament. Then supersonic MiG-21s with air-to-air missiles appeared, as well as S-75 anti-aircraft missile systems. [...]
The use of this latest weapon had to be taught to the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese mastered the relatively simple technique so well that soon they themselves could teach their Soviet teachers how to use it in combat. In particular, this applies to anti-aircraft artillery, which accounted for up to 2/3 of American planes and helicopters shot down over the north and south.
It was more difficult to train pilots. Firstly, because of the complexity of the technique. Secondly, due to the fact that most Vietnamese pilots were small and weak compared to their Soviet counterparts, they did not withstand overloads well, the dimensions of the cabins did not fit them.
Until the very end of the war, the Vietnamese loved the old MiG-17 more than the new MiG-21. The subsonic MiG-17 was easier to master, had smaller dimensions and lower speed (respectively, the pilot experienced less overload), but good maneuverability.
However, the Vietnamese have learned to fight on MiG-21. Pham Tuan, the future Vietnamese cosmonaut, who flew this fighter, shot down an American B-52 strategic bomber on December 27, 1972. To date, no other pilot in the world can boast of such success.
In April 1972, Vietnamese pilots even carried out a successful attack on American warships, severely damaging the destroyer, although MiGs are not adapted for such actions at all (to this day this is the only successful air attack on US Navy ships after the end of World War II).
Almost all the losses of the DRV Air Force fell on air battles over their own territory, they did not fly to the south, so they did not meet with American ground air defense. According to various sources, Vietnamese losses ranged from 75 to 113 MiG-17s, from 65 to 90 MiG-21s and from 5 to 10 J-6s (Chinese MiG-19). The most likely range of total losses is from 131 to 145 fighters.
The spread of data on American losses in air battles over the north is even wider: from 79 to 350 aircraft, the most adequate option is 114 aircraft and three helicopters. The MiG-17 has at least 40 American aircraft on its account (including at least 16 "Phantoms"). On account of the MiG-21, most likely, there were from 70 to 80 American aircraft (including at least 38 "Phantoms").
In Russia, it is very popular to talk about the fact that Soviet pilots fought over Vietnam. This thought is reflected in the once famous song "Phantom Pilot", which is a monologue of a downed American pilot: "And the slanted one who commanded the interrogation answered me: "Our pilot Li Si Tsyn shot you down."
However, already in this song itself, the mixing of the events of the Vietnam and Korean wars is visible (Li Si Tsyn is an obvious Koreization, but not the Vietnamese of the Russian surname). In fact, Soviet instructor pilots were present in Vietnam, two of whom (captains Yuri Poyarkov and Vinidikt Mrykhin) were killed. But there is still no intelligible information about the participation of our pilots in air battles over Vietnam. It is impossible to explain this with secrecy, since no one has been hiding the fact of direct participation of Soviet pilots in the battles in Korea and the Middle East for a long time.
"UNDER ME, EDWARD AND BOB RUSHED TO MEET GOD"As no one hides the participation of our servicemen in the fighting in Vietnam – not just pilots, but anti-aircraft rocket men.
In the initial period of the war, ours fought on the S-75, only by the end of the war local anti-aircraft gunners began to form the basis of calculations.
The first combat use of an anti-aircraft missile system (SAM) took place on July 25, 1965, when the C-75 of the 236th anti-aircraft missile Regiment of the Moscow Air Defense District shot down three "Phantoms" (the United States recognizes the loss of only one). The American Air Force was "honored" to become the first Air Force in the world to face the massive use of anti-aircraft missile weapons, from which they suffered losses many times greater than from MiGs.
From 1965 to 1972, 95 S-75 air defense systems and 7658 anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) were delivered to Vietnam. By the end of the war, 6806 missiles were spent and lost, 43 sams remained combat-ready, including four training ones. According to Soviet data, they shot down 1,044 to 1,770 American planes.
The Americans themselves admit the loss of about 150-200 aircraft from this SAM. At the moment, the losses confirmed by the American side by aircraft types are as follows: 15 B-52 strategic bombers, two or three F-111 tactical bombers, 36 A-4 attack aircraft, nine A-6, 18 A-7, three A-3, three A-1, one AC-130, 32 F-4 fighters, eight F-105s, one F-104, 11 F-8s, four RB-66 scouts, five RF-101s, one O-2, one C-123 transport, one CH-53 helicopter.
The real results of the S-75 in Vietnam are obviously much greater, but it is impossible to say what they are. Although it is unlikely that they reach even the minimum Soviet data.
Very high at first, by the end of the war, the efficiency (that is, the number of missiles spent on one downed aircraft) of the S-75 decreased several times. This happened thanks to the use by the Americans of electronic warfare (EW), anti-radar missiles (first AGM-45 "Shrike", then AGM-78 "ARM Standard") and new tactics.
The tactic consisted in the transition of American aviation to small and extremely low altitudes, that is, leaving under the lower boundary of the SAM defeat zone. The downside of this tactic was an increase in losses from anti-aircraft artillery and from accidents (collisions with the ground). As well as a reduction in the combat radius (the earth has a higher air density and, accordingly, fuel consumption).
RESULTS OF THE AIR WARIn December 1972, the Americans very loudly "slammed the door" by conducting an air operation "Leinbaker-2" against the DRV.
It ended the high–tech air war - and, in fact, the war with the participation of the United States in general.
This operation was the only one in which no restrictions on the locations and targets of strikes were imposed on American pilots from Washington. The outcome of the operation is extremely contradictory and ambiguous: both sides still consider it their victory, forcing the enemy to sign the Paris Agreements (which, however, became the de facto political capitulation of the United States).
During the operation, the Americans dropped 20,370 tons of bombs on the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong, killing "only" 1,318 civilians (on this occasion, American General Davidson seriously wrote: "Civilian casualties were strikingly insignificant"). Up to 80% of the DRV power plants were destroyed (in the USA to this day they consider this an outstanding military success, and not a "barbaric destruction of civilian infrastructure", which is now being done by "Russian aggressors" in Ukraine).
The Vietnamese Air Force lost three to five MiG-21s, the US Air Force lost at least 26 aircraft, including 17 B-52s, of which 15 were shot down by the S–75 SAM, one by the aforementioned Pham Tuan on the MiG-21, another B-52 fell as a result of a collision with another MiG-21 (but it is unclear whether it was an intentional ram or a mistake by a Vietnamese pilot). Soviet data on the destruction of 34 B-52 vehicles is clearly far from the truth. A total of 22 B-52s were shot down over Vietnam, although there are large figures in Soviet sources that are hardly relevant to reality.
Also during Operation Leinbaker-2, the US Air Force lost two medium F-111 bombers, in total, at least 10 aircraft of this type were killed in Vietnam.
The main hero of the US air war against the DRV, of course, was the F-4 "Phantom" fighter-bomber, which was used in several modifications, including the deck version. At least 59 "Phantoms" were lost in air battles, at least 32 of them from the SAM. At the same time, the total losses recognized by the Americans amounted to 761 aircraft of this type! It is difficult to assume that almost 700 vehicles were killed by anti-aircraft artillery and accidents. Consequently, MiGs and especially C-75 shot down many more "Phantoms" than officially recognized.
The tactical and technical characteristics of the F-5 fighter were artificially underestimated in relation to the F-4, since it was created specifically for export. The US Air Force used it over South Vietnam as a strike aircraft. More than 200 of these machines were received by the South Vietnamese Air Force, of which about 90 became Communist trophies in 1975.
Tests of several of them in the USSR showed that the F-5E was significantly superior to the MiG-21 in maneuverability. Thus, the American command made a serious mistake by using the F-4 as the main fighter, and not the F-5.
For another American car, Vietnam literally became a grave. The F-105 Thunderchief was considered an extremely promising aircraft and was intended to break through air defenses and launch nuclear strikes on the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries. However, 395 of 833 aircraft of this type were lost in Vietnam, after which his career quickly ended.
In total, the United States lost from 3.7 thousand to 4.2 thousand aircraft in Vietnam. However, more than half of this number was lost in South Vietnam – from anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns, as well as on the ground, as a result of attacks by South Vietnamese guerrillas and North Vietnamese soldiers on airfields. As it was above, there was no clear winner in the air war, but the Americans suffered enormous damage in it.
As a result of the war, the USSR created the most powerful ground-based air defense. Its part, which remained in Ukraine, has not been updated for three decades, but even in this state it creates very serious problems for the modern VKS of the Russian Federation.
Alexander KhramchikhinAlexander Anatolyevich Khramchikhin – independent military expert
