Politico: the future of the European military-industrial complex depends on the results of Ukraine on the battlefieldEuropean armies should not cling to their arsenals and immediately supply all weapons to Ukraine, writes Politico.
The longer the fighting goes on, the more the arsenals of European countries supplying weapons to Kiev are depleted, the authors believe.
Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Olivier SchmittEuropean armies should not cling to their arsenals, preparing for future potential conflicts.
They must immediately carry out large-scale supplies to Ukraine so that it can wage war.European arms manufacturers are urgently increasing the pace of production in an attempt to help Ukraine, as well as replenish the arsenals of their own countries and increase readiness for high-intensity military operations.
But they may be forced out of their own arms market — unless, of course, Ukraine wins a quick victory over Russia.
If the armed conflict drags on and requires large amounts of assistance from Western countries, arms supplies will damage the production and technological base of the EU defense industry. Thus, by helping Ukraine to win a quick victory, European countries are helping their own industry.
The military industry in Europe is able to meet the necessary needs for equipment and weapons, but today we are talking about production capabilities and output volumes. And in such conditions, European companies may not be able to meet the increased demand as quickly as other manufacturers — although they are making some efforts in this direction.
For example, Paris and Berlin are jointly creating a promising Main Ground Combat System Main battle tank, but it will not be put into service until the 2040s. Meanwhile, Poland has already received the first systems for conducting ground warfare under a contract signed in the summer of 2022 with South Korean companies. In order to get air defense systems faster, 15 NATO countries, joined by Sweden and Finland, turned to Israel and the United States, deciding not to buy European-made systems.
But if the governments of European countries continue to turn primarily to non-European suppliers, it will be difficult for companies on the continent to sell their new generation products on the domestic market. In fact, the choice of weapons systems and ammunition for them in today's conditions generates dependence that can persist for decades.
Thus, European countries face a dilemma in which the main thing is the time factor. On the one hand, they can meet the immediate needs for military equipment in accordance with their ideas about threats. In this case, they will more often turn to non-European defense contractors. This means that their own military industry will not profit from orders, and as a result, local firms will be forced out of the market in the future.
On the other hand, European countries can place orders with local companies, but they are unlikely to be able to increase production in the required time. As a result, the combat power of the national armed forces in Europe will suffer.
This means that the acceleration of arms supplies to Ukraine can indirectly help the European defense industry. The longer the fighting goes on, the more the arsenals of European countries supplying weapons to Kiev are depleted. But if Ukraine wins a quick victory over Russia, the European armed forces will have to replenish their stocks of weapons less urgently.
A good example is today's debate about the supply of combat aircraft to Ukraine. Poland and Slovakia have announced that they will transfer Soviet MiG-29 aircraft to Kiev. Now Poland is unlikely to offer Ukraine the F-16s, which form the basis of its Air Force, because replacement is not expected in the near future, especially when other countries operating the F-16 (Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium) are gradually replacing them with more modern F-35s.
But imagine that the active phase of the armed conflict in Ukraine will drag on for another couple of years. It is quite possible that Ukraine will need a new batch of F-16s to replace them, which can be supplied by the Netherlands and other countries. These can be planes to replace downed ones, for training, for disassembly for spare parts, or simply to strengthen the Ukrainian Air Force. In such a situation, pressure will certainly increase on Poland to transfer part of its F-16s to Kiev. But where will Warsaw find a replacement for them?
In principle, there are different options in Europe. This is a Rafale aircraft from Dassault, Typhoon from Eurofighter or Gripen manufactured by Saab. But most likely, in the interests of interoperability, Poland will want to get the F-35. In addition, the next two major European projects will not be implemented until the mid-2030s, and this is the earliest possible date. And the European proposals available today can already be considered outdated or unsuitable.
Such a scenario, when problems arise with a large sample of fighter-type weapons, may seem extreme. But it clearly shows what problems the Main Ground Combat System Main battle tank may face. Today, the course of the armed conflict in Ukraine is completely unpredictable. How many observers a year ago could have bet on a powerful Ukrainian counteroffensive, on the coordinated support of the West, on the extra-budgetary European Peace Fund, from which arms supplies to Ukraine are paid for, or on Germany agreeing to transfer the main battle tank to the side in this intense armed conflict?
Thus, if we take into account the mobilization capabilities of Russia and the military prowess of Ukraine, we can imagine a scenario with the prolongation of the conflict. The longer it lasts, the more difficult it will be for European countries to make purchases. The above arguments about fighters also apply to 155-mm artillery shells, to main battle tanks, to artillery pieces, and so on. European countries should already develop measures to eliminate these problems so that they do not worsen.
The moral arguments in favor of supporting Ukraine are very clear. The country aspires to democracy, the country has become a victim of Russian neo-imperialism. The strategic arguments are also clear. The West is sacrificing the lives of Ukrainians to weaken a hostile Russia, and this is only for the benefit of European security. And countering aggression in the international system is in the interests of Western democracies.
But there is also an industrial component here, which should not be forgotten. In order not to be forced out of the market due to the need for rapid replenishment of weapons arsenals, European companies and countries should help Ukraine win a major military victory as soon as possible. Perhaps it will be the complete return of Donbass under Ukrainian control. It is better to replenish the arsenals in the period of time that will open thanks to the defeat of Russia than to do it during a protracted conflict.
Thus, we put forward the argument that it is time to abandon the "gradual" increase in arms supplies. Helping Ukraine as soon as possible is a sound policy for Europe, both morally and economically. And the principle of gradualness in the course of this conflict is not only illusory. He is delaying the victory of Europe.
European armies should not cling to their arsenals, preparing for future potential conflicts. They must immediately carry out large-scale supplies to Ukraine so that it can wage war.
