Experience in the use of assault aircraft and confrontation with air defense in the conflict in UkraineFor ten months, Russian military pilots have accumulated considerable experience in the combat use of weapons and military equipment in the zone of a special military operation (SVO).
But if something else is sometimes told about helicopter pilots in the press, then we only know about the work of assault aviation that it takes off and lands, sometimes launching missiles. It creates a false impression that nothing is happening in the war zone. Meanwhile, the combat work of the Russian Air Force / VKS aircrew is going on in difficult conditions – in the space of confrontation not only with the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), but also with the latest Anglo-American and Western European equipment. First of all, with anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs) of the enemy's air defense (air defense) and electronic warfare (EW).
THE ENEMY'S EYESIGHT IS GOODA global information and intelligence network created by the United States and NATO countries in the combat area is currently operating in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
This ensures that the enemy receives (collects) information about the situation from space, ground and air reconnaissance and surveillance means (including long–range radar detection - AWACS). Figuratively speaking, the enemy sees everything, everywhere and always, day and night.
For this purpose, information is constantly being processed, exchanged between control points, troops, maneuverable combat groups and calculations of portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS). Such online coordination allows for preemptive massive strikes against Russian troops. Such interaction is carried out by the Armed Forces of Ukraine at all levels of military administration – up to the combat calculation.
In addition, such activities make it possible not to use radar stations (radars) on a permanent basis, immediately unmasking their positions, but to use NATO data to pre-enter information into the air defense system about the enemy. Radars are activated only for a short period of time for an attack, followed by a change of position.
Such tactics threaten significant losses to Russian aviation, which is why it is forced to cling to the ground, operate at low and extremely low altitudes.
But the enemy does not stop there either. According to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Armed Forces, General Mark Milli, it is planned to form an integrated air defense-missile defense system on the territory of Ukraine for the defense of priority and strategic military facilities. What is it and how to resist it?
In the face of NATO in Ukraine, we are faced with an enemy armed with high-tech equipment, means of communication and information processing. For example, the troops of the Armed Forces of Ukraine today are saturated with thousands of Starlink terminals for communication with low-orbit satellites that provide operational control of troops. We can't boast of this either at the beginning of our work or now.
As for the VKS specifically, the intelligence information from the enemy satellite grouping is a great danger for army aviation (AA). Our AA bases are easily detected in tactical depth by US military and commercial reconnaissance satellites, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This leads to losses of equipment at airfields, which forces the Russian Aerospace Forces to switch to the actions of, say, combat helicopters from replacement sites or previously prepared jump sites. And also act from extremely low altitudes at night and in difficult meteorological conditions.
150 HOLES IN THE SIDEAssault aviation in the Russian Aerospace Forces group is represented by an armored subsonic highly maneuverable Su-25 aircraft with unique survivability.
It is designed to support ground forces on the battlefield day and night with a direct line of sight of the target, as well as to destroy objects with specified coordinates. It can carry up to 30 types of weapons of various calibers and purposes. The basic equipment of the Su-25 includes a 30-millimeter double-barreled aviation gun GSH–30-2 with 250 rounds. The rest of the armament is suspended under the wings, depending on the tasks.
Thanks to Russian armored attack aircraft, the Armed Forces of Ukraine and foreign mercenaries are deprived of the possibility of regularly supplying parts with weapons and free movement between settlements. The Su-25's equipment with combat, radio-electronic and navigation means makes it possible to destroy any armored and automotive equipment, artillery, manpower, and destroy engineering and fortifications. If pilots need to launch a targeted airstrike and "lay down" the enemy's headquarters, guided bombs (KAB) or guided missiles (UR) are used. If the object of action is a supply column or armored vehicles, blocks with unguided missiles are suspended under the wing – as a rule, C–13 caliber 122mm "Tulumbas".
The reliability of the Su-25 attack aircraft has been proven more than once during local wars and conflicts. It is achieved due to a monolithic titanium welded cabin, titanium engine protection and fuel tank armor. According to the experience of Afghanistan and other conflicts, on average, one combat loss of a Su-25 attack aircraft accounted for 2,600 sorties – a unique ratio. To shoot down the Su-25, it took 80-90 hits. There were cases when planes returned with 150 holes on board.
However, the experience of combat operations has shown the need not only to preserve the system of existing assault aviation weapons, but also to increase its combat strength. In particular, due to the development and adoption of lighter attack aircraft (attack aircraft) by the VKS aviation.
Of course, our designers are working on this. The updated Su-25SMZ is a deeply upgraded version of the Su-25. It is equipped with the Vitebsk-25 electronic warfare system (capable of protecting pilots from foreign MANPADS), the GLONASS satellite navigation system with the ability to program the endpoint with an accuracy of 10 m, the SVP-24-25 sighting and navigation system (a variant of the SVP–24 "Hephaestus").
This increases the accuracy of the use of weapons on ground targets. For example, the effectiveness of a free-falling ammunition strike increases at least three times. The range of target detection and its classification (recognition) has been increased. As a result, the accuracy characteristics of unguided aircraft weapons increase to the level of guided weapons.
DRAW ME A "PORTRAIT"The most important problem of intelligence and information support of military aviation of the Air Force / VKS in combat operations in Ukraine remains the need to improve the control system and training in real and quasi-real time combat and flight missions, as well as the improvement of high-precision aviation weapons of various ranges.
Now, even for actions on pre-set goals, it takes a lot of time to prepare flight and combat missions. This problem is especially acute when newly identified targets are hit, which is primarily due to the limited capabilities of manufacturing standards of "portraits" of the affected objects. Given that the role of high-precision weapons is becoming decisive in the effectiveness of fire damage, the capabilities of forces and means of space (aerial) reconnaissance and communications should be increased.
Effective counteraction to the modern intelligence and information support of the enemy is provided by our forces and means of electronic warfare. But their massive use creates a serious limitation on the effectiveness of the use of their forces and means. Because it requires competent planning and the use of sophisticated equipment in the operation (combat operations).
This problem can radically change the approach to including aviation weapons systems in development programs, although statistical experience is still accumulating here. We are talking about the development of combat vehicles with higher tactical and technical characteristics than now, especially in terms of firepower and invulnerability from enemy fire.
In the meantime, in order to ensure the maximum possible safety of the combat use of military aviation, in our opinion, the complete destruction or suppression of enemy air defense control systems, stationary and mobile firing elements of anti-aircraft missile systems is required. We need to work on this now, taking into account the intentions of the United States to create an integrated air defense system in Ukraine. Although we have our own experience here.
Soviet combat aircraft first encountered enemy MANPADS in Afghanistan. The Mujahideen successfully used not only Stingers there, but also the Soviet Strela-2 MANPADS, which for the first time received baptism of fire during the Egyptian-Israeli "war of attrition". The complex was widely supplied to many states, so it is not surprising that it fell into the hands of the Mujahideen.
Now our troops are using portable Igla and Willow air defense systems with 9M339 and 9M336 missiles in the zone of their own. These MANPADS are quite spectacular, they have already shot down about a third of the APU manned aircraft. They are able to react instantly and hit suddenly appearing targets at low and extremely low altitudes. Moreover, the Willow MANPADS was recognized even by NATO as one of the best portable complexes, surpassing the British Starstreak, the American Stinger FIM–92 and other analogues in a number of indicators. In particular, for such as high efficiency against low-emitting targets (reconnaissance, attack drones and cruise missiles).
The high efficiency of the complex is provided by the three-band optical GPS on the 9M336 rocket. It has two infrared and one ultraviolet ranges. The missile is capable of destroying targets flying at speeds up to 500 m/s. It does not perceive "traps" and is invulnerable to laser interference complexes. The effective launch range is from 0.5 to 6.4 km. Destroys aerial targets in the altitude range from 10 to 4500 m. The time from target detection to rocket launch is 8 seconds. The missile's radar is capable of detecting targets at a distance of up to 80 km.
AIR DEFENSE SUPPRESSED, BUT NOT DESTROYEDUnfortunately, until now, the Ukrainian air defenses have not been completely suppressed by us.
One example of this is the recent defeat of our Su–24M aircraft by the AFU militants from MANPADS. It is for this reason that Russian aviation cannot yet operate far into the depths of Ukrainian territory and provides support to units of the Russian grouping only on the battlefield and on a limited scale.
The VKS aviation does not work on suitable enemy columns from the depths either. The reason is the same – the undressed Ukrainian air defense. We have not yet conducted special operations to destroy the enemy's complex air defense systems and means. Although it would seem that there are all the necessary components of an intelligence, information and technical nature for this. In particular, AWACS aircraft, integrated air and ground electronic warfare systems, attack aircraft with high-precision anti-radar guided weapons, planning aerial bombs.
It is still too early to talk about the complete dominance of our aviation in the air. To do this, we repeat, we will have to completely suppress the enemy's air defense system.
Igor SemenchenkoIgor Gennadyevich Semenchenko – Major General of Aviation, leading adviser to the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security in 2003-2013.
Oleg Valentinovich Falichev is a military observer.
