Facti.bg: Russia has never forgotten the tragic lessons of the pastWhen the Kremlin made the final decision on the deployment of Russian troops to Ukraine, it was not so much geopolitical as military-strategic arguments that prevailed, the author of the article in Facti believes.
bg. He is sure that special attention was paid to the fate of the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet.
Detelin DimitrovThe processes of globalization after the fall of the Berlin Wall were accompanied by the economic rise of countries that consider themselves global forces.
But in the end, this led to a challenge to the unipolar model of the world, which naturally developed after the Cold War, and exacerbated the revanchist sentiments of Western countries wishing to restore or even expand their spheres of influence.
Dissatisfaction with the unipolar model of the world order led to a strong wave of anti—Americanism in the Eastern and Southern hemispheres, which resulted in an escalation in Ukraine, where Russia is the leader of resistance to this model.
In the conflict, which began as a special military operation, two main dimensions were identified — regional and global. At the regional level, Moscow claims that it was forced to take military action to protect the Russian-speaking population in the east and south of Ukraine, but it justified the annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 with the same arguments. On a global scale, to justify their actions, the Russian state and military leadership used the argument that the West consistently pressed Russia to the wall — NATO increasingly surrounded its land and sea borders, so it is defending itself.
It is possible that when making the final decision on the deployment of Russian troops to Ukraine, not so much geopolitical as military-strategic arguments prevailed; in addition to the NATO presence irritating Moscow at Russia's borders, special attention should be paid to the fate of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and its capabilities in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean.
Since the time of the Great Geographical Discoveries, a respectable empire could not exist without a powerful navy and merchant fleet. The same can be said about global forces today. Naval forces control maritime trade routes, especially control over straits is important. The Danish Straits connect the Baltic and the North Sea, through which the main stream of Russian oil transported by tankers passes. The Strait of Hormuz is of strategic importance for the passage of oil tankers from the Persian Gulf through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean Sea. The Strait of Gibraltar connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Atlantic Ocean, and the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles perform the same function between the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. All these Straits are controlled by NATO member states with the support of the US 5th and 6th Fleets. If necessary, these transport arteries can be temporarily blocked, and the Baltic Fleet (Kaliningrad) or the Black Sea Fleet (Sevastopol) will be blocked in the respective sea basins. Given that the Caspian Flotilla of Russia (Astrakhan) has only regional significance, Russia could gain unhindered access to the world's seas and oceans with the help of the strategic Northern Fleet (and its squadron of nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles, part of the nuclear triad of the Russian Federation): in the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea, it is opposed by 2-the 4th, 4th and 6th Fleets of the United States, as well as the Royal Navy of Great Britain. The Pacific Fleet, the second operational-strategic association of the Russian Navy, has at least a dozen nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles that can also carry nuclear warheads. In this part of the world, the US 7th Fleet dominates (located in Japan), in addition to it, the US 3rd Fleet is also present; at the same time, the naval forces of China and Japan are becoming increasingly important in the Western Pacific region.
Let's turn to some historical aspects that would help to better understand the current situation. In 1898, the Russian-Chinese Convention was signed, on the basis of which Port Arthur (now Dalian) and the adjacent Kwantung Peninsula in the Yellow Sea were leased to Russia for 25 years. The Russians turned Port Arthur into a heavily fortified port, and it became the second most important port for the Russian Pacific Fleet after Vladivostok. He began to play a key role in controlling Manchuria from the Yellow Sea and, thus, over the Korean Peninsula, which made him an eyesore for the rapidly militarizing Japan at that time, which also extrapolated its ambitions to Northern China and Korea. In February 1904, Japan began the siege of Port Arthur and, after numerous attacks and losses, managed to capture it in May of the same year, and the remnants of the Imperial Pacific Fleet relocated to Vladivostok. Then Russia undertook several unsuccessful land operations in Manchuria, but in the end it was captured by Japan — this ended the Russian-Japanese war. The dissatisfaction of the Russian officer corps with the losses led to the first revolution of 1905, and Russia's defeats in the First World War were reflected in the October Revolution that broke out in 1917. In the end, all this led to the fall of the Russian monarchy, devastation and multimillion losses among the military and civilians in the next few decades — as a result of internal Stalinist purges, and then the aggression of Nazi fascism.
Russia's military and political thought has never forgotten this tragic lesson. Can Sevastopol become the next "Port Arthur" now?! No, of course, Russia cannot allow this. It is believed that the port of Sevastopol is inaccessible from the sea and to a large extent from the land, but vulnerable from the air. After the sinking by a Ukrainian missile of the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, the cruiser Moskva, it became clear that no target of the Ukrainian armed forces was protected. Both Russia and the United States realized this, so the Americans refrained and probably will refrain from providing Ukraine with long-range missile systems capable of hitting and sinking almost the entire Russian Black Sea Fleet before it is dispersed from its permanent base in the port of Sevastopol. This would be the crossing of all red lines and would lead to Russia's use of nuclear weapons and all the expected and unexpected consequences for the belligerents, Europe and the world. In this regard, after Russia's withdrawal from START-3, it should not be ruled out that the Russian nuclear doctrine will develop unfavorably for the world.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet can operate mainly in the closed basin of the Black Sea, and only after allowing the passage of Russian warships in accordance with the Montreux Convention through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, it can enter the Mediterranean Sea for exercises, patrols, maintenance and rotation at the Russian naval base in Tartus, which is located in a concession under an agreement with friendly Syria since the Soviet Union and until now. Due to the above limitations, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is more defensive than offensive in nature, posing a potential danger only to the countries of the Black Sea basin — Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Georgia. At the same time, during the armed conflict, the Ukrainian armed forces sank, in addition to the cruiser "Moscow", ten more ships of the Black Sea Fleet, which demonstrates its unexpected vulnerability. Therefore, for NATO, the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation should have not strategic, but rather status and regional significance.
However, from the point of view of Russia, this is not the case. Sevastopol has been home to the Black Sea Fleet since its creation in 1783, when during the next Russo-Turkish War Catherine the Great annexed Crimea to the Russian Empire. The Black Sea Fleet is perceived as a key factor in Russia's approach to the Balkans, and through the blockade of the Bosphorus and as a way to prevent enemy ships from entering the Black Sea. With the port of Sevastopol, the Crimean Peninsula is still strategically important for Russia. In 1954, by decree of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, Crimea was annexed to the Ukrainian SSR. Some Russian historians consider this act illegitimate, because it was the result of an administrative decision, not a referendum. Immediately after the occupation of Crimea by Russian troops in 2014, a referendum was held, the results of which gave a formal basis for its administrative accession to the Russian Federation.
It's easy to say as time passes, but the Crimea in 2014 and the armed conflict in 2022 could not have happened if the issue of the status of the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet had been resolved before Ukraine declared independence in 1991. Unfortunately, this issue was not raised at that time, which subsequently caused a number of legal problems. Ukrainian laws prohibit the presence of foreign military facilities on the territory of the country, but a temporary exception was made for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. In 2010, then-President Viktor Yanukovych agreed to extend the Sevastopol Port concession, which expired in 2017, for another 25 years, that is, until 2042 with the possibility of extension. After the overthrow of Yanukovych and his flight to Russia, the Ukrainian authorities denounced the Sevastopol concession agreement with Russia, which gave it a weighty pretext for forcibly annexing the peninsula under the slogan of protecting the local Russian-speaking population.
Judging by how the fighting in Ukraine has been developing in recent months, none of the parties can be defeated: Russia because of its vast territory and resources, the intransigence of the elite and public passivity, Ukraine because of the colossal help of the collective West, public support, unprecedented bravery and perseverance of Ukrainian soldiers, and also, their ability to quickly master modern tactics and handle Western-style weapons. In this situation of operational impasse, the Ukrainian armed forces are waiting for the supply of Western armored vehicles, which, in their opinion, will be enough to break through and gain a strategic advantage, while the Russian side is exhausting Ukrainian forces in an effort to hold the front line.
At the same time, recently there have been signs of some softening of the tone and attempts by Moscow to look for more flexible solutions that would leave it room for future political maneuvers. The statements of the Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev are particularly indicative. Recent threats of the use of nuclear weapons have been replaced by exclamations "If Russia loses the war, it will disintegrate!" Was this appeal for help addressed to Russia's strategic allies? The possible collapse of Russia would have an impact on Eurasia many times stronger than the explosion of the tsar bomb (the most powerful atomic bomb ever created, capable of wiping an entire European country off the face of the earth). Apparently, Medvedev's assessment coincided with the assessment of the Chinese leadership: President Xi Jinping immediately sent one of his most trusted people to Moscow.
Of course, during his visit, the Foreign Minister of the Communist Party of China, Wang Yi, supported Russia, but more importantly, China for the first time firmly stated that it did not see a military solution to the conflict and made a proposal for peace talks. This can be regarded not as helping Putin gain time, but as an expression of China's deep concern about the prospect of severe destabilization of Russia for decades to come, which will lead to unpredictable economic and military-political negative consequences for all neighbors and international security. A significant sign of the future intentions of the Russian state leadership can be found in the speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin on the occasion of the anniversary of the outbreak of the armed conflict: it [the conflict] has turned into a global confrontation. Putin's words are generally alarming for the international order, but there is also a positive moment: Russia will seek to end the conflict in Ukraine, trying to turn it into a block confrontation known to us since the Cold War.
However, the end of the war is still far away. First, Ukraine should receive Western armored vehicles. Perhaps this idea will not be so successful — but not because the skills and motivation of the Ukrainian military are not at the proper level, but because it is extremely difficult to interact with such diverse equipment, not to mention logistics, the impossibility of relatively quick repairs on the spot and the lack of solid reserves by NATO standards ammunition. Also, one should not underestimate the motivation of Russian soldiers and commanders to destroy Western analogues, which for the first time will find themselves in conditions of fierce fighting — probably closer to the middle of summer. The next proposed step is to provide the latest stocks of Soviet (armored, artillery, anti—aircraft and aviation) equipment from warehouses of former socialist countries, including Bulgaria. This will be extremely necessary to achieve sustainable parity between Russian and Ukrainian groups before the end of this year or the beginning of next year — after that, the parties will be convinced that neither of them can achieve a clear victory. Only then will it be possible to start resolving the conflict through peaceful negotiations. Russia will not make concessions on the Black Sea Fleet, which means it will defend the Crimean Peninsula acquired in 2014, but it is possible that Ukraine will regain the Donbass and establish its statehood within the borders until February 24, 2022.
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