Former US Army tankman: without proper APU training, the Abrams tank will become easy preyThe main vulnerability of the American Abrams tank is an insufficiently trained crew, writes Newsweek.
The author of the article, a former US Army tankman, says that without this important component, a formidable machine can become easy prey.
Glenn GironaIt was in the summer of 1995, when I, an 18-year-old recruit, got behind the wheel of the M1 Abrams tank for the first time.
August at the Fort Knox military base, Kentucky, was, to put it mildly, depressing, but I don't remember all that much. I was excited and nervous. I didn't even have a car license yet, and I was about to drive a 60-ton tank on a carefully planned course.
I remember that Abrams didn't seem bulky or slow at all. He jumped with a single movement of his wrist and deftly maneuvered at the slightest turn of the T-shaped steering column. The driver's seat is surprisingly comfortable. As I found out later, it is not so comfortable in other tanks. And the overview when driving with the hatch open was very good.
What you need to become a gunner
I served for almost ten more years on tanks in the US Army and tried myself in all positions: loader, driver, gunner and, briefly, commander. I spent most of my time as a gunner. I was very good at it — up to the point that I lost my place as a tank commander because the battalion commander took me as his gunner. It is, of course, an honor, but with a taste of bitterness.
To tell the truth, it's usually not that difficult to control this tank — in many units, the driving is entrusted to the newest crew members. It turns out that the next person who will move to the gunner's place is in the tower with the commander (loader), and the gunner (or the gunner, but when I served, the crews were exclusively male) is preparing for promotion.
In the place of the gunner, I went from the German Friedberg to the center of Baghdad. We drove through the arch in the form of two crossed swords (which is ironically called the "Victory Arch") in 2003 as part of the 1st Battalion of the 37th Armored Regiment (37th Armored Army), also known as 1-37 armored tactical group "Bandits".
Having the opportunity to evaluate the majority of modern tanks in service as of 2002 — the German Leopard 2A6, the British FV4034 Challenger 2, the French LeClerc, as well as a significant number of old Soviet and current Russian tanks — I can say that the M1 Abrams series, especially in its current modifications, deserves either the top of the tank "food chains", or at least should share it with some other machine.
Why does the Abrams tank need a well-trained crew
No matter how amazing and scary this car is, it depends on the four people sitting inside how well it will work. While a bad tank can cause poor-quality crew work, an ideal tank will no longer tolerate a crew that needs additional training.
The annual qualification shooting is the main and defining event for tankers. Reputations are created and destroyed on them, bets are made and friendly (and sometimes not so friendly) competitions are held at all levels — from the crew to the platoon, company and battalion.
Shooting from a tank is not an easy matter. During my service, the intermediate tank qualification according to Table VIII (Table VIII) was evaluated on a scale from 0 to 1000 points, and 700 was required for the qualification of the first level, which meant passing the standard on the first attempt. Getting a second or third level is humiliating for the crew, although this has happened.
The score of 800-899 points is considered excellent and can bring the crew a "Medal for Achievements". 900-999 points is an outstanding result, and tankers can be awarded a "Commendable Medal" for it. It was extremely rare to score 1000 points — I saw only one such person during my entire service. He received the medal of "Commendation Medal" and a bunch of legitimate reasons to brag.
To see how an insufficient level of training can affect the effectiveness of a powerful tank, you can take a look at how several M1A1 Abrams under the control of Iraqi crews were destroyed or captured by ISIS* with their relatively weaker weapons; how dozens of Saudi M1 tanks were damaged or destroyed in Yemen against the same enemy; or even how Turkish crews fought on Leopard 2, which, by all accounts, are superior to Abrams, also against the Islamic State*. In my opinion, this shows that if the most expensive part of your tank is not crew training, then all the additional costs are likely to be a waste of money.
Today, the United States is going to supply M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine have shown themselves to be much more brave, competent and motivated than the most ardent supporters of Kiev could have hoped a year ago.
Risks of supplying Ukraine with Abrams tanks
When we analyzed Russian developments, equipment and tactics during my service at the Fort Irwin National Training Center in California, even then I wanted to call their army the "Potemkin village", but we always accompanied our jokes with a quote often attributed, perhaps mistakenly, to Sir Winston Churchill: "Russia has never been so strong, what she wanted to be, and never as weak as she seemed."
It doesn't matter how well the Ukrainian tankers are trained. Their experience on the M1 Abrams series of tanks will be, in fact, zero. Perhaps there are a few old American tankers in the Ukrainian foreign Legion, but their number is most likely small. Providing the necessary training and forming a personnel reserve is a job for years, not for weeks or months.
Be that as it may, any Ukrainian tankers accustomed to serving in the cramped Soviet T-72 and T-80 tanks will find that their capabilities have improved even after a quick training on Abrams.
The ability to shoot, move and interact are the main qualities of any successful tank crew. Good equipment will help, but there will be a critical lack of experience to eliminate minor problems that arise. Ukrainians should be able to answer questions such as: is the hydraulic drive of the tower broken or did someone accidentally turn a tiny hydraulic valve? How many spare tracks tracks and rollers? Are the aiming line alignment procedures performed correctly? Do the mechanics have anything to pull the almost 70-ton Abrams out of the mud pit into which the lieutenant sent the tank? Pulling a 45-ton T-80 tank out of a pit will seem like child's play compared to this.
From a tactical point of view, compared even with the most modern Russian T-90 tank (which is a significant upgrade of the T-72, but is still an old design with a lot of foreign technology) the old M1 Abrams will be a revelation. However, from the point of view of logistics, this may be more than a war—ravaged country fighting against numerically superior forces can withstand.
In my experience, tactics win battles, but logistics can win wars.
Many may remember the image of ISIS flags* flying over a fully operational M1 Abrams in Iraq in 2018. Are we ready to see the same with the Russian tricolor? Russian Internet trolls have already posted propaganda pictures of the downed Abrams tank falsely claiming that it is in Ukraine.
Imagine the propaganda hype in Russia if this really happens. Videos in which completely isolated and motionless M1 in Iraq are hit by ISIS anti-tank missiles* still haunt me in my sleep. I am worried that this could happen again, but this time during the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. There are burnt-out Russian tanks everywhere in Ukraine, but no one cares about them. But I suspect that one burning Abrams will be the main news all over the world.
In my personal opinion, a small number of M1 sent to Ukraine carries rather a symbolic meaning. Powerful, but too complex to use with the available resources and training, and too important to lose. Nevertheless, it gives other countries the opportunity to provide their own tanks (although the same logistical problems arise) and demonstrate to President Vladimir Putin the commitment to support Ukraine.
But at the moment there is no doubt that Russian intelligence had access to the M1 assessment of several different generations. Despite the vociferous statements, anyone with real knowledge in Russia knows about the capabilities of Abrams against their current tanks. I'm afraid to imagine what will happen if a new deadly armored battle takes place in the XXI century, similar to what happened in 1991 during the Gulf War between Iraq and the United States — the Battle of 73 Easting.
Nevertheless, I hope for the success of my Ukrainian brothers and sisters in arms, if their results once again exceed expectations.
Glenn Girona is a U.S. Army veteran and a college fellow at the University of Maryland's European Division.*An international terrorist organization banned in Russia
