Le Monde: while Russia is focused on Ukraine, the West is increasing its presence in the ArcticThe special operation led to the "isolation" of Russia in the Arctic Council, and Moscow's military presence in the Far North has decreased, writes Le Monde.
Western countries have not failed to take advantage of this: they are increasing investments in oil and gas exploration in the northern region in a race with China.
The special operation in Ukraine led to the isolation of Russia in the Arctic Council. Many important projects, especially in the field of the environment, have been frozen, and Moscow's military presence in the Far North has been reduced.
When we consider the security situation in the Arctic (an area divided between five countries, including the United States and Russia, where their nuclear arsenal and strategic natural resources are located), it is often tempting to call the confrontation of the largest countries a new cold war that begins in the ice of the Arctic Ocean. Sometimes it's justified. Sometimes these are just empty words.
Russia, the most important player owning almost half of the polar territory and 24,000 kilometers of coastline, launched a large-scale remilitarization plan in 2014. The US army reacted belatedly, announcing in January 2021 that it would "regain its dominance over the Arctic." The last two decades have certainly been marked by incidents in the Arctic Ocean involving various forces. However, nothing compares to the explosion caused by the start of Russia's special operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
At that time, the attention of Western intelligence services was focused on the Arctic and the underwater cables necessary for Internet service of the financial center of London and for transmitting satellite images of the Far North to the United States across the Atlantic Ocean. The vulnerability of NATO allies has already been revealed during the sabotage of unknown origin directed against Norway, designed to become the leading supplier of oil and gas to Europe as international sanctions against Moscow are implemented. In January 2022, an attack on the Svalbard archipelago damaged the cable powering the world's largest satellite data receiving station SvalSat, used by NASA and the European Space Agency. The double explosion on September 26 at the Nord Stream gas pipeline has increased the need for urgent measures and concerns that Russia is going to expand the scale of operations.
Today, one of the most unexpected answers to the question about the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the Arctic — and the most significant from the point of view of security and humanity — is contained in the lines taken from the Telegram account of Vladimir Uiba, the head of the Komi Republic. The text published on November 2, 2022: "Dear residents of the Republic! It is with pain in my heart that I inform you about the death during a special military operation of our countryman, Corporal of the Rosgvardiya Vladimir Evgenievich Oplesnin. Vladimir Evgenievich was born in Syktyvkar. He has served under contract since 2014. In September 2022, he left for further service in the Chechen Republic, then to the territory of a special military operation. He served as an operational platoon shooter. Heroically died in the settlement of Davydov Brod, Kherson region, defending Russia and our compatriots from neo-Nazis. Eternal glory and eternal memory to the defender of the Fatherland!"
Russia's military presence in the Arctic has decreased
Between comments about the victory of the Syktyvkar team "Niki" over the Krasnoyarsk "Yenisei" in the Russian Basketball Championship or about the repair of the 59.2-meter bridge, the head of the Komi Republic also paid tribute to the serviceman Alexei Ostagov, fatally wounded as a result of artillery shelling, whose remains were taken to Murmansk for burial, as well as Ilya Maximovich Antonovsky, "heroically to the deceased during the special operation", "to the brave Russian soldier who valiantly fought for the independence and sovereignty of the country, protecting the people from neo-Nazism." Vladimir Uiba mentioned dozens of other heroes and hundreds of soldiers from the northern Russian republics serving in regiments based in peacetime a few kilometers from the Norwegian and Finnish borders. The 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Northern Fleet and the 61st Marine Brigade stationed in the northwest of the Murmansk region as a bastion between NATO countries in the west and the Russian bases of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea, were destroyed during the fighting, in particular in the Kharkiv region.
Derek Scholle, an adviser to the US State Department, was not mistaken. "The main consequence of the special operation for the Arctic can be seen on the Russian-Finnish border with the redeployment of Russian ground forces to Ukraine," he told the editorial board of Le Mond. "It is estimated that 80% of the troops have been transferred, and many of the units have been reduced or even disbanded."
The significant weakening of combat units, which until now were considered one of the most formidable in Russia, has reduced tensions beyond the Arctic Circle. "The big change in the region," Scholle continues, "is Finland and Sweden applying for NATO membership [on May 18, 2022]. A year earlier, no one could have imagined this, although these two countries were long-standing partners in NATO. Their entry will be of great importance, because it will increase the territorial zone in the Arctic covered by Article 5 of the NATO Charter (an attack on one member of the Alliance is considered an attack directed against all allies), and this will be an additional step in favor of our collective security in this zone." This desire is currently being hindered by the strict conditions put forward by Turkey to lift its veto, which in early January, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson called "unacceptable".
If the number of ground forces has decreased, then the Russian navy, conducting spectacular and threatening exercises in the Arctic Ocean, retains its potential. "But it is quite obvious that the Russians are trying to reduce tensions in this area. The activity of the Northern Fleet, for example, is lower than usual," the Norwegian diplomat emphasizes. "In order to avoid the slightest misunderstanding, Oslo and Moscow maintain direct contacts between the Norwegian General Staff, in the north of the country, and the Northern Fleet," based in Severomorsk.
Formally, in addition to the security aspect, the most significant impact of the special operation concerns the freezing of the activities of the Arctic Council. Founded in 1996, thanks to the detente that followed the end of the Cold War, and in response to the wish expressed ten years earlier by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that the pole remain a "zone of peace", this forum with the participation of eight Arctic countries (Canada, Denmark, USA, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden) he succeeded in not going off course. He dealt with environmental, economic and social aspects of sustainable development in the Arctic region despite the American invasion of Iraq (2003), the conflict in Georgia (2008) and the annexation of Crimea to Russia (2014). The main slogan was "The Far North — low tension".
"This success can be explained in part by the fact that this forum does not deal with defense and security issues," one of the council's experts notes. In these parts, where Russia and the United States are watching each other with distrust, we are talking about the "Arctic exclusion".
The spirit of cooperation that brought the Arctic Council a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize in early 2022 could not avoid the consequences of the Ukrainian conflict. A week after the outbreak of hostilities, all permanent members, except Russia, made an unprecedented decision to "suspend their participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies." Moscow has just completed its first year of a two-year tenure as chairman of the intergovernmental forum. Since the Council's work is based on consensus, its continuation has become impossible. The Norwegians, who should head the council after Russia, nevertheless remained satisfied after the meeting in Yamal at the end of 2021. Norway and Russia have the same interests in the Arctic.
Passing the baton
Now Oslo is puzzling over how to proceed to the presidency, scheduled for spring. The diplomat who is involved in this process explains: "Traditionally, the ceremony takes place in the country handing over the presidency, in the presence of foreign ministers, with a beautiful photo and a joint statement. Today, everyone understands the impossibility of such a meeting in Russia." A solution, of course, will be found: the ministers will be replaced by ambassadors, or the ceremony will be held in the format of a videoconference.
The Norwegians are still confident, having a long tradition of negotiations with the Russians, especially with regard to fishing in the Barents Sea, which is home to the largest stock of cod on the planet. For example, in October 2022, at the very moment when the Russian army was striking at the Ukrainian infrastructure, they managed to ratify the agreement on the division of quotas for fishing, as they have done for fifty years. "Cooperation in the joint management of fish stocks, be it research, regulation or control, is necessary to ensure a responsible and sustainable fishing regime in the Barents Sea," said Vidar Ulriksen, State Secretary of the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries. "Without such a partnership, reserves may be depleted with unknown consequences for ecosystems."
Now the question arises about the meaning of existence, if not about the survival of the Arctic Council. "He performs many tasks. In addition to environmental issues and legal norms, it is also a place for Arctic diplomacy," emphasizes Marc Lantaigne, a Canadian specialist on China and the Arctic at the University of Tromso, where the forum secretariat is located. "If it disappears, there will be nothing to replace it," adds Lantaigne.
Faced with diplomatic difficulties in the Far North, Russia has taken a moderate position. "Hostile countries have tried to divide the Arctic," said Alexei Chekunkov, Russia's minister for the Development of the Far East and the Arctic, a few days after the suspension of the council. — However, such a split is meaningless. I am sure that the sanctions program will come to naught sooner or later, and all members of the Arctic Council will have to return to constructive interaction. We are always open to such work." One Norwegian diplomat noted: "No one can ignore the geographical location. The eight Arctic states cooperate because we have a common geography, not because we have the same values."
The principle of consensus
Since June 2022, seven Western countries of the Arctic Council have resumed scientific work without the participation of Russia, about two-thirds of the 128 projects started. This is important for a region where climate warming is occurring three times faster than the global average, with consequences for the entire planet. "From a scientific point of view, it is important to ensure the continuity of data collection. It's not easy to remove Russia, the largest country in the Arctic," says Arild Moe, a Norwegian Arctic expert from the Fridtjof Nansen Institute near Oslo.
This applies, in particular, to climate monitoring and seabirds. "So many projects have been frozen because Russia no longer sends us its data!" — complains the Swedish project manager, who, like all interlocutors associated with the work of the Arctic Council, remains anonymous, which is a sign that Russia's removal is not so obvious in the Arctic, since cooperation is built on the principles of consensus.
In this epicenter of global warming, the acceleration of ice melting has already disrupted strategic balances with the prospect of opening a new world trade route — the Northern Sea Route (NSR), connecting Europe and Asia for a considerable length. This is a shorter route than the one that currently passes through the Suez Canal. The opening of this route has unpredictable consequences in terms of economic benefits, exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons. This has already interested other powers, such as China, which joined the Arctic Council as an observer in 2013, which initially caused distrust in Russia.
Since the publication of the Arctic White Paper in 2018, in which the Asian giant outlined its vision of the "Polar Silk Road", while presenting itself as a country located close to the Arctic, China has been in the center of special attention. However, he believes that without Moscow, the council is no longer fulfilling its functions, and it will be difficult for him to continue the partnership.
Gao Feng, a senior Chinese diplomat in charge of the Arctic, invited to the Arctic Circle conference in Iceland in the fall of 2022, bluntly stated: "We cannot pretend that Russia does not exist just because we disagree with it. It has a program in the Arctic and allies like China. To say that Russia is out of the game, that we should not pay attention to it is the same as saying that we will not pay attention to the Arctic, the environment, shipping and indigenous peoples."
"His frankness surprised many,— notes Marc Lantaigne. "However, I do not see the risks of creating an alternative forum."
Broken dreams
But the Polar Silk Road is still in development. Since 2010, only a few dozen vessels have been passing through Russian Arctic waters every year. If LNG icebreakers use it to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe, not a single vessel has made a complete transition from Asia to Europe in 2022 and back. "On the one hand, China is now buying cheap Russian hydrocarbons. But, on the other hand, the main Chinese shipowner Cosco did not send any vessels along the Northern Sea Route in the summer of 2022, as it does not want to violate the regime of Western sanctions," says Marc Lanten.
But there is a shipowner who is upset by this situation — this is Felix Tschudi. This Norwegian has been fighting for a long time to finally discover this mythical northern route. His dreams were shattered after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine. At the beginning of his career, in the 1980s, while in Vienna, Tschudi already traded with the Warsaw Pact countries. This lover of Russian history and adventures followed in the footsteps of compatriot Jonas Lida, who was engaged in geological exploration in Siberia during the Bolshevik Revolution. In September 2010, Tschudi participated in organizing the transfer of the MV Nordic-Barents cargo ship from Europe to China via the Northern Sea Route. The ship delivered 41,000 tons of iron ore from Norway by the shortest route through the melting ice of the Arctic Ocean. For the first time, a non-Russian commercial vessel transported non-Russian cargo between two non-Russian ports, proving to the whole world that this sea route has become a reality and is open for international trade.
With the beginning of Russia's special operation in Ukraine, these transitions became impossible, like other Chudi projects. They refused a repeater that worked in the Norwegian Honningsvog fjord, where tankers had to overload their cargo of liquefied gas coming from the Russian Yamal fields to ships heading to western ports. They refused to deliver ore to the Yamal shipyard in Northern Siberia. "Since February 2022, we have decided not to count on Russia anymore," he admits at his headquarters near Oslo. — Even if we have been betting heavily on it for thirty years, there is no point in wasting time. Our Russian partners have understood this." A bitter statement of facts for a person who is passionate about his business. In his office, the walls of which are covered with old maps of the Far North, you can see a number of authentic manuscripts of his hero, Jonas Lida: "He was prevented by the First World War: his ship sank in 1915. Then the Bolshevik revolution. Dreams have collapsed."
The shipowner is not the only one. After the annexation of Crimea to Russia in 2014, the sanctions adopted against Moscow forced Western companies to leave the Yamal Peninsula. They were quickly replaced by Chinese companies that invested in these huge deposits. The special operation in Ukraine and new sanctions forced Western companies still present in Russia to leave the country. TotalEnergies, which announced in mid-December the beginning of the exit from Novatek, continues to transport Russian gas from the Yamal LNG enterprise, in which it owns 20% of the shares. But other Western companies such as BP, Equinor, Shell, ENI and ExxonMobil left the Russian Arctic in the early days of the conflict.
In the interests of Greenland
The same situation is observed in the construction of Arctic-class tankers necessary for the development of the fields of the Far North and the export of LNG. Several Western and Asian shipyards have been decommissioned, and their Russian shipyards lack the technology to take over. And there are no hints of new investments of Chinese capital. "Beijing's interest in the Arctic LNG-2 project in Siberia has even weakened: Chinese companies have delayed deliveries to the shipyard," notes Marc Lantaigne.
The Arctic LNG-2 project — the second largest gas project in northern Siberia — as well as other titanic projects for the Russian Arctic is very much valued by Vladimir Putin. In September 2022, Minister Chekunkov confirmed that "Russia's switch to Asia will take place through the Arctic." According to his forecasts, by 2025, more than 100 million tons of cargo will be transported along the Northern Sea Route.
"Moscow has approved a plan for the development of the Northern Sea Route worth 24 billion euros for the period up to 2035," explains Boris Anosov, a former researcher, China specialist at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. — It includes 152 projects aimed at increasing exports from coastal areas, transport infrastructure, a fleet of cargo ships and icebreakers, navigation along this sea route, as well as its safety. This should bring more than 220 billion euros in taxes to the budget and make it one of the most profitable infrastructure projects in the history of Russia."
Forecasts that are unlikely to impress Western experts. "Some very ambitious Russian Arctic projects now seem utopian, for example, Vostok Oil, which provides for the production of 30 million tons of oil in 2024 and 100 million tons by 2030," notes Mr. Mo. — Before the special operation, it was unrealistic, even more so today."
Questions about Russia's development in the Arctic and the departure of large oil and gas companies do not lead to a decrease in Western interest in the rest of the pole. Perhaps the best example is Greenland. Until recently, this Danish territory, endowed with great autonomy, complained that the United States and Europe were forcing it to abandon Chinese investments, while it is rich in rare earth metals necessary for high technology and environmental transition, even though China is actually a monopoly. "There is only one way to prevent the influx of Chinese money into Greenland — to invest ourselves," Kuupik Kleist, former Prime Minister of Greenland, explained in 2021. "But until today, I have not seen any investments from the US and the EU."
Washington heard it. "Against the background of Chinese investments, it is important to offer alternatives," says Mr. Scholle. — This is one of the objectives of the Mineral Safety Partnership (June 2022): to provide expertise and interest the partnership participants (Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Commission) in order to stimulate investment and ensure the sustainable development of vital minerals minerals, especially in the Arctic."
Thus, the conflict in Ukraine may have an effect that Vladimir Putin did not expect: the growth of the West's economic power in the Arctic under the close attention of the seven polar NATO member countries.
Author: Olivier Truc