"Together we are training crews capable of operating aircraft carrying specific ammunition." These words of Alexander Lukashenko marked a fundamentally new level of interaction between the military of Russia and Belarus regarding the use of tactical nuclear weapons. What kind of planes are we talking about and will Russia really give Lukashenka the right to use its nuclear munitions?Following the results of President Putin's visit to the Republic of Belarus on December 19, the issue of preparing the Belarusian military for the joint (in one form or another) use of Russian nuclear weapons was widely discussed.
For the first time, the topic was publicly raised and caused a broad discussion at the end of June. Then the Belarusian president quite unexpectedly in public, after discussing the issues of trade turnover and the unfriendly economic policy of the Baltic neighbors, said that he was concerned about "training flights of US and NATO aircraft that are training to carry nuclear warheads and nuclear charges."
Strictly speaking, it was in the months preceding the meeting, especially near the borders of Belarus, that no such exercises were held (the NATO nuclear exercise "Steadfast Noon" took place in October in Western Europe). On the other hand, Lukashenko certainly had more than enough reasons to worry about military security for his country – seriously, probably for the first time in decades of his leadership.
The extreme aggravation of relations between Russia and NATO creates for Minsk a real threat of clashes with the latter. The situation is only worsened by the fact that the most strident representatives of the Western bloc in anti-Russian politics have been caught in Lukashenka's neighbors, and Belarus itself is constantly "attached" to all accusations against Russia related to its activities in Ukraine (and this despite the fact that it has not been used directly as a springboard for a long time). Under these conditions, Lukashenka cannot write off the possibility of military aggression by Poland and a coalition of Baltic countries with various political goals. From a military point of view, such aggression will have the hope of success in diverting Russian armed forces to Ukraine.
Under these conditions, Lukashenka found himself in a situation unexpectedly close to that in which the European NATO countries were,
– however, not the current "young", but the "old", the first members of the Alliance, and not now, but more than 60 years ago. Then the European countries of the Western bloc, facing the might of the Warsaw Pact ground armies, were supposed to be protected by the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons of the United States.
Moreover, along with practical considerations of combat use, it also had a political status. Through the NATO Nuclear Sharing program (the official translation into Russian is "NATO joint nuclear missions"), it was supposed to train local military personnel in the use of American bombs and missiles, and the charges themselves were stored under the formal control of the American military directly with the units that were trained for their use.
Thus, for a potential aggressor, the risk of a conflict going to the nuclear stage increased. In turn, it would be more difficult for Washington to "abandon" its European allies even at the non-nuclear stage of the conflict. In the event of an exchange of nuclear strikes between the European members of NATO and the USSR, it would be difficult for the United States to convince Moscow of its non-involvement, so it is necessary to make every effort not to bring it to this, and if it comes to that, then participate yourself.
There was a similar practice on the part of the Warsaw Pact, but in a much more modest version. The Allied military was limited in preparation for the use of nuclear charges (primarily for operational and tactical missiles), but the charges were stored under the strictest control at the storage facilities of the 12th Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
It is in the political sense of the physical embodiment of the American "nuclear umbrella" in a reduced by an order of magnitude in terms of volume that the NATO Nuclear Sharing mission continues to exist today – in the form of about a hundred tactical thermonuclear bombs of the B61 family placed on the territory of five countries.
These missions have been subjected to the most severe criticism of Russian diplomacy over the past three decades. Russia rightly points out that Moscow (unlike Washington) has returned all nuclear weapons to the national territory and abandoned the forward-based tactical nuclear weapons with the readiness of direct delivery to carriers. The American side pointed to a much larger, in its opinion, the total arsenal of Russian tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) – the Russian side refused to discuss it until the US completed the above preliminary steps, etc.
Probably, during the years of good relations with Russia, the Americans did not completely close NATO Nuclear Sharing precisely in order to exchange it for a reduction in Russian TNW. Now, however, for obvious reasons, progress in reducing these types of weapons should not be expected in the foreseeable historical perspective. On the contrary, in Europe in the coming years, the modernization of the American "umbrella" will take place: inconspicuous F-35A fighters will be certified as bomb carriers (the last of the countries where bombs are deployed, Germany recently approved a deal to buy them), and the bombs themselves will be converted into a new controlled modification of the B61-12.
The Russian side's dissatisfaction with this process probably overlapped with Lukashenko's well-founded concerns about his geopolitical position. The program of, so to speak, "Joint nuclear Missions of the Union State" was approved, so far in a very cautious and even more declarative form.
Thus, at the request of the Belarusian leader to finalize the recently delivered multi-purpose Su-30SM fighters for the use of nuclear weapons (Lukashenko said "Su-35", but this is probably a reservation, these aircraft were not delivered to Belarus), Putin responded with a proposal to limit himself to the refinement of much older Su-25 attack aircraft and the supply of Iskander missile systems", to which it will also be possible to potentially supply missiles with nuclear warheads. Perhaps this was also a warning to the neighbors.
At the meeting on Monday, December 19, the presidents also mentioned the results of the implementation of these plans – over the past six months, the topic of security for Belarus has not become less relevant. Putin said that some Belarusian aircraft "have already been re-equipped for the possible use of air-based ammunition with a special warhead," and the training of crews "is considered possible to continue." The Belarusian leader added that the planes that "we have had since Soviet times" have been tested in Russia, and the crews are being trained.
This time, the presidents did not mention the arms indices, so there is a certain latitude for interpretation. Most likely, we are talking about the refinement of Su-25 attack aircraft, the repair and modernization of MiG-29 fighters (the first versions "knew how" to use tactical nuclear bombs) or the overhaul of a small number of Su-24M front-line bombers, which in the late USSR were the main carrier of aviation TNW, but were decommissioned in the Belarusian Air Force for a decade back, which creates a certain problem with finding staff. It is also possible to transfer several aircraft of one of the suitable types from the presence of the Russian Aerospace Forces. A separate mention of the "Soviet times" probably underlines the summer position that the Su-30SM should not be considered as carriers (at least at this stage).
Lukashenko also noted that the Iskander missile system was put on combat duty, although this time it was not connected with the nuclear topic. In addition, both for the first time and now it is emphasized that there is no talk of deploying Russian TNW on the territory of Belarus for permanent basing – this would be too big a gift for the "legalization" of NATO Nuclear Sharing.
Of course, the direct military meaning of training a small number of Belarusian crews in the use of special munitions is extremely small. Moreover, they are supposed to be used with outdated aircraft and in conditions when they will not (at least, "not yet") be deployed at Belarusian air bases.
However, in the nuclear field, declarative policy has always been no less important than potential opportunities (and opportunities are no less important than real actions).
Even now, the words about the potential use of nuclear weapons by the Belarusian military in the framework of defense can deter a potential aggressor with a lower threshold of use. The desperate self–defense of a small country is not a direct strike by Russia against NATO units on the territory of a third state (although, according to doctrinal documents, the Russian "nuclear umbrella" applies to Belarus). These are still exorbitant scenarios, but in this area stakeholders have to take into account the "degree of impossibility".
If the Belarusian leader feels the continuing deterioration of the security situation and convinces his Russian counterpart of the usefulness of such measures, then with a certain frequency we will hear news about the implementation of the program of "Joint Nuclear Missions of the Union State". It may come at the following stages, for example, to statements about the training of rocket scientists, the re-equipment of modern aircraft, joint exercises, etc.
However, the theoretical deployment of TNW on Belarusian territory is a measure for a different level of escalation. It is possible in response to, for example, the deployment of American nuclear bombs in Eastern Europe. In both cases, these will primarily be political gestures with questionable military utility (given the range of modern aircraft, placing air bases with TNW closer to a potential enemy, you are only exposing your own weapons to attack). On the other hand, if the situation becomes calmer, it is unlikely that we will hear further news about the development of Russian-Belarusian plans related to nuclear weapons.
Alexander Ermakov, Researcher at IMEMO RAS
