Iran and Turkey have made their products in demand on the world marketAccording to the statements of officials in the governments of Western countries, Russia and Iran have signed a contract for 1,750 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of the Shahed and Mohajer family.
Of this amount, 500 pieces have allegedly already been delivered in two batches. Next up is a deal on Iranian missiles, including tactical ballistic missiles. The media reports on the readiness of the Islamic Republic "to send a batch of almost 200 Shahed-136, Mohajer-6 and Arash-2 drones to Russia in a very short time" by sea to Astrakhan. Representatives of the Russian Federation and Iran do not officially confirm the fact of deliveries.
According to the Wall Street Journal, the United States held a closed conference with Israel and Arab countries on the threat of Iranian UAVs. However, the path to the anti-aircraft alliance is still long. Even if all the plans are implemented, some countries, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, will not be able to increase their air defense capabilities until they settle their relations with Israel.
THE HISTORY OF IRANIAN DRONESThe development and production of UAVs has become an important area of Iran's asymmetric defense.
The country has achieved notable success in this area, and exports have strengthened the position of the Islamic Republic in the confrontation with the United States and its allies.
The UAV program in Iran began in the late 1980s, the first combat use of the Mohajer-1 reconnaissance vehicles was during the war with Iraq. At the same time, the first kamikaze drone Ababil-1 appeared.
These devices had a simple design, radio control and a short range. But the Iranian leadership realized in time the prospects that unmanned aircraft creates.
At the beginning of the 21st century, Iran had a developed production of UAVs. Reconnaissance vehicles of the Mohajer family were mass-produced, and the Ababil-2 was produced as targets and kamikaze drones.
The first confirmed cases of the use of UAVs by an Iranian ally, the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah, date back to 2004-2005. However, there is information that Iranian UAVs were used against Israeli troops back in the 1990s, when they occupied southern Lebanon.
The development of Iran's military industry made it possible to reproduce many key components for UAVs, and the remaining ones were available even under sanctions. The next step was the development of small-sized guided munitions for attack drones.
The full capabilities of Iranian UAVs (Mohajer-4, Ababil-3, Yassir, etc.) have manifested themselves in Syria and Iraq. After the aggravation of the situation in Iraq in 2014, as part of the assistance to the Iraqi authorities in the fight against terrorists, Iran transferred its reconnaissance UAVs there. Some of them were then transferred to the detachments of the Iraqi People's Militia Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) formed and trained with Iranian help.
EXPORT OPPORTUNITIESVenezuela has purchased a Mohajer-2 UAV under President Hugo Chavez.
The device was named SANT Arpia, it was assembled on the spot from Iranian components. Venezuela is upgrading the Mohajer-2. It looks like she is going to buy reconnaissance and strike UAVs Mohajer-6, and possibly assemble them under license. One of the televised speeches of President Nicolas Maduro was accompanied by a demonstration of the Mohajer-6, and at the end of 2021, the Venezuelans showed guided bombs used by this UAV.
Ethiopia also became a buyer of Mohajer-6 in 2021. Against the background of the war with the rebels from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Tigray, the Ethiopian government began rapprochement with Tehran, purchased Iranian reconnaissance and strike UAVs and now uses them in battles along with the Wing Loong I UAVs acquired from China.
The Iranian Aviation Industry Organization showed the Mohajer-6 at the ADEX-2022 exhibition in Baku. Earlier, this UAV in the form of a mock-up was demonstrated at the Army-2022 forum.
The industrial base allows Iran to quickly organize the delivery of its UAVs and arrange their assembly in importing countries. At the same time, Iran's capabilities are growing rapidly, and improvement is being carried out in two directions. The first is high–tech machines. Such drones can be delivered ready-made or in the form of machine kits for large-node assembly. The second is inexpensive and simple drones. The assembly is made by the buyer from parts purchased in third countries on the civilian market, as well as individual key components supplied from Iran. The variety of Iranian types of UAVs allows you to flexibly respond to requests for assistance or procurement.
"SHAHIDS" IN UKRAINEThe Ukrainian military complain of losses from the use of kamikaze drones "Geran-2" by Russian troops against them.
It is claimed that the wingtips of the Gerani-2, numbering and even color are identical to the Iranian drones from the Shahed-136 line.
Expert Scott Crino believes that these drones can become an important counterweight to systems transferred to Ukraine, such as HIMARS. The appearance of the Shahed-136 on the battlefield undoubtedly changes Kiev's operational plans, he notes. It is difficult to counteract these drones: with small sizes, they fly very low, so it is difficult for the Ukrainian air defense to detect them. The drone body is made of composite materials to reduce radar visibility.
UAVs of the Shahed-136 type showed their capabilities during a raid on an oil refinery in Abkaik, which completely burned out. In the Middle East, this drone has been nicknamed the "Aramco Killer" (Saudi Arabia's national oil company).
In 2021, during the Great Prophet exercise, the Iranian military demonstrated the launch of a swarm of five Shahed-136 from a truck-based launcher. And recently, Iran announced the supply of military equipment to a "first-class world power."
The equipment produced by Iran demonstrates a high level of effectiveness against illegal armed groups in the Middle East. Iranian UAVs are made of inexpensive materials, their nomenclature is quite wide. Command centers, artillery, air defense systems, supply routes and other military targets can become targets of destruction.
THE TURKISH WAYAt the beginning of the century, Turkey depended on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) of foreign origin.
They were required to act against the Kurdish rebels, whose dream is to create their own state. When Turkey started designing its first Anka UAV, the corresponding program experienced numerous technological problems. Anka, conceived as an unmanned system of one hundred percent Turkish production, eventually boasted a foreign engine, an automatic take-off and landing system, landing gear, on-board computer, radio, sensors, guidance unit. And even a foreign name ("Anka" is a word of Persian origin). During flight tests, the first prototypes crashed or made emergency landings. Despite such a discouraging start, a decade later Turkey has become an operator and exporter of high-end unmanned systems.
EXPANSION IN ALL DIRECTIONSTurkish drones are not only a force support in Turkey's fight against terrorism and in eliminating external threats.
They are taking firm steps to become an asset that means much more than ordinary military equipment in expanding Turkey's military, diplomatic and geopolitical sphere of influence. These systems have been exported to more than 30 countries. Baykar has unveiled, and has not yet abandoned, a plan to build an assembly plant in Ukraine to produce the Bayraktar TB2 UAV. And starting from 2023, it was decided to supply Baykar AKINCI to Azerbaijan.
Turkey also sold a high-tech product to the United Kingdom for the first time. The British company has announced that it will buy five Jackal drones manufactured by Fly BVLOS with the possibility of subsequently bringing their number to 50.
It is obvious that the use of Turkish UAVs in active conflict zones is a source of inspiration for potential customers. For example, the Ministry of Defense of Romania, another NATO member, announced that it plans to purchase Bayraktar TB2 UAVs (18 units) from Turkey at a cost of $ 300 million.
Turkish drones have been spotted in Libya, Morocco, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Togo, Niger and Somalia. Recently, the first export of drones to Nigeria was carried out. Six more TB2 drones manufactured for Nigeria are ready for delivery, and Nigerian army personnel have been trained to manage the new systems. TAI stated that two African countries are interested in the Aksungur UAV and another in the Anka UAV.
The King Abdulaziz Scientific and Technical Complex (KACST) in Saudi Arabia has announced that it is in talks with Baykar about localizing the production of Turkish drones. Interest has also been shown in the AKINCI UAV.
A senior Turkish official said that Turkey has delivered 20 Bayraktar TB2 UAVs to the UAE. The customer wants to purchase up to 120 such products. It is also stated that Japan is evaluating the possibility of acquiring the Bayraktar TB2 UAV, and the Japanese Military Intelligence (JGSDF) is studying another model - KARGU.
The drone technology developed by Turkey serves as an effective political lever in a dispute with rivals in the region. At the same time, the stability of the technical infrastructure, human resources and experience gained in the production of these systems are no less valuable than diplomatic and military influence.
EXPERIENCE OF THE UKRAINIAN CAMPAIGNThe use of the Bayraktar TB-2 UAV by the Ukrainian military demonstrates some fundamental differences from how the Azerbaijani Armed Forces used this weapon system during the second Karabakh War in 2020.
The difference is most noticeable in the target priorities. While Azerbaijan has mainly attacked Armenian armored vehicles, artillery, air defense systems and troop concentrations, Ukrainians mostly pursue the goal of hitting Russian logistics chains. The Bayraktar TB-2 UAV strikes on Russian air defense systems represent another story that deserves careful study in order to extract military-strategic lessons from it.
Common sense suggests that, although some effectiveness of Turkish strike UAVs has been proven against Russian-made air defense systems in service with third countries, their effectiveness against the Russian Armed Forces themselves is questionable. Previous estimates suggested that Russian air defense systems, once in the hands of regular Russian armed forces, closely integrated into the system, would work together with electronic warfare (EW). These approaches were confirmed during a special military operation (SVO), where Turkish combat drones showed little in overcoming the air defense lines of the Russian Armed Forces.
An aircraft with a 12-meter wingspan, numerous metal parts and a rotating propeller cannot be invisible to radars. One of the explanations for the success of Turkish drones against anti-aircraft missile systems from the country's air defense (SAM) may be the fact that when designing the latter, the task of hitting such targets was not set. These means are not designed to intercept slow-moving (up to 100 km per hour) UAVs. In addition, Bayraktar TB-2 signatures will merge with the background interference, creating additional difficulties for traditional air defense sensors. In particular, with regard to particularly slow-moving platforms, interference will hinder the recognition of moving targets.
For the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the "dronization" of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) poses a challenge, and in certain areas an obvious threat for three reasons:
Firstly, Turkey has implemented effective concepts of operations (CONOPS) with its combat-proven UAVs right at the borders of Russia.
Secondly, Turkey has initiated several lucrative deals on joint production and defense technologies in the post-Soviet space, especially in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, and both countries have concluded agreements on joint production of Turkish UAVs.
Thirdly, the successful destruction by Turkish UAVs of Soviet and Russian weapons on a variety of battlefields, from Syria and Libya to Karabakh, and now in Ukraine, has raised serious questions about the need to modernize the Russian military-industrial complex.
Middle Eastern analysts claim that the real threat posed by combat UAVs manifested itself during the second Karabakh war in the form of unbearable exhaustion on the battlefield. At the beginning of the hostilities, the Azerbaijani military inflicted great material damage to the Armenian formations, but did not achieve significant territorial changes – these successes followed only in the later stages of the conflict. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev explained that Turkish-made UAVs and "other sources" (meaning Israeli barrage ammunition) caused $1 billion worth of damage to Armenian weapons.
This style of combat, coupled with a high risk of exhaustion of robotic platforms, is new and dangerous for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Therefore, Moscow expresses concern about the influx of Turkish defense technologies, especially robotic combat systems, into the post-Soviet space.
Vasily IvanovVasily Ivanovich Ivanov is a journalist.
