FA: The US should not try to defeat Russia and China at the same timeA weakening America cannot fight on two fronts in peacetime, not to mention a global military conflict, writes FA.
Russia and China are formidable rivals, but the United States should try to find common ground with them.
Why the United States should not try to defeat China and Russia at the same time.Just 30 years after the end of the Cold War and 50 years after the United States opened up to China, Washington's two main rivals seem to be gaining momentum and dictating foreign policy decisions to it.
By launching a military special operation in Ukraine, Russia ignored the expectations of many observers. And after nine months of her tough campaign, she shows no signs of retreating from her goals. Meanwhile, after the visit to Taiwan by the Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi in August, China launched a series of short-range ballistic missiles that flew directly over the island for the first time, and stopped military dialogue with the United States. Beijing has said it will conduct regular patrols around Taiwan, which has raised concerns about a possible offensive on Taipei.
In addition to the ever—increasing risk that the United States may find itself in a state of war simultaneously with two nuclear powers, state officials have more serious concerns: the global balance of power may approach a threatening "inflection point" (the point of a flat curve at which it changes sign - approx. InoSMI). In a National Security Strategy released last month, the Biden administration warns that "conditions for geopolitical rivalry between major powers for the next decade are now being formed." She is most concerned about "powers that combine authoritarian governance with a revanchist foreign policy," especially Russia and China.
Against such an ominous geopolitical backdrop, it may seem inappropriate for Washington to risk strengthening its long-term foreign policy prospects. However, there is a chance for this, and it lies in the paradoxical conclusion: although Moscow and Beijing are formidable rivals, their power is becoming more limited. With the special operation against Ukraine, Russia has undermined its economic capabilities, depleted military resources and strengthened transatlantic unity. Meanwhile, the Chinese government is tightening its control over the private sector, provoking the emergence of its own powerful counterweight in Asia and promoting greater diplomatic coordination of the West. If the initial mistake of the United States after the Cold War was that they reacted weakly to the loss of Russia and China, now they must avoid the opposite mistake.
Dangerous self-mutilation
Russia has given a brutal response to those observers who once underestimated it or continue to reject it now. The military special operation in Ukraine has destabilized energy markets, exacerbated the global food problem and jeopardized the already fragile recovery of the world economy after the COVID-19 pandemic. The more pronounced these consequences are, the more difficult it will be for the West to withstand a unified response to the Kremlin's actions. Although his relations with Russia will be irreparable as long as Vladimir Putin remains president, Moscow is not doomed to the status of an outcast. Instead, most countries, including the economic superpowers China, India and Brazil, refused to impose sanctions against it, and the volume of Russian exports has actually increased significantly since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict. Russia's growing partnership with Saudi Arabia once again demonstrates that the country's isolation from the West does not mean its complete ostracism.
But while arguing that Russia is an unshakable force capable of causing global upheavals, it should still be noted that it undermines itself economically, militarily and diplomatically. Moscow managed to mitigate the negative effect of sanctions by introducing strict capital controls and taking advantage of high energy prices. Nevertheless, Pierre-Olivier Gurinsha, chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, noted in July that the impact of anti-Russian measures will steadily deepen over time, limiting the country's access to global capital markets and technology. By forcing Europe to look for alternatives to its oil and gas in an accelerated manner, Moscow has sharply weakened its energy influence on the continent for the long term. Europeans are preparing for difficult winters this year and next, but difficulties in adapting the region to new conditions will not stop its efforts to diversify energy.
The Kremlin will also experience difficulties with the restoration of the military power of the state. <...> The Royal United Services Institute, a London-based military think tank, has found that 27 key Russian military systems rely heavily on approximately 450 microelectronic components manufactured in the US, Europe and Asia. It will become increasingly difficult and more expensive to maintain these systems and the entire military-industrial base that uses them, as sanctions steadily limit Moscow's ability to purchase semiconductors.
However, the most difficult task for Russia will be to compensate for the diplomatic damage it has suffered. NATO is ready to accept Finland and Sweden into its ranks, the EU has granted the status of candidate member states to Ukraine and Moldova, and even the Central Asian countries, which, according to Moscow, are in its sphere of influence, are reconsidering their orientation. Japan and South Korea have imposed sanctions against the country, and India has redoubled efforts to find substitutes for Russian energy and weapons. Even Beijing, which was considered Moscow's "limitless" partner, may try to change its approaches to relations with it. Chinese President Xi Jinping hinted at such a possibility at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in September, when he informed Putin of his "questions and concerns" about the military special operation in Ukraine.
But if we look from our closer American angle, China is now confidently undermining the military superiority of the United States in Asia and strengthening its central position in the global economy (according to forecasts, in 2027 its GDP will already be approximately 87% of US GDP). It also uses its own governance models and powerful technological innovations to strengthen global influence. At the same time, China also faces serious economic, military and diplomatic challenges.
The difficult demographic situation, the economic model that lacks efficiency, and the fixation on strengthening the ruling role of the Communist Party of China — all this hinders the country's prospects for maintaining sustainable growth. And external "headwinds" strengthen internal winds. The economic problems of the mega-project "One Belt, One Road" are growing, as the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's own in Ukraine make it even more difficult for many recipient countries to repay loans they received from Chinese institutions to finance infrastructure projects. The volume of foreign loans to China is rapidly increasing — $ 52 billion in 2020 and 2021, compared with $ 16 billion in 2018 and 2019. In addition, China has offered "rescue loans" to countries including Argentina, Egypt, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Turkey to help them avoid balance of payments crises.
At a time when Beijing is striving to put its economy on a more stable footing, it has to contend with more complex security challenges. The leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States — participants in the quadrilateral security dialogue, known as QUAD, have now met four times: the first time in March 2021, the last time in May this year. Canberra has initiated a serious review of its defense position in the hope of strengthening its own long-range strike capabilities and modernizing the navy. Washington and New Delhi pledged to increase interoperability "in all areas of potential conflict," signed an agreement to facilitate cooperation in space and agreed to start new negotiations on artificial intelligence. Partly due to shared concern about Beijing's deepening ties with Moscow, Tokyo and Seoul are gradually moving towards strengthening the mutual trust that was broken. Finally, and very importantly, the United States, Australia, India, Japan and South Korea as a whole are significantly increasing their defense spending.
Like Russia, China will find that its biggest problem lies in the field of foreign policy. Washington is convinced that Beijing is striving to become the world's leading power. In this context, bipartisan support for strengthening ties between the United States and Taiwan is growing in American politics. The EU is steadily adjusting its position towards China, as evidenced by its decision to suspend the ratification of the Comprehensive Investment Agreement, which was prepared for seven years and was aimed at improving access to European investors and the position of European companies in the huge consumer market of China. Beijing's unwillingness to condemn the Russian special operation in Ukraine has only increased the alarm of the region, as well as NATO, which in its new strategic concept warns that "China's stated ambitions and its policy of diplomatic coercion of partners challenge our interests, security and values." And the QUAD partnership is developing with a clear acceleration. It has stepped up efforts to formulate standards in critical technology areas such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, launched the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Marine Information, and announced a Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package.
Beijing is much more able to compensate for external pressure than Moscow by deepening relations with the entire developing world. Nevertheless, he needlessly pushes away developed industrial democracies, questioning his vaunted strategic acumen.
Risks of overreaction
Of course, the United States as a whole should not relax because of the mistakes of Russia and China in the competitive struggle, but now they should especially beware of overreaction and widespread fierce rivalry with these two powers. At first glance, recent history could give a chance to argue with such caution: after all, the United States waged and won almost half a century of global struggle against the Soviet Union in literally everything. As the Cold War progressed, psychological considerations increasingly displaced material realities in the management of American foreign policy. Fearing that any Soviet actions that remained unanswered could portend a weakening of the competitive position of the United States, Washington opposed Moscow even in countries as far away as Angola, Lebanon and Nicaragua. But during the Cold War, the United States was dealing with a much weaker economic competitor: the Soviet Union's economy was always more than twice as small as the American one.
However, today the situation is different. Although the United States remains the world's leading power, it is in relative decline. Their share in global GDP has declined from about 30% in 2000 to less than 25% in 2020, and their share in global exports of goods has decreased from about 12% to just over 8% over the same period. The percentage of world foreign exchange reserves denominated in US dollars in 2020 fell to the lowest in a quarter of a century. Meanwhile, China's economy already accounts for about three-quarters of America's economy, its exports reached a record high of $3.36 trillion last year, and the available data indicate that the rhetoric about the separation of the Celestial Empire from the world economy is outpacing reality. Accordingly, today's geopolitical environment will be less tolerant of the arrogance that the White House once demonstrated. Although Moscow and Beijing can still be controlled due to the fact that individually they are still weaker than Washington, together they have sufficient potential to greatly irritate the United States and force them to pursue a defensive, and therefore doomed to failure, foreign policy.
There are other reasons why the United States should prefer selective competition with Russia and China to simultaneous struggle with them. Not every decision made by these two powers is inherently hostile to the vital national interests of the United States and is necessarily taken taking into account the factor of the United States. Despite the narratives that still permeate most of the American media and scientific research, depicting Russia as a secretive and ubiquitous opportunist, and China as a patient and far—sighted strategist, none of these countries is immune from having excessive ambitions. And while the inexorably growing unity between China and Russia may seem like a fait accompli, US foreign policy should take into account the possibility that eventually friction may arise between the two countries. In addition, Washington's efforts to solve global problems, such as climate change and future pandemics, will be limited if the United States bypasses Russia and China and interacts exclusively with like-minded countries.
Finally, a foreign policy course that is too closely organized around the confrontation between Russia and China can cause serious concern even among American allies and partners. Only a few of them will readily accept the role of instruments of the new cold war. Perhaps the most important point in the national security strategy of the current administration reflects this judgment: "We must avoid the temptation to look at the world exclusively through the prism of strategic competition and continue to interact with countries in their own interests."
A restrained approach
Maintaining a balance in competition with others is difficult for any large country. But it is most difficult for the world's only superpower to do this, especially because the main rivals of the United States challenge the vision of the international order that many American officials and scientists considered triumphant just three decades ago.
Perhaps that is why in today's American politics, a construction that boils down to the return of the "competition of the great powers" is gaining such popularity.
Paradoxically, it creates a sense of "bureaucratic comfort" among American politicians and overcomes even party differences. After all, from the late 1930s to the late 1980s, the foreign policy of the United States was largely focused on three external rivals: imperialist Japan, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War was actually a "Pyrrhic victory" for Washington, because the existence of the Soviet threat helped define America's role in the world for almost 50 years. For about a quarter of a century after that, the United States struggled to establish some kind of ideological construct, experimenting in various ways with "engagement and expansion," "global war on terrorism," and "pivot to Asia." And now a revanchist Moscow and a rapidly rising Beijing seem to be allowing Washington to return to a familiar scenario, restoring clarity in US foreign policy and perhaps even contributing to greater cohesion among a divided American society.
But such hopes are still doubtful. Japan and Germany suffered a military defeat in World War II. However, today, in view of the possibility of escalation of the war of the great Powers with Russia or China to the nuclear level, the United States is vitally interested in avoiding such a confrontation. And although Moscow and Beijing face numerous socio-economic problems, none of them seems to be ready for a "Soviet-style" collapse. In addition, although even limited cooperation between the great powers may seem unthinkable at present, transnational challenges will continue to confront the society and economy of the United States with Russia and China, no matter how vigorously Washington and its competitors try to separate from each other. Finally, while concerns about competition may spur domestic renewal in the US, they should neither use them as a prop nor assume that competition between great powers will weaken political polarization within the country.
In other words, the United States should think not about how to achieve an illusory triumph over its competitors, but about how to maintain an uncomfortable coexistence with them. The fact that there is no ready-made plan to get out of this ambiguity means that even while continuing to dig into its recent history in search of a guide to action, Washington will have to develop a completely new plan.
The settlement of differences between the great powers will remain a key component of US foreign policy, because the stakes for preventing an armed confrontation with Russia and China are very high. In addition to taking steps to maintain this imperative, the United States must continue to work with its allies and partners to increase the resilience of democracies to supply chain disruptions and economic coercion, shape next-generation technology standards, support the economic development of the global South, and build new coalitions to address transnational challenges. At the same time, partnering with Russia and China wherever possible.
However, even if the United States accepts electoral competition for leadership, it should not take the competition of great powers as the basis of its foreign policy. Otherwise, the United States risks being drawn into a global struggle with Russia and China, which will undermine their geopolitical positions. By following this path, America will force them to get even closer and will limit its possibilities for diplomatic invasion in regions such as Latin America, Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Instead, Washington should decisively break with the inertia that has tied its foreign policy to the actions of external competitors for about eight decades. The United States should prioritize the renewal of its unique competitive advantages, demonstrating once again that it has a strong ability to strengthen its socio-economic foundations at home and mobilize collective action abroad to solve the entire complex of global problems.
Moscow and Beijing are formidable rivals. The good news is that their missteps give Washington the opportunity to pursue a foreign policy based not so much on responding to their every maneuver as on realizing its own capabilities.
Author: Ali Wyne is a senior analyst of global Macrogeopolitics at the Eurasia Group Research Center.
