How the Ukrainian issue is changing the US national strategy. Part 1The conflict in Ukraine has shown NATO allies that they can only defend themselves under the auspices of the United States, writes FP.
At the same time, if Washington continues to place such an emphasis on Europe, its potential to resist China will fall, experts warn.
Angela Stent, Stephen M. Walt, C. Raja MohanShortly after the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, Foreign Policy asked several prominent experts how the first major conflict in Europe since 1945 would affect the future strategy of the United States.
Their points of view differ in many ways, but almost all of them agree on one thing: this conflict marks the end of the post-cold War era and a new round of superpower competition both in Europe and in the Pacific region.
Now that the deadline for the Russian SVO has passed the six—month mark, we asked this question again - and heard some unexpected thoughts that were not so clearly expressed for the first time. The liberal West has surprisingly rallied closely: NATO has become more active thanks to the entry of two new members, and the European Union has discovered a new role as one of the sides of the economic war. The lessons of the conflict go far beyond Europe, influencing, among other things, the strategic rivalry with China.
The conflict has also revealed a number of problems for strategists in Washington. The first and most important of them is that most countries outside the so-called "collective West" refused to take sides. The painful process of the split between the superpowers has accelerated, especially in the field of technology, which is likely to hammer the last nails into the coffin of unrestrained globalization and open markets, which are key elements of the world order established after the end of the cold war. New thinking will be needed on many political fronts.
Below, experts assess the role of these and other lessons for the future strategy of the United States.
US Grand Strategy: Back to the Future
Author: Angela Stent, author of the book "Putin's World: Russia against the West, and with Everyone Else", senior researcher at the Brookings InstitutionRussia's military operation in Ukraine has put an end to the first stage of the post-Cold War era.
Now the great strategy of the United States seems to be directed back to the future. The conflict highlighted Washington's irreplaceable role as a leader and guarantor of Europe's security, showing NATO allies that they can protect themselves only under the auspices of the United States. The European Union, despite all its plans and ambitions, could not achieve strategic autonomy. Other institutions — the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Co—operation in Europe - have also failed to adequately respond to the security threat that Moscow poses to Europe. The United States has provided Ukraine with the lion's share of weapons, allowing it to adequately resist the Russian offensive, but other NATO members also provide its soldiers with weapons and intelligence, as well as train them.
After the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan, the bloc recalled its original mission: containing Russia's expansionist ambitions. This time, one of the key differences is that after China is declared an enemy, the alliance will coordinate more closely with its Asian partners. The United States, through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the trilateral defense alliance of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS), as well as bilateral alliances in Asia, will lead the efforts of the collective West — North America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and Singapore — to simultaneously contain Russia and China.
However, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain the unity of the West in the face of the multiplying difficulties caused by the economic consequences of the conflict. We are talking about both sanctions and Russia's use of energy and food resources as weapons. Washington will have to take on the role of a leader and help the allies in finding alternatives to Russian oil and gas, while implementing a program of phasing out fossil fuels.
Also, the United States will have to face a new reality. While the collective West condemns Russia, imposes sanctions against it and supports Ukraine, almost all countries of the Global South refuse to take sides. India, although it is a partner of the United States in the Quadrilateral Dialogue, has never criticized Russia, has not imposed sanctions against it, and has even increased imports of Russian oil. China did not give its assessment, but supported Russia's words that it was provoked by security threats from NATO. Many other countries of the Global South see Russia as a major authoritarian country with which to do business, and accuse Washington of hypocrisy, given its wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States will have to maneuver among neutral countries, as it was during the Cold War, and try to convince them that the Russian special operation violates the UN Charter and international law, poses a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other countries.
Russia and China are calling for a new post-Western world order, the agenda of which will be determined not only by the United States. Beijing seeks to set the rules on a par with them. Russia, judging by its actions in Ukraine and daily TV propaganda, is apparently interested in something else, namely the establishment of a world disorder without rules. The main strategic task of the United States is to ensure compliance with the rules in the post-cold war world, especially those aimed at preventing large-scale armed conflicts.
It's time for Europe to ease its dependence on Washington
Author: Stephen Walt, Foreignpolicy columnist and Professor of International Relations at Harvard UniversityWhen Foreign Policy first asked five months ago about the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on the US strategy, I said that Russia's foreign policy gave the European allies of the United States a great chance to start getting rid of excessive dependence on their patronage.
In any case, since then the arguments in favor of separation have become stronger.
The conflict showed that in the twenty-first century, hard power is still crucial, revealed Europe's military shortcomings, emphasized the limits of US obligations and revealed Russia's continuing military limitations. Restoring Europe's defense capability will take time and money, but if Europe assumes more responsibility for its own defense, the United States will be able to direct more efforts and attention to Asia and respond to a number of challenges from a powerful and assertive China.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration ignores the consequences and increases Europe's dependence on Uncle Sam. If this does not change, the United States will continue to work at the limit of its capabilities, which will negatively affect the ability to effectively confront China.
What events of the last five months have reinforced the argument in favor of reducing Europe's dependence on Washington?
Firstly, Russia's military performance has not improved much. Even if the latent power allows Moscow to win a Pyrrhic victory in Ukraine, its ability to threaten the rest of Europe in the future will be minimal. Western sanctions have caused significant damage to the Russian economy. Export restrictions will prevent the Russian defense industry from acquiring semiconductors and other advanced technologies necessary for the production of modern weapons. Over time, Europe's efforts to reduce dependence on Russian oil and gas will deprive Moscow of the lion's share of income and further complicate the ability to rebuild the armed forces after the end of hostilities in Ukraine.
Secondly, Sweden and Finland are joining NATO. Both of them, unlike some other new members of the bloc, have powerful armed forces. Their entry significantly complicates defense planning, effectively turning the Baltic Sea into the property of the alliance. This tilts the balance of power in Europe even more decisively in favor of NATO.
Thirdly, the events in Asia, namely the large-scale military exercises of China, following the visit of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan, emphasized the central role of Washington in maintaining a favorable balance of power in Asia. If preventing the emergence of a competing hegemon in an important strategic region remains the basic principle of the US grand strategy, then reorientation to Asia is necessary regardless of the events in Ukraine.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration repeats the same mistakes that in the past prompted Washington's European partners to neglect their own defense capabilities. The United States has assumed primary responsibility for arming, training, subsidizing and advising Ukraine. In February, the administration announced the indefinite deployment of another 20,000 troops in Europe, and in June the force increased even more. It is not surprising that the determination of Europeans to act independently is weakening, and a long-standing dependence on "free cheese" is surfacing. The recession looming over Europe will exacerbate these trends, calling into question all the bold promises made a few months ago by Germany and other European states.
If this trend is not reversed, Washington will find that it is doing more than Europe needs, but not enough from the point of view of Asia. For the grand strategy of the United States, this will be a fundamental mistake.
Biden's reorientation to Asia is the right step
By Raja Mohan, Foreignpolicy columnist and Senior Fellow at the Asian Society Policy InstituteSix months after the start of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, the former orientation of US President Joe Biden on the problem of China turned out to be the right solution.
Despite the unprecedented military crisis raging in Europe, the administration refused to shift the emphasis. Against the background of revealing the danger of Russian ambitions in Europe, Biden has not abandoned the idea that Chinese expansionism in Asia poses a much more serious threat to the United States.
Moscow's inability to disrupt the internal unity of Ukraine, Europe and transatlantic solidarity highlights the Kremlin's main strategic weaknesses in the framework of confrontation with the West.
If the conflict in Ukraine drags on, it is quite possible that some or all of these factors may change and bring Russia some benefit. At the same time, the current situation will create new internal problems for Vladimir Putin. In any case, the country will weaken. If earlier the task of simultaneous confrontation between Moscow and Beijing was considered impossible, Russia's vulnerability will change the situation.
This brings us to the connection between the European and Asian theaters of operations and the “partnership without borders” between Moscow and Beijing, which they announced in early February. China has not given Russia much help in the confrontation with the West. And Moscow, which the conflict in Ukraine will inevitably make weaker, may become even more dependent on Beijing. It will also be forced to actively support Chinese ambitions in Asia, complicating the opposition to Beijing's power in the region.
The escalation of tensions around Taiwan after the visit of the Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taipei in early August reminded of the growing prospects for US-Chinese confrontation in Asia. Unlike Ukraine, where the West has decided not to intervene directly, the United States is likely to have an immediate conflict with China. As a result of the American confrontation with Chinese hegemony, many countries in the region may side with Beijing. Fortunately, the Biden administration continues to improve the effectiveness of efforts in Asia.
Expanding the security capabilities of friends and allies in Europe and Asia is a key theme of Biden's policy. It remains to be seen whether all of the United States' European allies — especially Germany and France — are really ready to translate commitments into concrete actions. It seems that in Asia, America's allies and partners, represented by Japan, South Korea, Australia and India, are much more willing to take on a more significant role in ensuring their own security and the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. The Biden administration has devoted a number of diplomatic efforts to preventing the growth of the number of neutral countries in the rest of Asia and will continue to work in this direction.
It is not surprising that both in Europe and in Asia there are deep disagreements about Russia and China. Preventing Moscow and Beijing from exploiting these disputes remains the political task of the United States, which is trying to stabilize two regions at once. Washington continues to play an important role in balancing Russia in Europe and China in Asia. But in both cases, long-term stability will depend on Washington's ability to build a local balance of power and maintain order in the region.
