Course correction in the direction of diplomacy in the Ukrainian crisis. Part 3The popular opinion in the West that Russia seeks to "conquer" the whole of Ukraine is wrong, writes TNI.
The author of the article emphasizes that if Moscow had set such ambitious goals, the ways to achieve them would have been completely different.
Ramzi Mardini
Part 1 . Part 2 Misconception about "maximum goals"
Since the coup on the Maidan in 2014, which overthrew the pro-Russian government in Kiev, Moscow's main goal has been to reorient Ukraine to the status of a neutral state. Russia counted on neutrality both de jure and de facto. This meant not only legal guarantees and mechanisms to ensure a ban on the country falling into the spheres of influence of competitors — such as NATO and the EU — but also the demilitarization of relations with the West, given the growing importance of the role of NATO since 2014. This strategic interest was not invented yesterday. In fact, the policy of non-alignment of Ukraine was in the interests of Russia even before Putin came to power. Moreover, neutrality and its enforcement mechanisms were included in the stalled and now defunct Second Minsk Agreement. It was signed in 2015 with the participation of Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany and was aimed at resolving the war in Donbass. But Moscow's efforts to force the parties to implement it in the following years — up to the last week before the start of the special operation — have reached an impasse. Minsk II became too bitter a pill for Ukrainian nationalists, who regarded it as a death sentence to the sovereignty of the country.
Contrary to the popular "picture" in the media, the special operation does not and has never set as its goal the conquest of Ukraine. From its very beginning, it had neither the scale nor the means of implementation that would correspond to the achievement of the "maximum" goal: to conquer the state and subjugate its society. On all fronts of this military campaign, the spread of resources used by the Russian land and air forces — even where a great will to win has been demonstrated — contradicts the military strategy, which focuses on the fate of the capital. Absolutely by any criteria, the "center of gravity" of this operation falls on the southern and eastern regions.
Contrary to the warnings of the United States, Russia did not start bombing the entire territory of the country, let alone tie it to some notable strategic goal. Moreover, in the first month, the Russian military made fewer sorties and launched fewer missiles than the United States in 2003 during the Iraq war on the first day alone. "The heart of Kiev is almost untouched," an American intelligence analyst said on condition of anonymity three weeks after the operation began. "For some reason, the Russians clearly did not want to strike within the urban part of the metropolis."
Despite the colossal non-nuclear firepower that the Russian army has at its disposal, there are signs of self-restraint. And although the data is still shrouded in darkness, the available information on non-combatant deaths is consistent with the same indicator among the military. This means that civilians mostly get caught in the crossfire in contested areas, and do not become victims of a parallel military campaign to exterminate the civilian population. Proportionally, the number of civilian casualties is on the same level, or even lower, than the results of US air campaigns in the Middle East. Moreover, according to one report, the authors of which refer to US intelligence and military observers, the Russian Air Force "almost exclusively provides direct support to the ground forces." Indeed, to the west of the Dnieper River, which divides the country into two halves, the intensity and the slaughterhouses that were in the east, where the confrontation is taking place, were not observed.
There is still no goal to destroy the infrastructure of Ukraine in order to accelerate the collapse of the state. Until now, there have been no systematic attempts to destroy communication and transport networks. Both continue to function. In addition, there were no deliberate attempts to destroy the power grid of Ukraine by destroying power plants and critical distribution nodes. Some of them were damaged, but the reason is more likely to be the proximity to military installations or battlefields, rather than deliberate shelling. Moreover, airfields "still worked" in the uncontested territories, and some even remained untouched, including in large cities.
As for the plans for a coup d'etat and the overthrow of the Ukrainian government, there is no indication that the establishment of a new regime from the outside was the goal, and that Russian leaders, in addition, considered it feasible. From a military point of view, neither the conditions in Ukraine nor the capabilities of Russia itself confirm the generally accepted opinion about conquering ambitions.
For example, according to available estimates, the number of mobilized Russian forces on the eve of the operation ranged from 100 to 190 thousand people. Even with the peak value for the conquest of Ukraine, this is not enough, not to mention maintaining a military occupation to install a puppet regime in Kiev. Ukraine is a modern country with a population of 44 million people, the largest by area on the European continent after Russia. In addition, its armed forces have recently been modernized: restored, armed and trained by NATO. Considering that the number of active military personnel is 200 thousand soldiers, and the reserve is much larger, the Ukrainian army is able to bear huge losses, especially if it is fighting for the survival of its country. The potential of the rebel movement, assembled from military veterans — in the event of the overthrow of the regime — is beyond doubt. And not only is Ukrainian nationalism with its anti—Russian ideology a powerful political force, the country also borders with several NATO members who can provide support in the fight against the invader's troops.
All these conditions make the military occupation of Ukraine, to put it mildly, a more difficult and burdensome task than what the US military experienced in Iraq. However, it is not worth comparing — the difference is too great.
Apart from the gigantic military obstacles, the political part — regime change — also does not look like a plausible goal. In fact, there are no real signs that Russia was going to organize and install any political project in Ukraine at all. Moscow has not tried to form an alternative government in exile, nor to create some kind of opposition in Ukraine, ready to take the reins of government into its own hands. Moreover, for that matter, none of the departments of the security apparatus of Ukraine, no state institution could be persuaded to partner with Russia. By itself, this fact negates the model of "decapitation" of the country promoted by the United States and Great Britain — as if the Kremlin plans to establish a puppet government. Any attempt to impose regime change from the outside would require purging and rebuilding the state from scratch.
Despite all these huge obstacles, claims that the Russian army is aimed at capturing Ukraine and dismantling its political system continue to be heard from the mouths of not only politicians and experts, but also journalists. They claim that the Russian leadership probably miscalculated — or for some unknown reason it was unaware of the difficulties of forced regime change in its nearest neighbor. The Kremlin, in their opinion, made a mistake even before the operation, assuming the role of a "liberator" and believing that the Ukrainian population would welcome the soldiers with open arms — which allegedly initially justified the "maximum" goal.
Such a theory resonates in the West. Nevertheless, it is, to put it mildly, ridiculous. As the experience of its adherents shows, it is the universal values preached in the West within the framework of liberal internationalism — and not the Russian realpolitik — that more condemn manifestations of military adventurism to such mistakes. To begin with, the belief in miscalculation in this case stems from the so-called confirmation bias. It is this cognitive distortion that helps to rationalize and come to terms with Russia's audacious decision to "invade", which strengthens and supports the general opinion that the Kremlin has decided to conquer Ukraine.
It is obvious that Moscow has never believed in the excessive optimism of the Ukrainian population, let alone build its aggressive adventure on it. Despite the fear and contradictions fueling the crisis, it is hard to believe that the Kremlin's growing anti-Russian sentiments were in a "blind spot". Putin openly expressed pessimism about the Ukrainian people. "Ukrainian society is faced with the rise of extreme nationalism," he said just a few days before the start of the military operation, "which quickly took the form of aggressive Russophobia and neo—Nazism." Since 2014, a pro-Russian government has been overthrown in Kiev; Russia has annexed Ukrainian territory; a war has been waged against pro-Russian separatists; the use of the Russian language has been suppressed at the legislative level; Minsk II, advantageous to Moscow, has met resistance from the population; and anti-Russian rhetoric from Ukrainian elites has sharply gained momentum. Moreover, such misplaced optimism would contradict Russia's concerns that the Ukrainian far-right has too much influence both in the government and in society.
As for popular support, the segments of society friendly to Russia represent a small minority. Moreover, the geography of residence of this minority is the southern and eastern territories of Ukraine. This alone excludes any political initiatives aimed at using public forces to govern most of the country — especially to the west of the Dnieper, where pronounced nationalism dominates. Without the much-needed support of local residents, the price of "conquest" becomes astronomical.
War as a deal, not as a conquest
For Russia, the maximum goals were not only unattainable — it did not even prepare for them. On closer examination, the special operation is a war with limited goals, which is being waged as an extension of the Russian state administration. In essence, Russia seeks not to conquer Ukraine, but to force it. Russia's military actions are a means of strengthening negotiating positions, and the goal is to force Kiev to change its political orientation, as a result of which it will not be able to threaten Russia's security and geopolitical interests.
At the first salvo of the operation, the Russian northern front, operating from the territory of Belarus, deployed small but mobile forces that quickly approached Kiev. In real time, US officials stated that Russian forces intended to seize Kiev, the capital of three million, with the aim of beheading the Ukrainian leadership in 48 hours. In the West, the desperate rush to Kiev confirmed the assumption that Russia intends to change power. And since that time, the Western media has mistakenly accepted this as an empirical fact.
This statement, however, was only an artifact of American distortion. Such a military goal was unattainable with the available forces and types of weapons. Kiev is a huge city with wide and endless avenues separated by narrower streets, often lined with relief cobblestones, with extensive basement rooms and basements in many buildings. This in itself can turn the task of establishing control over the city into a bloody job for many weeks, if not months. "None of our leaders, neither the president nor anyone else, spoke about the desire to seize Kiev," the Russian ambassador to the UK said, "I don't think Kiev can be occupied or occupied. It's a big city."
In reality, the Russian movement to the capital of Ukraine was not an attempt to capture, but an attempt to compel. Along with the military actions, diplomatic activity unfolded, the purpose of which was to force Kiev to sit down at the negotiating table. The goal of the Russian plan A was Kiev's acceptance of the conditions of the Russian side, and the latter's intentions were supported by military units deployed nearby. And the Ukrainian leaders, having agreed to these conditions in time, could avoid the destructive, devastating military actions that broke out on their land.
Zelensky, enraged and disappointed by NATO's initial indecision in supporting him, actually made it clear (and threatened) that he could agree to Putin's February 25 proposal to "talk about a neutral status for Ukraine." Days later, he called for national resistance and the fight against the "aggressor", and refused the proposed negotiations in Belarus, where the Russian delegation had already arrived. Nevertheless, he was forced to send a delegation to the negotiations, since a public rejection of them could be interpreted as a propaganda victory for Putin. Nevertheless, no agreement appeared, the parties agreed on new rounds, and each of the parties tried to improve their negotiating positions on the battlefields.
In the West, Zelensky's bravado was being glorified. However, the reason for his change of position was not a sudden change in his beliefs. On the contrary, the reason for this was the promises of the West to provide military assistance, along with unprecedented actions taken by Europe. And it is quite possible that these promises were rash, given the disappointment of the Ukrainian leader with the actual scale of this assistance.
To be clear, Moscow's plan for a so-called "quick and decisive victory" was not about capturing the flag; it was about accelerating, under pressure, a settlement through negotiations on neutrality. In fact, Plan A was not carried out not because of a military defeat, but rather because it was not possible to forcibly achieve a political agreement. Immediately after that, Moscow activated Plan B, aimed at strengthening the negotiating positions.
But, since erroneous assumptions about an unprovoked operation with maximum goals still remain in force, Western observers initially perceived Russia's subsequent military behavior as an attempt to "redouble efforts" to conquer Ukraine. Later, they began to say that Russia had "tempered" its initial ambitions and was now striving for control over part of the territories, and not over the whole country. Both of these misinterpretations are caused by confirmation bias, given erroneous confidence in prevailing narratives.
So far, there are no signs that Moscow has abandoned its initial military tasks. In fact, Plan B also pursues the main goal of Ukraine's revision of its political orientation, as in the case of plan A. In fact, changes have occurred not so much in the content of Russia's original goal as in the military strategy aimed at achieving it. Russia, preferring to reach an agreement and avoid an expensive war, is now raising the price for the enemy to force him to accept his position.
As has already been shown, the Russian backup plan included heavy efforts to create an environment on the ground that would primarily express the strengthening of negotiating positions. Along with this, another campaign of coercion is being carried out, aimed at getting Kiev (and the West) to agree to Moscow's conditions. The enforcement phase, which is now focused on global energy and food supplies, is likely to expand in search of other vulnerabilities. It may include attacks on infrastructure in areas of the country that have been almost untouched by military clashes.
Nevertheless, the multitude of contradictions on the battlefields did not lead to a revision of the axioms underlying the distorted interpretation of military operations. Despite the misinterpretation of the plans of the Russian military, the narrative of maximum goals, the complete conquest of Ukraine was supported in the West, and any misunderstandings or shortcomings were attributed to Russian incompetence, irrationality or weakness.
For example, the Russian multi-kilometer military column that entered from the territory of Belarus was assigned the task of encircling Kiev and overthrowing the government. But despite the fact that the column quickly reached the capital, its further behavior puzzled Western observers with its long passive standing. The media attributed logistical problems and "fierce resistance" from the enemy to the convoy, which seemed to be "easy prey".
In fact, the capture of Kiev was not part of the plans of this column of troops. On the contrary, it served as a kind of "false goal", part of the very "backup plan" deployed after Zelensky refused to negotiate.
The stationary column, standing at a distance of a shot from Kiev, delayed the forces of the Ukrainian army, which allowed other Russian forces to occupy territories in the east and south of the country. Later, the withdrawal of the column was mistakenly interpreted by the West as a sign of Russia's refusal to seize Kiev. But the optimism caused by the closure of the Russian northern front was also misplaced. The column fulfilled its task and the mission of the northern front exhausted itself after it helped the Russian forces to break through the land corridor connecting the eastern and southern fronts. Now that the Crimean peninsula has received ground protection from the territories of Russia, Moscow has firmly established itself on the ground and has also strengthened its negotiating positions.
The correction of the course in the direction of diplomacy is becoming more and more deplorable for the Ukrainian troops.
But the West is not particularly inclined to change the narrative in order to make a U-turn towards diplomacy. He continues to exploit a favorable but fleeting discourse to justify a policy of denial. Even when the narrative loses its force, the political elites will continue to insist on it. "You can already see in the media that interest in the conflict is falling, and this affects the public, which, in turn, affects politicians," Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Linde said in July. "Our duty is to keep Ukraine and what Russia is doing in the spotlight."
The interest in preserving the postulates of this narrative allows us to continue punishing and humiliating Russia. But it also changes the very concept of victory. Of course, if Putin's goal was "maximum", his business is bad. However, if we admit that it is limited, then the trajectory of the conflict is changing in favor of Moscow, not Kiev — and supporters of Ukraine's "victory" should take this into account.
In any case, the West is not winning the war. A decisive victory in Ukraine is worth neither the risks nor the costs of achieving it. Even if more support arrives, it will not convince Russia to abandon the retaliatory escalation. Military assistance will also not help to take away from her those colossal levers of influence that she has acquired during this time. Under any settlement option, it will be very difficult to reject Moscow's conditions.
Moreover, prolonging the struggle will lead to even more bloodshed and can only worsen Kiev's negotiating positions. Moscow's goals are indeed expanding — at the expense of secondary interests that go beyond the main one, that is, the neutral status of Ukraine. And this expansion is happening not only because the costs of the war must be justified, but because as a result of this very war, new security problems arise.
For example, since Ukraine now has new weapons systems, Russia will probably insist on creating a buffer zone that will reduce the value of these weapons in terms of coercion. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in July: "Now the geography is different. This is not only the DPR and the LPR, it is also the Kherson region, the Zaporozhye region and a number of other territories, and this process continues, and continues consistently and persistently." This will strengthen not only Moscow's negotiating positions, but also its power superiority over Kiev, reducing the effectiveness of its response actions. "If the West supplies Kiev with long—range weapons, geographical tasks will be pushed even further," Lavrov warned.
A flawed US-led approach will inevitably stumble upon a harsh and uncomfortable truth: Russia's determination is likely to tear through the thin shell of Western unity. Since Europe constantly has to take the brunt of Washington's policy, further escalation may accelerate its retreat towards finding a compromise with Russia. In addition, a more active NATO involvement will only exacerbate the threat that Russia regards as existential. It fuels her resolve rather than weakens it. The rattling of nuclear weapons makes it clear that when Russia's vital interests are at stake, it gives its leadership much more political will than the West to accept the burden and dangers of escalation.
Ukraine is increasingly being offered to make territorial concessions to put an end to the fighting. But neither a bilateral deal nor the redrawing of borders by themselves will lead to lasting peace. All because Ukraine was dragged into a proxy war. Its casus belli cannot be simplified to a territorial dispute between neighbors. Although such disputes have played a role in this crisis, the root of instability is still the living commitment of NATO — adopted by the alliance in 2008 and confirmed in 2021 — to accept Ukraine into its membership.
Based on this, the West should become a party to the negotiations and sign any long-term settlement. Without a multilateral agreement, the Ukrainian conflict will become "frozen" or recurring. Moreover, Putin can be satisfied with any of these scenarios. If diplomacy with the West remains a difficult way to "calm" its security concerns, Russia will continue to hold Ukraine hostage as part of a broader confrontation with NATO, as was the case with Georgia. This will save a loophole in order to block Ukraine's admission to the alliance for an indefinite period.
A negotiated settlement is in the interests of all parties. However, diplomacy has long been stuck somewhere behind the scenes, and given the multilayered actors from the West, the necessary prerequisites will take a long and painful time to form. Indeed, despite their dangerous situation, Zelensky's internal and external supporters are inflexible in their desire to continue military operations until victory is achieved. But in order for diplomacy to start working as soon as possible, the United States and Europe must simultaneously put pressure on him and give him the opportunity to seek a much-needed compromise with Putin, which will also require the West to officially abandon its position on Ukraine's admission to NATO.
But above all else, Washington must come to terms with its role in provoking — and now delaying — the conflict. Unfortunately, the generally accepted narrative drowns out the understanding of this and increasingly postpones the course correction.
This reckless stubbornness far from the ocean will only destroy Ukraine even more.
