Playing with fire in Ukraine, the United States should stop playing with fire in Ukraine, where the escalation of the conflict threatens a nuclear clash, the author of the article warns.
Moscow will not make concessions to the West in Ukraine. The US is dragging out the conflict in vain.
John Mearsheimer Underestimated the risks of a catastrophic escalation of the Ukrainian conflict.
Western politicians seem to have reached a consensus on a military special operation in Ukraine: the conflict is coming to an impasse, and, in the end, a weakened Russia will accept a peace agreement that benefits the United States and its NATO allies, as well as Ukraine.
Although Western officials acknowledge that both Washington and Moscow may expand the conflict in order to gain an advantage or prevent defeat, they suggest that a catastrophic escalation can still be avoided. Few believe that US forces will be directly involved in the fighting, or that Russia will dare to use nuclear weapons.
In this, Washington and its allies behave exceptionally frivolously. Although a catastrophic escalation can probably be avoided, the ability of the warring parties to cope with this danger is far from indisputable. The risk of such an escalation is significantly higher than is commonly believed. And given that the consequences of the spread of the conflict could mean the emergence of a major war in Europe and, possibly, even a nuclear apocalypse, there are good reasons for special concern about this.
To understand the dynamics of escalation in Ukraine, start with the goals of each side. From the very beginning of the special operation, both Moscow and Washington have significantly increased their ambitions, and now both countries are firmly committed to the idea of victory and achieving grandiose political goals. As a result, each side has powerful incentives to find ways to win and, more importantly, avoid defeat. In practice, this means that the United States can join the fighting if they desperately want to win or prevent the defeat of Ukraine. At the same time, Russia can use nuclear weapons if it desperately wants to win or faces the threat of imminent defeat, which is quite likely if the United States finds itself directly involved in hostilities.
Moreover, given the determination of each side to achieve its goals, there is little chance of a reasonable compromise. The maximalist thinking prevailing now in both Washington and Moscow gives each side even more determination to achieve victory on the battlefield so that it can dictate the conditions of a possible peace. In fact, the absence of a possible diplomatic solution gives both sides an additional incentive to climb up the "escalation ladder". What is further down this ladder can be something truly catastrophic: the number of deaths and destruction will exceed the threshold of the Second World War.
The United States and its allies initially supported Ukraine in order to prevent Russia's victory and help negotiate a favorable cessation of hostilities for themselves. <...> They also tried to cause serious damage to the Russian economy by imposing unprecedented sanctions against it.
As US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin explained the goals in April: "We want Russia to be weakened to such an extent that it can no longer do what it did in Ukraine." In fact, the United States has declared its intention to knock Russia out of the great powers.
Moreover, the United States has linked its reputation with the outcome of the conflict. President Joe Biden called Russia's special operation in Ukraine "genocide" and accused Russian President Vladimir Putin of being a "war criminal" who should be tried for "war crimes." Such presidential proclamations make it difficult to speculate that Washington may back down. If Russia gains the upper hand in Ukraine, then a serious blow will be dealt to the US positions in the world.
But Russian ambitions have also expanded. Contrary to popular opinion in the West, Moscow did not enter Ukraine in order to conquer it and make it part of the Great Russia. Basically, the Kremlin was concerned about preventing Ukraine from becoming a stronghold of the West on the border with Russia. Putin and his advisers were particularly concerned about Ukraine's possible entry into NATO. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov succinctly stated this in mid-January, saying at a press conference: "The key to everything is to guarantee that NATO will not expand to the east." For Russian leaders, the prospect of Ukraine's membership in NATO is, as Putin himself put it before the start of his own, "a direct threat to Russia's security," which can only be eliminated by military measures, turning Ukraine into a neutral state or into a "bankrupt state."
If we look from this point of view, it seems that Russia's territorial goals have significantly expanded since the beginning of the special operation. <...>At the same time, the threat to Russia today is even greater than before the special operation.
And mainly because the Biden administration is now determined to nullify all of Russia's territorial gains and destroy Russian power forever. For Moscow, the matter is complicated by the fact that Finland and Sweden are joining NATO, and Ukraine is now better armed and more closely tied to the West. Now Moscow cannot afford to lose in Ukraine and will use all available means to do so. Putin seems confident that Russia will eventually prevail over Ukraine and its Western patrons. "Today we hear that they want to defeat us on the battlefield," he said in early July. — What can I say? Let them try. The objectives of the special military operation will be achieved. There is no doubt about it."
Ukraine, for its part, pursues the same goals as the Biden administration. Ukrainians seek to return the territories lost to Russia, including Crimea, and a weaker Russia will certainly be less dangerous for Ukraine. In addition, they are also confident that they can win, as Ukrainian Defense Minister Alexei Reznikov made clear in mid-July when he said: "Russia can definitely be defeated, and Ukraine has already shown how to do it." His American counterpart seems to agree with this. "Our help is really making a difference on the battlefield," Austin said in a speech at the end of July. — Russia thinks it can overcome Ukraine — and overcome us. But this is just the latest in a series of Russian miscalculations."
In fact, Kiev, Washington and Moscow are deeply committed to the idea of defeating their opponent, which leaves little room for compromise. Neither Kiev nor Washington, for example, will almost certainly accept Ukraine's neutral status. Indeed, Ukraine is becoming more closely tied to the West every day. It is unlikely that Russia will return all or even some part of the territory. Moreover, the hostility that has fueled the conflict in the Donbas between pro-Russian separatists and the Ukrainian government for the past eight years is now more acute than ever.
These conflicting interests of the parties explain why so many observers believe that a negotiated settlement of the conflict will not happen in the near future, and therefore foresee a bloody impasse in the situation. And they are right about that. But many of them underestimate the possibility of a catastrophic escalation, which is inherent in the protracted military conflict in Ukraine.
There are three main ways of escalation: one or both sides deliberately escalate in order to win; one or both sides deliberately escalate in order to prevent defeat, or the fighting escalates not by conscious choice, but unintentionally. Each path could lead to the United States directly entering into conflict, or Russia using nuclear weapons, and possibly both.
America's entry into Ukraine After the Biden administration came to the conclusion that Russia could be defeated in Ukraine, it began to send Kiev more and more (and more powerful) weapons.
The West has begun to build up Ukraine's offensive capabilities by sending weapons such as HIMARS multiple rocket launchers, in addition to "defensive" ones such as Javelin anti-tank missiles. Over time, the lethality and quantity of Western weapons in Ukraine have increased. Remember that back in March, Washington vetoed a plan to transfer Polish MiG-29 fighters to Ukraine on the grounds that this could lead to an escalation of hostilities. But in July, he no longer raised any objections when Slovakia announced that it was considering sending the same aircraft to Kiev. The United States is also considering transferring its own F-15 and F-16 to Ukraine. The United States and its allies are training the Ukrainian military and providing them with important intelligence that the APU uses to destroy key Russian targets.
Moreover, as The New York Times reported, the West has a "secret network of special forces and spies" on the territory of Ukraine. Washington may not be directly involved in the fighting, but it is already deeply involved in the military conflict in Ukraine. And now he is just a few steps away from having his own soldiers pull the triggers and American pilots push the buttons to launch combat missiles.
The American army can participate in combat operations in various ways. Let's consider a situation when the conflict drags on for a year or more, and there is no diplomatic solution or a real path to Ukraine's victory. At the same time, Washington is desperately trying to put an end to the hostilities — perhaps because it needs to focus on containing China, or because the economic costs of helping Ukraine are causing political problems at home in the US and in Europe. In these circumstances, American politicians will have a motive to think about riskier steps, such as the introduction of a no-fly zone over Ukraine or the introduction of small contingents of US ground forces to help Ukraine.
The scenario of US intervention is more likely if the Ukrainian army begins to collapse and Russia wins a major victory. In this case, given the Biden administration's deep commitment to preventing such an outcome, the United States could try to reverse the situation by taking direct part in the fighting. It is easy to imagine how US officials believe that their country's credibility is at stake and convince themselves that the limited use of force will save Ukraine without prompting Putin to use nuclear weapons. Alternatively, a desperate Ukraine may launch large-scale attacks on Russian cities, hoping that such an escalation will provoke a massive Russian response that will finally force the United States to join the fighting.
The final scenario of American intervention involves an unintended escalation: Washington, unwittingly, finds itself drawn into a military conflict by an unforeseen event that develops in an upward spiral. For example, American and Russian fighter jets that came into close contact over the Baltic Sea accidentally collided. Such an incident can easily lead to escalation, given the high level of fear on both sides, lack of communication and mutual demonization.
Or maybe Lithuania is again blocking the passage through its territory of sanctioned goods heading from Russia to Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave separated from the rest of the country. Lithuania did just that in mid-June, but backed down in mid-July after Moscow signaled it was considering "tough measures" to end what it considered an illegal blockade. However, the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs resists its complete removal. Since Lithuania is a member of NATO, the United States will almost certainly stand up for it if Russia attacks this country.
Or perhaps Russia is destroying a building in Kiev or a training ground somewhere in Ukraine and inadvertently killing a significant number of Americans, such as aid workers, intelligence operatives or military advisers. The Biden administration, faced with public outrage at home, will decide that it must take retaliatory measures and strike at Russian targets, which will then lead to an exchange of blows directly between the two sides.
Finally, there is a chance that the fighting in the south of Ukraine will damage the Russian-controlled Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, the largest in Europe, to such an extent that it will emit radiation throughout the region. This will encourage Russia to respond in kind. Dmitry Medvedev, the former president and prime minister of Russia, made an ominous allusion to this possibility, saying in August: "Don't forget that the European Union also has nuclear facilities. And incidents are also possible there." If Russia strikes a European nuclear reactor, the United States will almost certainly enter into a military conflict.
Of course, Moscow can also provoke an escalation. We cannot discount the possibility that Russia, desperately trying to stop the flow of Western military aid to Ukraine, will strike at the countries through which the bulk of it passes: Poland or Romania, both of which are members of NATO. There is also the possibility that Russia could launch a massive cyberattack against one or more European countries helping Ukraine, which would cause serious damage to its critical infrastructure. Such an attack could prompt the US to launch a retaliatory cyberattack against Russia. If it succeeds, Moscow can respond militarily. If such a US cyberattack fails, Washington may decide that the only way to punish Russia is to strike it directly. Such scenarios seem far-fetched, but they are by no means impossible. And these are just some of the many ways in which the current local conflict can turn into something much bigger and much more dangerous.
The nuclear conflict, although the Russian military inflicted huge damage on Ukraine, Moscow still did not want to escalate the conflict in order to achieve victory in it.
Putin has not increased the size of his armed forces through large-scale conscription. He also has not yet targeted Ukraine's electricity grid, which would be relatively easy to do and would cause huge damage to this country. Many Russians scold Putin for not conducting the special operation more vigorously. Putin acknowledged this criticism, but made it clear that he would strengthen the military component if necessary. "We haven't even started anything serious yet," he said in July, hinting that Russia could and would do more if the military situation worsened.
And what about the final form of such escalation — nuclear? There are three circumstances under which Putin can use atomic weapons. First, if the armed forces of the United States and its NATO allies directly joined the fighting. Such a development of events will not only noticeably shift the military balance against Russia, but will also mean that it will conduct military operations right at its doorstep against great powers that can easily spread to its territory. Russian leaders would surely consider their survival in danger, which would give them a powerful incentive to use nuclear weapons to save the situation. At a minimum, they will consider demonstrative nuclear tactical strikes designed to convince the West to retreat. It is impossible to know in advance whether such a step will put an end to the military conflict or lead to its escalation, getting out of control.
In his February 24 speech, Putin hinted that he would turn to nuclear weapons if the United States and its allies came into conflict. Addressing "those who may be tempted to intervene," he said: "They should know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history." His warning did not escape the attention of Avril Haines, the director of US National Intelligence, who in May predicted that Putin could use nuclear weapons if NATO "either intervenes or is going to intervene" because such an intervention "will give Putin the feeling that he is about to lose in the conflict in Ukraine."
In the second nuclear scenario, Ukraine itself will reverse the situation on the battlefield, without the direct participation of the United States. If the Ukrainian forces were ready to defeat the Russian army and regain the lost territory of their country, there is no doubt that Moscow would view this outcome as an existential threat requiring a nuclear response. After all, Putin and his advisers were so alarmed by Kiev's growing rapprochement with the West that they deliberately decided to launch their own in Ukraine, despite clear warnings from the United States and its allies about the serious consequences that Russia would face. Unlike the first scenario, here Moscow will use nuclear weapons not in the context of a war with the United States, but against Ukraine. The Kremlin will do this without fear of nuclear retaliation, since Kiev does not have atomic weapons, and Washington is not interested in unleashing a world nuclear war. The absence of a clear retaliatory threat would make it easier for Putin to consider the possibility of using atomic weapons.
In the third scenario, the conflict enters a protracted deadlock, which has no diplomatic solution and costs Moscow extremely expensive. Desperate to end the conflict on favorable terms, Putin may resort to nuclear escalation in order to win. As in the previous scenario, when the Kremlin goes to it to avoid defeat, a retaliatory nuclear strike by the United States is unlikely. In all these scenarios, Russia, at least initially, is likely to use tactical nuclear weapons against a small set of military targets. If necessary, it can hit cities and towns in subsequent attacks. Gaining a military advantage will be one of the goals of the strategy, but more important for Russia would be to deliver a decisive psychological blow — to cause such fear in the West that the United States and its allies will quickly move to end the conflict on favorable terms for Moscow. Not surprisingly, William Burns, the director of the CIA, remarked in April: "None of us can take lightly the threat posed by the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons or low-power nuclear weapons."
Flirting with disaster It is possible to recognize that although one of these catastrophic scenarios can theoretically be realized, the chances of this are still small and therefore should not cause much concern.
After all, the leaders of both sides have powerful incentives to prevent the American army from fighting in Ukraine and to avoid even the limited use of nuclear weapons, not to mention a real nuclear war.
If only we all had enough of such optimism. In truth, the generally accepted point of view significantly downplays the danger of escalation in Ukraine. Firstly, wars in general, as a rule, have their own logic, which makes it difficult to predict their course. The one who says that he knows with certainty which way the military conflict in Ukraine will go is mistaken. The dynamics of escalation in wartime are very difficult to predict or control, which should serve as a warning to those who are sure that events in Ukraine can be controlled. Moreover, as the Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz recognized, nationalism contributes to the escalation of modern wars to their extreme forms, especially when the stakes are high for both sides. This does not mean that wars cannot be limited, but it is not easy to do so. Finally, given the staggering costs of a possible nuclear war for the great Powers, even the small probability of its occurrence should make everyone think long and hard about what this conflict could lead to.
This dangerous situation creates a powerful incentive to search for a diplomatic solution to the Ukrainian military conflict. However, unfortunately, there is no political settlement in it yet, since both sides are firmly committed to military goals, which now make compromise almost impossible. The Biden administration was supposed to work with Russia to resolve the Ukrainian crisis before the special operation began in February. It's too late to make a deal now. Russia, Ukraine and the West are stuck in a terrible situation from which there is no obvious way out yet. One can only hope that the leaders of both sides will manage the military conflict in such a way as to avoid its catastrophic escalation. However, for tens of millions of people whose lives are at stake, this is little consolation.
