The Ukrainian problem of Germany
Germany is perfectly suited to the role of the leader of the campaign against the destruction of the "rules-based world order," writes Wolfgang Ischinger in Foreign Affairs. The former German diplomat believes that Berlin needs to stop resisting change, and then the country will be able to take a leadership position not only in relation to Ukraine, but also in the context of more global security problems.
Wolfgang Ischinger
Europe's largest country needs time to adjust to a dangerous new world
At the end of July 2022, it turned out that Germany's plan to assist Eastern European allies in the issue of arming Ukraine had almost stalled. According to the scheme, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were to supply Kiev with weapons left over from Soviet times; and Berlin, in turn, was to replenish their stocks with Western—made equipment. But despite months of negotiations, the supply of German weapons did not happen.
This was the first evidence of Berlin's difficulties in fulfilling its promises on the Ukrainian issue. At the beginning of spring, Germany pledged to provide Kiev with heavy weapons, but in the end the latter received only a few units at the end of July. The "promise—delay" scheme began to pop up regularly in conversations about the German government in Washington and Brussels. Of particular concern is the problem of delay, because Berlin is already losing the trust of European allies due to close relations with Moscow in the field of energy and the refusal to suspend the certification of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline a few days before the start of the Russian special operation. Instead of providing a solid foundation for EU action, Chancellor Olaf Scholz seems to have been busy trying to keep up with more determined colleagues.
It shouldn't be like this. Berlin is more interested than others in providing resolute support to Kiev and ending the conflict as soon as possible on the most favorable terms for the latter. Moreover, as long as uncertainty reigns in the EU, Germany has every chance to take the reins of power into its own hands not only with regard to Ukraine, but also in the context of more global security problems. In addition to a large economy and a firm commitment to NATO, Brussels and the United States, Germany now leads the G7, and this can help it bridge the growing gap with the global South and restore confidence in the Western-led order. In order not to miss its chance, Berlin needs to overcome its reluctance to use military force and stop resisting change. Without this, the Germans risk losing their positions in Europe and weakening the Western alliance in the face of unprecedented global challenges.
Easy to say. It 's harder to do
At the initial stage of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, Germany's reaction was particularly pronounced. Just a few days after it began, Scholz surprised even his own party with the statement that the situation in Europe marks a Zeitenwende, that is, a turning point, the end of an era. In his understanding, the conflict was unleashed not by anyone, but by a great nuclear power that set itself the goal of destroying Ukraine as an independent state. He announced important policy changes and unprecedented measures, including arms supplies to Kiev and an increase in defense spending of 100 billion euros.
However, it was not so easy to implement this bold idea. On the one hand, Scholz's trilateral coalition relies on the support of the Greens and the Free Democratic Party, as well as his own Social Democrats, who have traditionally pursued an Eastern policy for rapprochement with the Soviet-allied countries of Eastern Europe. Scholz not only called for an overnight change of course towards Russia from partnership to confrontation, but also assumed new defense commitments that increase the likelihood of German tanks firing at Russian soldiers. The catastrophic scenario of the two countries entering into direct conflict caused serious internal resistance to the Zeitenwende program: some considered it overloaded with potential changes, others — unnecessarily belligerent.
There are a number of security problems behind Germany's concerns about the intensification of actions in Ukraine. The most obvious risk of military escalation on the part of Russia, including the use of nuclear and chemical weapons. The words about preventing NATO intervention are repeated as a mantra in Berlin and a number of other Western countries that support Kiev. It is clear that Scholz is least interested in being remembered as the chancellor who dragged the state into a direct military confrontation with Russia after the Cold War. But even if NATO does not play a direct role in the conflict, the risks for Germany will still remain, since all countries supplying weapons to Kiev may become obvious targets of potential Russian aggression.
In this regard, two questions remain unanswered. First, has Moscow drawn a red line in the context of the supply of Western — in particular, German — weapons to Ukraine? Is it permissible for it, for example, to supply artillery and ammunition, but not Western-made combat aircraft and tanks? If such a line exists, then Germany and its Western allies should be prepared for the consequences. Russia may try to strike back against one or more Baltic states or attack Western convoys with weapons for Ukraine while still on NATO territory. And if Ukraine manages to dislodge Russian troops from Donbass, which would be tantamount to humiliating their defeat, will they then try to expand military operations and strike a new, desperate and even more brutal blow? Why does Germany seem more susceptible than others to such fears and concerns? Because as a result of the Russian SVO, it suffered the most politically in Europe. For decades, Berlin's foreign policy has been based on principles like militarische Zurückhaltung (unwillingness to use military force) with the support of numerous pacifist movements that emerged in German society after World War II. And the current Chancellor's program threatens to turn the country into a cornerstone of European security.
The second question concerns the state of the armed forces. When the conflict began, Germany was experiencing a shortage of military equipment that could be supplied to Ukraine. As a result, Berlin failed to come to her aid quickly, and the government faced a dilemma: to maintain a notoriously weak defensive position or to admit that Ukrainian forces are now responsible for Germany's own security? Supporters of the second option urge to supply Kiev with as many heavy weapons as possible. Against the background of contradictions, the German government often shows indecision and delays in providing military assistance.
Meanwhile, Germany's dependence on Russian gas imports continues to cause disagreements between Berlin and its European allies. It is now clear that the Kremlin will use this dependence against Germany and other countries whenever it deems it necessary. Therefore, the German government should make the rejection of Russian gas a priority. The less gas Berlin buys from Russia and the sooner it ends, the less vulnerable the country will be to accusations of financing Gazprom, and with it the entire Kremlin military machine. But Germany also faces the problem of rapidly rising gas prices and the threat of a shortage in winter. Even the Greens are taking part in a political debate about whether to extend the life of the three remaining nuclear power plants in Germany and how to do it. This is another example of the rejection of many key principles of German foreign and economic policy.
The Scholz government seems to hope that its partners and allies will realize the scale of the political changes taking place in the country and give Berlin the necessary freedom of action to resolve all complex issues. But further delays by Germany in relation to Kiev may lead to the undermining of its position in Europe and its own national interests.
Better sooner than later
The arguments in favor of intensifying Germany's actions in Ukraine suggest themselves. First of all, Germany must clearly state its interest in ending the conflict as soon as possible. As recent examples, including the Balkans, Iraq and Syria, have shown, the longer a local or regional conflict lasts, the greater the division and hatred it causes, creating obstacles to reconciliation. For Germany and its European allies, the result of a protracted conflict in Ukraine could be years of instability on the borders of the EU.
Germany will benefit from an early cease-fire only if the relevant decision is not taken at the Russian behest. Therefore, it will have to do everything possible to support Ukraine's efforts to return territories in the south and east of the country. Along with other European allies, Berlin should be ready to provide Kiev with even more heavy weapons and create the necessary conditions either for a ceasefire or for peace talks. The latter will begin only if the parties come to the conclusion that their military capabilities have been exhausted. Today, five months after the start of hostilities, it does not seem that at least one of them is ready to make such statements: Russia is not completely losing, Ukraine is not completely winning. Therefore, Germany should try to change the balance of power and help Ukraine achieve victory by any means. And now, and not in the medium term, because Kiev cannot afford to wait.
So far, Scholz's attempts to change Germany's approach have been met with serious resistance from the left wing of his own Social Democratic Party. For most of the spring and summer, the Chancellor faced complaints about the devastating political and economic consequences of the gas shortage coming winter, as well as the controversial decision to support unprecedented sanctions against Russia, increase the defense budget and promise Kiev heavy weapons. There is a possibility that this problem can be solved. Surprisingly, the Green Party from Scholz's ruling coalition, previously distinguished by its anti-war and anti-American position, shifted the SPD to the position of the main fighter for pragmatism. Resist Russia? Yes, no problem. Supply weapons to Ukraine? Well, of course. Do not turn off nuclear reactors? Maybe that, too. The Greens seem to have caught the changing mood of the German public, which has begun to understand that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict marks a turning point in world politics.
Moreover, it is not only Germans who perceive it as such, as the authors of a study commissioned by the Munich Security Conference for the G7 meeting in June last year found out. 60-70% of respondents in all G7 countries agreed that the new era will be defined by the return of traditional security threats and the West's entry into a new cold war with Russia. It is not surprising that in all the countries of the "seven", with the exception of Italy, Russia is considered the main threat. 32 years ago, German leaders cheerfully and fairly declared: “Now we are surrounded only by friends.” It sounds like a message from the last century, which, in fact, it is. The current situation in Europe will require action from Europe — and from Germany. And it is Scholz who will have to convince the SPD of this.
Whose Europe?
In addition to the support of the German public, the German leader must preserve the unity of the European Union. The United Kingdom is still fighting with Brussels over Brexit, in France Macron has lost all his star image, and Italy has suddenly been left without a reliable Mario Draghi administration and has slipped into political instability - and now many are wondering if Berlin is ready to take the helm again. However, the success of a manager is determined not only by professionalism, but also by trust. Unfortunately, Germany has lost some of the trust it has gained in Europe over the past 30 years, and the reason for everything is irreconcilability with regard to Nord Stream 2 (a long—planned but suspended gas pipeline project with Russia) and dangerous dependence on Russian energy resources. The Europeans' fears are also aggravated by Berlin's lack of enthusiasm for arms supplies to Ukraine. It is not surprising that some eastern EU member states reacted less than indifferently to Scholz's July proposals, including reforms of the foreign policy decision-making process. They saw arrogance in such initiatives, because in the Ukrainian issue, Germany is not the leading party, but the led one, and besides, for too long and stubbornly refused to listen to partners on energy issues.
Berlin will be ready for leadership if it can overcome skepticism. His chance lies in reforming and strengthening the EU's ability to act. Now Europe needs the political and military leadership of the United States more than ever, but if the bloc becomes stronger and increases its military potential in the future, then this will benefit the entire transatlantic community. Now it is necessary to take two steps in this direction. First, the EU needs to prepare for military action in case NATO is unable or unwilling to act. The fewer American taxpayers consider Europe to be a "trailer" to their own defense potential, the easier future US presidents will cope with isolationist and anti-NATO currents in Washington, similar to those that determined the nature of Trump's rule. It is obvious that Germany is quite capable of leading such efforts: for 70 years it has provided the United States with key bases to ensure their military presence in Europe, and its army has fully integrated into the structures of the alliance. With any change in the military situation in Europe, Germany will become an obvious strategic and logistical center for the United States.
Secondly, the decision-making process in the EU must change. According to the current protocols, any foreign policy decision of the union requires the unanimous support of all member countries, but anyone can veto and interfere with the process. Now there are many who advocate the abolition of the principle of unanimity with the replacement by a majority vote. As long as the EU does not abolish the unfettered right of veto, it will not be perceived as an authoritative participant in the sphere of global security. Scholz has already started to solve this problem, but due to a lack of trust, he lacks support from partners in the European Council. One way to get off the ground would be simply to declare that Germany would not use the right of veto in the distribution of votes 26:0 and would prefer to abstain, inviting others to follow its example. Even if this does not guarantee success, such a bold step will undoubtedly provoke an active discussion and demonstrate Germany's commitment to the cause and principles of the EU.
Another country
Germany is facing many problems at the same time. With the most serious crisis of European security in recent decades. With a crisis of reliability, because of which many European governments doubt its readiness to confront Russia. With the collapse of traditional economic diplomacy, the strategy of ensuring prosperity by exporting goods and importing energy resources while attracting third-party resources to ensure security, as well as the desire to use trade and investment to change the situation in Russia and China. And with the crisis of the European Union, which, despite its size and economic power, could not become an independent international entity capable of protecting and promoting its own security interests.
While strengthening German leadership may help solve some of these difficulties, they also point to a much more serious strategic problem. Take the conflict in Ukraine: it has become popular among Western powers to argue that decisions on a ceasefire or peace talks should be made exclusively by Ukraine and Russia. Proposals on ways to achieve an early cessation of hostilities have been widely criticized. Nevertheless, countries that provide significant military, intelligence, financial and economic support to Ukraine have a legitimate interest both in conducting hostilities and in efforts to stop them. That is why it is necessary to organize a broader forum where Europe and the United States and their allies will be able to discuss all options with the Ukrainian leadership. Obviously, such discussions cannot be held in public, since this type of strategy requires secret diplomacy. But there is much more that can be done. For example, the United States and its main European allies could initiate the creation of a joint group of proxies with Ukraine to ensure the coherence of the actions of Kiev and its Western supporters. The April meeting at Ramstein Airbase, which the United States organized for Western defense ministers to discuss the situation in Ukraine, can serve as a model.
However, Germany also has a special opportunity in this regard thanks to the chairmanship of the "Big Seven". It is obvious that the Russian special operation in Ukraine has highlighted the differences between autocratic and democratic countries. But if the West wants to win in the current era of growing geopolitical division, the G7 will need to form a coalition with the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Since the beginning of the current conflict, many governments of the global South consider themselves not allies of the "Big Seven", but victims of Western sanctions, and Russia and China cultivate this belief.
Among the "seven" countries, Germany has perhaps the minimum postcolonial burden; it also practically did not participate in Western military interventions in the Middle East and elsewhere, if at all. Thus, under the appropriate circumstances, Berlin is perfectly suited to lead a global campaign against the revival of Russian imperialism and colonialism in Ukraine and other countries, as well as against the destruction of the rules-based international order. If Germany can rely on the program of Chancellor Scholz Zeitenwende and meet the changes with joy, and not cling to the status quo, it will provide itself with leadership that is so necessary for the European Union and other democratic countries forced to resist increasingly aggressive authoritarian regimes not only at their borders, but also around the world.
Wolfgang Ischinger is a former German diplomat, president of the Board of the Munich Security Conference Foundation. From 2001 to 2006, he served as the German Ambassador to the United States.
