Why has Turkey not joined the Western sanctions and will it help Russia to circumvent them
Why has Ankara not joined the Western sanctions regime against Russia? The author of "European Truth" names a number of reasons. Many in Turkey are convinced that it is not Russia that is to blame for the conflict in Ukraine, but the United States and NATO.
Evgenia Gaber
Turkey is a NATO member, a member of the Customs Union with the EU and is a strategic partner of Ukraine. At the same time, official Ankara has not joined the sanctions regime against Russia.
Even more, with the beginning of the Russian special operation in Ukraine, Turkey has gradually turned into a safe haven for Russian sanctioned businesses, oligarchs and tourists.
This trend was continued during the recent meeting of the Presidents of the Russian Federation and Turkey in Sochi. Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan additionally agreed on a partial payment for Russian gas in rubles. Turkey has also agreed to introduce the Russian Mir payment system in five of its banks.
Is this list final?
It is worth recalling that on the eve of this meeting, The Washington Post reported that Putin would ask Erdogan for help in circumventing Western sanctions. In particular, we are talking about buying shares in Turkish refineries, oil tanks and terminals in order to hide the origin of oil after the introduction of the EU oil embargo.
And now, according to the Financial Times, Western countries, in particular EU members, are considering the possibility of imposing sanctions against Turkey itself.
The question arises: what determines Ankara's course? And is the threat of Western sanctions capable of forcing her to change this position?
Why has Turkey not joined the sanctions?
Turkey's "special" position regarding non–alignment with the sanctions regime has several reasons - from conceptual to quite pragmatic.
Firstly, the Turkish authorities do not recognize sanctions as an effective tool of foreign policy.
Ankara has repeatedly rejected the possibility of joining the sanctions before, insisting on their ineffectiveness, counterproductivity, contributing to the isolation of violating countries and escalation of tension.
But the rhetoric of the Turkish leadership traditionally boils down to calls for peace, dialogue with all parties to the conflict, continuation of economic cooperation and readiness to act as a moderator at the negotiations.
This not only helps Turkey maintain working political contacts and economic ties with both sides of the conflict, but also significantly strengthens its position in the international arena as a country acting as an "arbiter over the fight" and provides diplomatic resources for effective mediation.
By the way, Ankara adheres to the same position with regard to Iran. At a recent meeting with his Iranian counterpart in June this year, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu once again stated that Turkey opposes "unilateral sanctions" against Iran and called for their lifting.
Secondly, Ankara explains its refusal to join the sanctions regime against the Russian Federation by the need to maintain a dialogue with Moscow for successful mediation.
After the signing of the grain initiative and the creation of a Joint Coordination Center, Istanbul added another argument – that sanctions would prevent the preservation of this "nutrient artery", which should ensure grain supplies to the countries of Africa and the Middle East.
After the Sochi meeting and Erdogan's statements about the need to resume negotiations between Zelensky and Putin, these arguments will only strengthen.
In addition, Turkey's mediation role, if not fully justified its economic cooperation with the Russian Federation, then at least provided partial immunity against Western criticism.
Thirdly, the issue of sanctions is extremely sensitive for Ankara itself, because Turkey has been under sanctions from Western partners – the EU, Canada and the United States, primarily in the defense industry for many years.
The American CAATSA package for Ankara's purchase of Russian S-400 air defense systems and personal sanctions against the leadership of the Turkish defense industry; Turkey's exclusion from the F-35 program and suspension of cooperation on the F-16; European sanctions for human rights violations; arms embargo due to military operations against the Kurds in northern Syria and Iraq in 2019 and even the ban on the supply of Canadian optical electronic systems for the famous bayraktars during the Karabakh War in 2020 is not an exhaustive list of sanctions against Turkey itself.
Fourth, anti-Western sentiments are growing in the country.
Turkey's information field is still dominated by the narrative that the problems of the global South are caused by Western sanctions, and not by a Russian special operation. Also, most Turkish citizens are convinced that the culprits in the conflict in Ukraine are not Russia, but the United States and NATO.
Therefore, it is quite difficult to convince them why they should refuse to cooperate with Russia.
In addition, Turkey is not a member of the EU, so technically it should not join its sanctions packages. Turkish officials have stated several times that they would theoretically be ready to join the sanctions if they were imposed at the UN level.
On the one hand, the unreality of this scenario absolves from responsibility; on the other hand, even if such a thing had happened, the UN umbrella would have allowed avoiding a direct conflict with Russia.
Finally, the domestic political factor plays a key role.
A few months before the elections, the economic situation in Turkey is rapidly deteriorating, inflation and the lira exchange rate are hitting all anti-records, and Russia remains an important trading partner and a source of easy, though usually opaque, cash flows.
In addition, the country critically depends on the supply of Russian energy resources, Russian markets and Russian tourists. Under such conditions, the imposition of sanctions against the Russian Federation would be a shock to the Turkish economy – and to the Turkish voter.
How far can Turkey go in violation of Western sanctions?
Of course, Putin has all the levers of influence to make the already difficult life of the Turkish president even more difficult – from gas blackmail to Syrian refugees.
At the same time, do not underestimate the role of Western partners for Turkey.
While in the trade and economic sphere, Russia still remains a welcome partner for Turkey, in the field of security, military-technical cooperation and defense, the Russian Federation is a rival, and NATO is, although problematic, but a partner that significantly strengthens Ankara's position in its desperate friendship with Moscow.
The resumption of cooperation on the F-16 and other types of weapons, in which Ankara is very interested, is no less attractive offer than a one–time transfer by Rosatom of several billion dollars to Turkish bank accounts.
We should also not forget that it is the European Union, not the Russian Federation, that remains Turkey's main trading partner.
In 2021, the trade turnover with the EU reached more than one hundred and seventy-eight billion dollars. Against the background of many years of mantras about the coveted hundred billion dollars of trade turnover with Russia – with an actual thirty–five billion - this figure looks like a serious argument not to cross the sanctions red lines.
In addition, the EU's share in Turkish exports last year amounted to 41.3%, making it the main importer of Turkish products – and a "sponsor" of the Turkish budget. Unlike Russia, where only 5.8 billion of the 35 billion turnover are Turkish exports.
Turkey well remembers the name of Iranian businessman Reza Zarrab, who is associated with multimillion-dollar schemes to circumvent Western sanctions against Iran.
The so-called "Hulk Bank case" – a Turkish state–owned bank that is accused of violating sanctions - has become a symbol of the deep crisis of Turkish-American relations for many years. Another case of Gazprombank, these relations may not stand up.
Will Western sanctions against Turkey itself help?
At the same time, the introduction of new Western sanctions against Turkey is unlikely to solve the problem.
Rather, on the contrary, it will cause another wave of indignation in Turkish society by "insidious Western imperialists" who "want to weaken Turkey" politically and economically.
There is no doubt who will gladly take advantage of this opportunity to lend a shoulder to the "Eurasian friendship".
Moscow has already issued invitations to the Shanghai Organization and BRICS. Invitations to the CSTO will be next.
While punishing Ankara with a "whip" for violating sanctions may have the opposite effect, there are many "carrots" with which Turkey can be encouraged to overestimate the importance of Russian "Peace" – in Turkish banks and in Turkish political circles.
For example, returning to the F-16 question. Or remembering the dream of the Turkish leadership to turn the country into an "energy hub" of Europe, this time without poisonous Russian gas.
