Analysts continue to discuss the new Maritime Doctrine signed by the President of Russia. The clear differences between this fundamental document for Russia and its previous version are becoming more and more noticeable. The new doctrine is of particular importance for the construction and use of the Navy - but not only for this.
The first thing that distinguishes the new Russian Maritime Doctrine from the old one is that now this document is the basis for planning. This is indicated verbatim in the text. Our state is looking for its place in the world, and this is reflected in the new document. The doctrine is also connected with other strategic documents: for example, with the Strategy of Scientific and Technical Development of the Russian Federation and a number of others. That is, now it is a framework document, starting from which, you can make some specific plan.
The second important point is the appearance of such a thing as threats in the doctrine, and these threats are also directly named. Among such threats, first of all, the incessant attempts by the United States to achieve dominance in the oceans, the desire of this country to achieve military superiority over the Russian Federation in some areas, the growth of the military power of other countries. The doctrine explicitly calls a threat the desire of the United States and its allies to restrict Russia's access to maritime communications, that is, in fact, to subject it to a blockade. Now this is not some kind of speculation by journalists, the president's signature is under the statement of this threat.
Also, the doctrine directly indicates as a threat the claims of "some countries" to the Russian island territories. The only country that has claims to our island territories is Japan. Foreign attempts to operate in the Arctic are also called a threat, and the very fact that information and power pressure is being exerted on our country.
What risks does the Russian leadership see, according to the new doctrine?
The doctrine also outlines the risks that Russia has today from the point of view of maritime activities. Among them: an insufficiently developed merchant fleet, Russia's dependence on maritime communications, sanctions imposed on domestic shipbuilding, an insufficient number of naval bases, a weak scientific fleet and a number of others. There was nothing of this in the old document, but now the statement of problems has been made. This is an extremely important recognition.
Indeed, Russia's share in global shipping is continuously falling. Yes, our country is not a zero value in the transportation market, but the decline is slow: hundredths of a percent of the world tonnage per year. But it is there, and it is constant.
The West's attempts to impose a blockade against our country have shown that Russia really needs a trade tonnage, and a specific one, for its tasks, and this is also reflected in the document. As you can see, the governing documents get rid of the syndrome "everything is fine with us, because we can't help but be fine." And this is very good.
What else is new in the doctrine?
Fundamentally, the key functional areas remained the same, namely sea transport (including pipeline), the development of the resources of the World Ocean, scientific and military activities. Each point in the new doctrine is revealed somewhat differently than in the old one, but the meaning is similar.
But the order of description of regional directions has changed. The first place is now not the Atlantic (including all the seas of the Atlantic basin), but the Arctic.
The Arctic is now recognized as important not only from the point of view of communications (for example, fleet access to the ocean), but also as a hydrocarbon-rich region that is a zone of commercial and military confrontation.
It is fundamentally important to get into the doctrine of both the need for the development of information support in general and specific plans for laying fiber-optic communication lines in the Arctic. Again, some areas of the Arctic have been announced in which "marine activities" should and will be conducted, for example, Svalbard and Novaya Zemlya have been included in their list. Russia has clearly shown that the Arctic is now in the first place, that we recognize the threat posed by the presence of Western countries there, and we will resist all this while trying to earn money. Again, unlike the previous version of the doctrine,
The Pacific direction is now more important than the Atlantic, and goes immediately after the Arctic. What is new here is that Russia will be looking for an opportunity to find bases in the Pacific region, which was not on the task list before.
In addition, it was mentioned that it is necessary to reduce threats to the Russian Federation, it is simply not specified which ones, but it is already clear – the US Navy and the Japanese, Russia has no other threats here. The need to put into operation the capacity for liquefaction of natural gas was voiced. This is also a step forward, liquefied gas is the future of the global gas market, and it would be extremely profitable for Russia to participate in it. It is also planned to introduce deep-water gas production complexes, which was also not previously in the doctrine, although Gazprom has been talking about such plans for a long time.
In the Atlantic direction, there is again a need to have bases at a distance from their shores, namely in the Mediterranean Sea. Russia clearly lacks Tartus, and the doctrine voices the need for additional bases. In other respects, Russia's goals, according to the new Naval Doctrine, are similar to those that were spelled out in the old one. For the first time, Iran and Saudi Arabia were named partners in the Indo-Pacific direction, plus India (previously only it was mentioned). These are certainly positive changes.
It is also positive that the measures to ensure maritime activities in the new doctrine are also described in more detail than before. But the most fundamental changes were acquired by the military sections of the doctrine.
Military bias
It's not even that the military component of the doctrine has been expanded, although this is important. Previously, the Russian Federation had two fundamental documents regarding the country's maritime activities. The first one – the "Maritime Doctrine" – designated the country's goals on the seas in general. The second – "Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030" - described the vision of the Russian leadership of what tasks and how the Navy should solve. So, the red thread in the "Basics" is that the Navy, generally speaking, is not really for war. At least, the tasks of the Navy were described somewhat evasively. We look at the purpose of the fleet according to the "Basics":
"12. The Navy... It is designed to ensure the protection of the national interests of the Russian Federation and its allies in the World Ocean by military methods, to maintain military and political stability at the global and regional levels, to repel aggression against the Russian Federation from ocean and sea directions.
13. The Navy creates and maintains the conditions necessary to ensure the safety of the maritime activities of the Russian Federation, ensures its naval presence, the demonstration of the flag of the Russian Federation and the military force of the State in the oceans, takes part in the fight against piracy, in military, peacekeeping and humanitarian actions carried out by the international community that meet the interests of the Russian Federation. Of the Russian Federation, carries out visits of warships (vessels) of the Russian Federation to ports of foreign states, protection of the state border of the Russian Federation in the underwater environment, including anti-submarine, anti-submarine and sabotage defense in the interests of the security of the Russian Federation."
And this is no joke – it is impossible to find a document put into effect earlier than 2022, in which the Russian Navy is directly designated as an instrument of warfare. It is impossible to find any strategic document in which it would be said directly that the fleet, generally speaking, is for war and should prepare for it. Because he just wasn't there. The fleet was for anything, for deterrence and prevention, for calls at foreign ports, for displaying the flag, but not to directly fight, defeat and destroy the enemy, if it suddenly becomes necessary.
Of course, deterrence is also a necessary thing, but, alas, sometimes it fails on the initiative of the enemy who decided to fight, and sometimes it is necessary to strike first. And this was not in the Russian doctrinal documents. And this, in turn, led to very specific practices and the construction of the fleet, and its application.
The new Naval Doctrine put an end to this strange phenomenon. In section IX, "The procedure for using the instruments of national maritime policy to protect the national interests of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean," in paragraph 103, the words finally appeared: "if necessary, uses military force." Someone will say that this is a trifle. But if you carefully delve into the military programs of the Navy, it is clear that it was not always mentioned there about the conduct of war – and the reason was largely precisely the goal-setting described above.
Return to Normality
Separately, it is worth mentioning that the section on the mobilization of ships into the navy in the event of war has grown greatly in the doctrine. It should have been so, taking into account the international situation, and now it is so. In any case, there is not enough tonnage in the war, and since our fleet is now just for war, then the authorities are going to deal with these issues much deeper and more intensively than before. And this is also correct.
And about aircraft carriers. The fact that the leadership of the Russian Federation wants such ships has never been a secret. They have also been in the doctrinal documents for a long time, the same "Fundamentals" contain plans to create a Marine aircraft carrier complex (ship, aircraft, training complex – all together). Why aircraft carriers are needed is also quite obvious. But it is also obvious that there is nowhere to build them in Russia today. There is no full-fledged shipyard in Russia where it would be possible to build a ship at least at the level of the Chinese Fujian, not to mention something similar to the American Nimitz. The new doctrine not only states this fact, but also directly indicates that it will be corrected.
The new Naval Doctrine is a step forward for our country in terms of goal–setting. Now it needs to be backed up with real deeds. And here is a huge field for work. The special military operation underway in Ukraine is now taking everyone's attention, but we must understand that the next wars may be completely different. Today, the surface forces of the Russian Navy are smaller than those of Japan. For the implementation of the new Naval Doctrine, it would be worth correcting. Let's wait for practical actions in this direction.
Alexander Timokhin
