The myth of the S-400: why the power of the Russian air defense is exaggerated
The S-400 poses a great danger to NATO, warns the author of the Business Insider article. It is capable of detecting all American stealth fighters. The West should not underestimate this SAM, otherwise it may end badly. However, it is not without drawbacks, the author notes.
The Russian S-400 Triumph, often referred to in NATO circles as the SA-21 Growler, is widely touted as one of the most, if not the most combat-ready, air defense systems in the world. Thanks to the ability to use various missiles to combat different aerial targets, a range of more than 400 kilometers and the widely recognized capabilities to combat inconspicuous objects made using stealth technologies, the S-400 has gained a reputation as one of the few systems capable of resisting American approaches to air warfare based on air supremacy.
But does such an intimidating reputation of the S-400 really deserve it, or is it just another Russian weapons system that is based on the Kremlin's well-proven ability to manipulate the media in the interests of mass arms sales abroad?
Russia deliberately concealed the history of the S-400 tests, and in the few situations when the complex was in real combat conditions, its characteristics raised more questions than answers. But thanks to extensive research on the development and use of the system, supported by expert assessments from different countries, we can draw two seemingly illogical conclusions about the S-400.
Firstly, the system is not nearly as effective as it is often considered. Secondly: nevertheless, it is one of the most effective air defense systems used in the world today.
No air defense system in the world is 100% reliable
Although these assessments may seem to be the opposite, the complexity of air defense as a type of military is often underestimated both in the media and in public discussions. The emergence of hypersonic missiles has further exacerbated unrealistic expectations of modern air defense systems, since these extremely high-speed and maneuverable missiles are often advertised as super-weapons precisely because they can hit modern air and missile defense platforms.
The emphasis on the value of hypersound as a means of overcoming current air defense systems suggests that subsonic and even supersonic missiles cannot overcome them. But intercepting any missile is a very difficult task, with which no air defense system in the world can cope with 100 percent efficiency on a permanent basis.
This point was made very clear in an article by David Mosher published in the December 2000 issue of Arms Control Today. The original article can no longer be found online, but it has since been republished by the Rand Corporation. Mosher, who previously headed the national security division at the Congressional Budget Office, after being director of the American Physical Society's Research Group on Overclocking Interception Systems for National Missile Defense, says:
"Almost everyone underestimates the huge range of efforts that are required to create an effective missile defense."
David Mosher "Understanding the Extremely High Cost of Missile Defense" for "Arms Control Today" ("Understanding the Extraordinary Cost of Missile Defense," by David Mosher for the "Arms Control Today").
Truly advanced S-400 capabilities
The development of the Russian S-400 system probably began in the 1980s. However, these efforts were not known to the general public until 1993, that is, even two years after the collapse of the USSR. Like many former Soviet programs that continued their lives under the newly formed Russian Federation, budget constraints dictated most of the composition of the S-400: according to some estimates, 70 to 80% of its parts and equipment were borrowed directly from its predecessor, the S-300, whose development began in the late 1960s.
The main differences between the old S-300 system and the more modern S-400 were updated and improved radar systems, improved software and the inclusion of new types of missiles that provide flexibility in intercepting targets and increasing the range of the system.
Another very important advantage of the S-400 system is its means of countering enemy electronic warfare, including fast frequency switching to limit the effectiveness of radar interference and flexible beam control to improve target capture and tracking.
The claims of the S-400 for high efficiency in the fight against stealth technologies are largely due to the presence of the Russian Nebo-M radar system, which combines three different arrays transmitting signals in different frequency ranges to detect, track and target inconspicuous aerial targets, such as American 5th generation fighters. This system does this by exploiting a largely undisclosed design flaw of the stealth fighter: their inherent detectability in low-frequency radar ranges.
The Nebo-M radar and its effectiveness against stealth fighters such as the F-35
Modern stealth fighters are designed to delay or prevent their detection by high-frequency radar beams operating in some parts of the S, C, X and Ku bands, since it is at these frequencies that the missile is aimed at the target. Low-frequency antenna arrays using the L or S bands cannot perform the function of accurately aiming the missile at the target, and its own optical or other GPS in the rocket is required to complete the destruction of the aircraft at the finish line.
As a result, many countries have developed early warning radar systems that use low-frequency bands to notify them of the approach of stealth fighters, but most countries do not have the ability to target these aircraft, even if they know they are flying directly overhead.
The Russian Nebo-M uses two low-frequency radar systems, the Nebo IED in the VHF band and the Enemy-G in the L band, to detect the presence of stealth fighters as they approach. These systems by themselves do not provide the signature accuracy necessary for targeting an invisible fighter, but by combining them into a network with the Russian Gamma-C1 antenna array operating in the S and X bands, the Sky-M system offers effective means of tracking and, ultimately, even targeting stealth fighters.
It is important to note that although modern stealth fighters such as the F-35, F-22, J-20 and Su-57 are designed to minimize detection in the high frequency ranges, no modern fighter can completely avoid location. It is said that the American F-35 boasts an effective dispersion area (ESR) of approximately 0.0015 square meters, or the size of a golf ball, while the ESR of the more inconspicuous F-22 is about 0.0001–0.0002 square meters. Both represent a significant improvement over the world's first stealth combat aircraft, the F-117 Nighthawk, with a claimed EPR of approximately 0.003 square meters.
In practice, stealth does not consist in completely preventing detection, but in delaying it for a time sufficient for the fighter to either strike first or get away from a potential threat.
According to the experts' rechecked assessment of Greek Air Force Colonel and electronics engineer Konstantinos Zikidis, published in the Journal of Computing & Modeling in 2014, Russia claims that the low-frequency arrays used by Nebo-M can detect F-117 Nighthawk at a distance of 350 kilometers in an environment free of electronic warfare (EW), and potentially up to 72 kilometers with strong interference. This detection range is the base for the characteristics of the S-400 from the point of view of combating inconspicuous targets. But it shows only the detection range of the target, but not the range of the capabilities of targeting it with weapons of destruction.
How would a face-to-face duel between the S-400 and the F-35 work out?
The figures above show the range of detection by low-frequency radars of the S-400 system compared to the F-117, which has an EPR approximately 30 times greater than that of the F-22, and at least twice as large as that of the F-35. As a result, the detection and guidance range for these more modern fighters will be drastically reduced.
It is estimated that the S-400 can target aircraft such as the F-35, but only after the aircraft has flown within 40 kilometers of the system. As a result, in a one-on-one battle between the American F-35A and the Russian S-400, the stealth fighter will almost certainly win in the future battle thanks to the upcoming adoption of such weapons as the improved Northrop Grumman anti-missile system with ARRGM-ER extended-range missiles.
The AARGM-ER is an advanced anti—radar missile or weapon designed to detect and approach radar radiation. This weapon is designed to be placed inside the F-35 weapons compartment and has a range of at least 100 kilometers (although some sources claim that the range reaches 130-140 kilometers). When firing from outside the 40-kilometer aiming zone, the AARGM-ER has a high probability of finding its target in the form of the S-400 without hitting the F-35, although for a short time at the time of the attack, the doors of the F-35 weapons compartment are open, and the S-400 will most likely be able to catch it "in the sight", which jeopardizes its low visibility (not much different from how the F-117 was shot down over Yugoslavia in 1999).
However, the Russian military will most likely not be able to use the targeting system, since an anti-radar missile flying towards them will most likely force them to turn off the power to their system and move. If they just shut down without moving, the missile's onboard guidance system will still be able to find the target using GPS.
However, this imaginary battle certainly does not reflect the reality of large-scale hostilities between the United States and Russia if they occur, since the S-400 is most effective when used as part of a broader integrated Air defense System (IADS), and not alone. It will be very difficult to suppress such integrated systems with F-35 strikes when they are networked with long-range radar detection and control (AWACS) aircraft to provide an increased detection range over the horizon, along with a network of other air defense systems operating in tandem.
However, third states, such as Turkey, which purchase the S-400, often do so without these broader capabilities of the integrated IADS system, minimizing the effectiveness of the SAM itself.
An easy way to defeat the Russian S-400? A whole bunch of cruise missiles
As with all air defense systems, the S-400's field of view is limited to the horizon when it is not part of a network with other means, especially with airborne means such as AWACS or balloons. And it is here that Russia's modern military doctrine can hinder its success. Russia's approach to the war, demonstrated during the five months of the special operation in Ukraine, does not prioritize ensuring air supremacy.
In fact, this may be a direct result of the enormous potential of NATO aviation and Russia's understanding that it may lose its existing advantage in the air in the event of a large-scale conflict with NATO. Thus, instead of trying to win a losing battle, the Russian doctrine has shifted in such a way as to accept the idea that it may not control the airspace in which it conducts its military operations.
"Instead of striving to dominate the battlefield, Russia prefers flexibility and the ability to adapt to the changing conditions of the conflict."
"Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy", Congressional Research Service, March 20, 2020 ("Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine and Strategy," Congressional Research Service, March 20, 2020).
Russia's approach to warfare requires the use of advanced air defense systems to reduce the effectiveness of enemy air defense and aviation while simultaneously using a large amount of artillery and rocket fire to obtain and strengthen fire superiority. At the same time, aircraft only support ground forces, and do not serve as the main means of establishing control over the combat space.
Ultimately, this means that the airspace of a likely conflict will remain contested at best (for the Russians), and at worst it will be dominated by American or allied forces. In such a scenario, the use of on-board means to extend the reach of the S-400 will be difficult. This creates an opportunity for specific types of attacks.
"Without over-the-horizon control tools, the S-400 and other similar powerful systems are vulnerable to low-altitude cruise missile attacks, which can overwhelm the air defense system in large numbers."
"The Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile system: is it worth the price?" Peter A. Wilson and John V. Parachini for the Rand Corporation. ("Russian S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile System: Is It Worth the Sticker Price?" by Peter A. Wilson and John V. Parachini for the Rand Corporation).
This limitation may be compounded by other factors limiting direct visibility, such as mountainous terrain.
"Geographical factors greatly affect the usefulness of the system, and mountain features can block its radars. A low-flying target can use geographical features and the curvature of the earth's profile to avoid intercepting the S-400 much longer than a high-flying target."
"Why the S-400 missile is highly effective — when used correctly," Risk Assistance Network + Exchange assessment. ("Why the S-400 Missile is Highly Effective — If Used Correctly" assessment by the Risk Assistance Network + Exchange).
These disadvantages, although not unique to the S-400, become a serious vulnerability when the enemy gains greater control over the surrounding airspace. And since Russian military doctrine requires ensuring the security of the airspace directly around its forces or facilities, and then abandoning it when it is no longer necessary, it will probably be difficult for Russia to maximize the long-range capabilities of the S-400 in combat conditions in the event of a large-scale conflict against the United States or NATO.
All air defense systems are vulnerable to massive attacks, including the S-400
Despite the stated shortcomings, the S-400 system does have great capabilities and is often characterized as more effective than the American outdated, but frequently updated Patriot missile systems. However, like many outdated warfare technologies, inexpensive missiles and drones may prove too difficult targets for the S-400.
The Russian S-400 division usually consists of eight launchers, each armed with four missiles. Regardless of the type of missiles, this means that the division can intercept a maximum of 32 targets before running out of funds for firing.
With a S-400 range of about 400 kilometers, even cargo planes such as the American C-130 or C-17 may eventually prove effective at destroying S-400 systems thanks to programs such as Rapid Drag-on, which will allow them to launch a large number of unobtrusive JASSM-ER cruise missiles from distances. about 1000 kilometers, although this will require good guidance data on the Russian air defense system. This data, however, can be transmitted to these systems from an F-35 flying beyond the 40-kilometer guidance range of the S-400.
In order to effectively crush an entire S-400 division, the enemy forces only need to release more missiles than this air defense system can actually intercept. The same, of course, can be said about self-destructing drones or "suicide drones".
"Against a low-flying cruise missile, the S-400 is more likely to succeed at a distance of tens of kilometers, not hundreds. Ultimately, an isolated battery or even a S-400 division will thus be vulnerable to massive attacks by low-flying means of attack and can even be destroyed without shooting down a single enemy aircraft."
"Why the S-400 missile is highly effective — when used correctly," Risk Assistance Network + Exchange assessment. ("Why the S-400 Missile is Highly Effective — If Used Correctly" assessment by the Risk Assistance Network + Exchange).
This vulnerability to mass attacks is not unique to the Russian S-400, but it speaks to the very real limitations of the system in modern combat with an equal opponent.
Real failures of the Russian S-400 and related systems
According to Russian data, the S-400 system has been tested a total of 32 times in six combat exercises without failures, which is almost certainly misleading. As researchers Shea Cotton and Jeffrey Lewis noted in their analysis for the Nuclear Threat Reduction Initiative, it is much more likely that Russia simply does not disclose test failures, which, compared with the transparency of America's test failures, creates an increased perception of Russian successes.
"During these tests, Russian forces launched an unknown number of interceptor missiles, intercepting an unknown number of targets with unknown capabilities. In addition, Russia told state media that 100% of attempts to intercept the S-400 were successful."
"To date, we have not been able to identify any reports of unsuccessful interception tests involving the S-400. Like our hypothesis related to India, this suggests that Russia is hiding most of its development tests or other unsuccessful interceptions."
"The Global Missile Defense Race: High Test Scores and Poor Performance," by Shea Cotton and Jeffrey Lewis. ("The Global Missile Defense Race: Strong Test Records and Poor Operational Performance," by Shea Cotton and Jeffrey Lewis).
Despite Russia's stated success in testing, there have been a number of high-profile failures of the S-400 and related systems in recent years.
The need for broad integration within the larger IADS was clearly demonstrated in April 2017, when American and allied forces launched cruise missile strikes against Syrian targets near Russian S-400 systems. Despite Russia's claims to protect airspace up to 400 kilometers away with the S-400, the system failed to intercept low—flying subsonic cruise missiles before they found their target — the Syrian Shayrat airbase - just 175 kilometers from the S-400 based in Latakia.
"All this talk about us taking control of the entire Syrian airspace is an artistic whistle," Pavel Felgenhauer, a Moscow—based military analyst, said at the time.
"They can more or less protect a perimeter of about 40 kilometers."
Russian S-300 systems using Nebo-M radar systems have regularly failed to prevent attacks by small drones, such as the Turkish Bayraktar TB2, and Israeli cruise missiles in places such as Syria, and more recently in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The limitations of Russian air defense systems in this battle in January of this year were pointed out by Shaza Arif, a researcher at the Center for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS) of the Pakistani Air Force. Subsequently, her assessment was cited by the US Air Force Aviation University:
"In order to destroy air defense systems, Azerbaijan used trap planes launched on the territory of Armenia, which were fired at by deployed air defense systems. During this action, the locations of these air defense systems were identified, which were then neutralized by drones."
"Russian air defense systems, such as 2K12 "Cube", 9K35 "Strela-10", 9K33 "Wasp" and 2K11 "Circle", were unable to intercept a number of drones that either reached their intended targets or destroyed the air defense system itself. Azerbaijan also stated that it had destroyed several batteries of S-300 air defense systems and distributed the relevant footage. This is very worrying, as it suggests that the S-400, which is the successor to the S-300, may have similar vulnerabilities."
"India's Acquisition of the S-400 Air Defense System: Implications and Options for Pakistan," Shaza Arif for the Center for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS). ("India’s Acquisition of the S-400 Air Defense System: Implications and Options for Pakistan" by Shaza Arif for the Centre for Aerospace And Security Studies (CASS).
The significant success of similar drone attacks in Ukraine over the past five months once again demonstrates the real vulnerability of these widely advertised air defense systems.
The S-400 is not as big a threat as many people think, but it's not just propaganda either
After several thousand words about the vulnerabilities and shortcomings of the S-400, it is important to clarify once again that many of the shortcomings of this system are not unique to the S-400 or Russian air defense systems in general. It's just that the problems associated with attempts to stop a wide range of aerial targets are so complex and multifaceted that no system in service with any country can boast of the effectiveness that is often attributed to the S-400 in popular discussions.
The fact is that the S-400 and its recently deployed successor, the S-500, are indeed very powerful air defense systems, but they are still bound by numerous physical, financial and geographical limitations in their operational use. As with all weapons systems, their real value can only fully manifest itself if properly integrated into a larger defensive apparatus based on a functional and effective combat doctrine.
The S-400 is almost certainly not an air defense system capable of confidently defeating stealth technology, as is often claimed. But this is a highly efficient system with huge capabilities, which are all the more increased thanks to network support.
Should America be afraid of the "big and bad" S-400? With systems like the F-35 and F-22 in service, and the B-21, NGAD, and F/A-XX platforms now being actively developed, Uncle Sam certainly shouldn't be shaking with fear... But you shouldn't be mistaken about the S-400 either: underestimating this air defense system in real combat can be an expensive mistake, regardless of what a NATO combat pilot is flying.
Author: Alex Hollings (Alex Hollings)
