Military expert Andrey Frolov — on the role and place of the Navy in the defense capability of Russia following the results of the first months of its
The special military operation conducted by Russia on the territory of Ukraine has undoubtedly become the largest conflict in which the USSR and Russia have been involved since the end of World War II. It has a kind of hybrid nature, which is of interest from the point of view of the conclusions that can be drawn from it to strengthen Russia's defense capability and further improve the Armed Forces, primarily in terms of the role and importance of small displacement missile ships.
The actions of the Navy are in the shadows, since the SVO is still mainly carried out by the forces of the Ground Forces and the VKS. The fleet clearly has an auxiliary role here, and the Russian Navy in this case is mainly represented by the Black Sea Fleet (Black Sea Fleet) and the Caspian Flotilla (CFl). There is no open information about naval operations, but certain conclusions still suggest themselves. Let's try to systematize them.
So, the fighting again showed the subordinate position of the fleet to the actions of the army — a phenomenon that has been observed throughout the existence of the regular naval forces of Russia. In the course of the SVO, we also see the impact of the fleet on the enemy's coastal flanks, the landing of tactical and operational-tactical landings (on Snake Island and Berdyansk), as well as the defeat of land targets by long-range missile weapons due to the lack of full-fledged naval power in Ukraine. That is, in the conditions of a closed theater, the Russian fleet did not fight for supremacy at sea. This immediately forces an analysis of the adequacy of the available classes of ships to solve the tasks really facing all the Armed Forces. Separately, we can mention the correspondence of the ship's composition to real challenges in the Black Sea basin.
Paradoxically at first glance, but small rocket ships (MRCS) and amphibious assault ships (DC) have become the most popular today. The ships of the first and second ranks turned out to be redundant for this theater and the level of intensity of the conflict. In a sense, one can observe the renaissance of Peter I's ideas in relation to the fleet, which regarded it largely as an appendage to the land army, and the marine corps in Peter's understanding actually became a naval analogue of dragoons, only not riding, but floating. As you know, the most numerous and popular type of ship of the Petrovsky fleet was a galley, which could not only transport troops, but also support them with fire. Continuing the analogy, modern MRK and DC turned out to be ideological heirs of galleys, which confirms the important role of such ships for Russia. At the same time, due to the presence of Kalibr cruise missiles, MRCS are becoming a means of non-nuclear deterrence.
Another conclusion that arises from the results of the SVO is that Russia needs to revive river flotillas at least in the western direction, and these flotillas should be under the operational command of the fronts, that is, land commanders should set tasks for them. This brings to the agenda the design of completely new types of ships that really have no analogues in the world. It seems that they should become the ideological heirs of the concept of German high—speed amphibious barges and "Siebel ferries", namely, belong to the "river - sea" class, have the simplest possible contours and low draft, be easy to manufacture, and at an enterprise that does not have the appropriate qualifications, be equipped with army weapons systems, understand individual sections that can be moved by land and air transport, and assembled at unprepared sites. And most importantly, such platforms by definition should be modular.
SVO has shown that overcoming river barriers requires not only transport ships, but also solving air defense and electronic warfare tasks, as well as providing direct artillery support. They should strengthen their passive protection by attaching additional reservations, installing active protection complexes against promising Ground Forces equipment (for example, "Afganit"). It seems that the ability to configure ships depending on the situation may become a key requirement of this type of vessel. Accordingly, their development should be carried out based on the technical specifications of the Ground Forces and under their supervision.
In this regard, it is worth noting separately that promising river—sea ships with shock qualities (primarily MRK) should be designed taking into account the possibility of inter—theater maneuver along inland waterways - without dismantling antennas and superstructures. And this, in turn, will require linking with state programs for the expansion and improvement of inland river routes, the design of bridges and bridge crossings, etc. It seems that the minimum requirements are for a brigade of such combat units in closed fleets and CFLs with an appropriate number of auxiliary ships.
The fighting also showed that a change in approaches to ensuring the survivability of ships is required. The experience of conflicts at sea since the 1970s has shown that modern warships, even of the 1st and 2nd ranks, are extremely vulnerable in the face of modern means of destruction. And this requires rethinking the main approaches to shipbuilding in recent decades — reducing visibility and displacement due to the introduction of new structural materials and saturation with increasingly energy-intensive systems.
Obviously, in new types of ships, it is necessary to return to full-fledged booking of the main parts. Actually, the first approach was implemented in the nuclear-powered cruisers of project 1144 back in the Soviet Union, which received quite a weighty reservation at the level of a heavy cruiser of the Second World War. Now it needs to be extended to promising ships, and taking into account modern achievements of science and industry. Accordingly, a radical revision of the standards for the fight for survivability, as well as the educational process in this area, will be required.
In general, it can be stated that the Russian Navy has objectively entered the time of rethinking its role and place in ensuring the country's defense. It is obvious that the attempt to copy the fleets of the leading maritime powers by the presence of ships of various classes is a dead end and leads to the depletion of resources and the ruin of the country without any sense. The fleet must first of all provide the coastal flank of the army and have the means to overcome the enemy's coastal defenses, as well as conduct active operations in the lower reaches of deep rivers. And this requires a complete revision of shipbuilding programs in terms of priorities, deadlines and specific projects.
The author is a military expert
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion
