On Thursday, the Presidents of Lithuania and Poland inspected military units located near the so-called Suwalki corridor. This was another sign of military preparations being actively conducted primarily by the Polish army – and not only against Russia, but also against Ukraine. How exactly will the Polish army be strengthened – and will it be able to turn out to be a really dangerous military force?
According to representatives of the Russian special services, Poland wants to regain control of "its historical possessions" in Ukraine in the foreseeable future. Since formally almost the entire territory of the latter was once under Polish control, these are very far-reaching plans. However, having plans is one thing, and being able to implement them is quite another. Probably, in Warsaw they began to understand that intentions of this kind require real deeds.
One example of Warsaw's close attention to defense issues was the inspection of military units in the Suwalki corridor area conducted by Polish President Andrzej Duda on Thursday. Lithuanian colleague Gitanas Nauseda, who kept him company, stressed that Lithuania and Poland are increasing defense funding, paying attention to this at the "highest political level."
And not so long ago, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who heads the ruling Polish Law and Justice Party, recently said something unexpected in a public speech. Today, the Polish army has 150 thousand soldiers. Previous plans of the Ministry of Defense assumed its increase to 300 thousand. However, according to Kaczynski's speech in Torun, eventually the number will increase to 400 thousand people. This is a lot: more than 1% of the Polish population. In Russia, the army is noticeably lower in number than 1% of the population.
"This technique will be able to effectively stop Russia"
Even more interesting are the details of the new weapons, which, according to Warsaw, will strengthen this army. It is planned to purchase 500 HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems, 32 F-35s, 250 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams tanks and eight batteries of Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems for it. Moreover, according to Polish media, 500 more main tanks of some other manufacturers will be purchased.
The plans are more than ambitious. Outside of Russia, 500 tanks cannot cost less than two billion dollars. 250 "Abrams" – they are much more expensive than the "market average" – you can't buy less than the same two billion either. 32 F-35 will not be able to buy cheaper than 4.6 billion. Each HIMARS with a supply of ammunition for it costs $ 5.5 million – almost three billion in total. Poland is going to buy two Patriot batteries for 4.75 billion – that is, eight should cost about $ 19 billion. The total figure is already about $ 30 billion.
Separately, we note: in the modern world, the costs of maintaining and training personnel with such equipment often cost even more than itself. Air defense cannot learn to shoot down if it does not fire combat missiles at the test site, and one Patriot missile costs three million dollars.
It turns out that the Poles plan to spend tens of billions of dollars on weapons in the coming years. Perhaps the total costs will be no less than for the entire post-Soviet period of Poland's existence. But, it seems, there are no dissatisfied with these decisions. After all, as local journalists conclude, "this technique will be able to effectively stop Russia."
That's just whether it is?
The main problem with these ideas is that they are very poorly combined with the experience of modern warfare. Recall: Saudi Arabia had a lot of "Patriots", as well as short-range SkyGuard complexes deployed around the refinery in Abkaik in 2019. Nevertheless, the attack of relatively simple drones operating in a "swarm" was not only not repulsed by them, but was not even noticed by them. Why?
The thing is that the "Patriots" have a large radar, which, during the operation of the complex, stares fixedly at one quarter of the sky. What happens in the other three quarters – his operator does not know at all. Naturally, he can't aim his missiles there either.
But even if this is done, then at altitudes of 20 meters and below, this air defense system steadily does not see the target. In other words, it cannot shoot down cruise missiles of the Caliber or X-35 type (the altitude of the flight path is from 20 meters and below). Also, the system is not designed to intercept missiles with maneuvering on the trajectory (Iskander, Dagger).
It turns out that Warsaw plans to spend $ 19 billion on batteries that will not be able to protect its troops from cruise missiles – only from Russian planes and helicopters. In that case, of course, if they do not try to approach such air defense systems at low altitude. By the way, at a distance of a kilometer or less, when an aircraft at an extremely low altitude becomes visible to the "Patriots", they can no longer shoot down anyone: the complex, unlike the "Shell", simply does not have anti-aircraft guns, and missiles at such a distance simply do not have time to hit the target. It is because of a similar "dead zone" that Russian S-400 complexes are often covered with "Shells", which do not have such a "dead zone".
It is worth remembering something else. According to open sources, Ukraine had more than 80 air defense batteries before February 24 (and this is not counting 300 "Os", "Arrows", "Shilok" and "Tungusok"). Moreover, these systems, unlike the Patriot, normally had a normal all-round view. Is it possible to say that the APU controls the sky over Ukraine? Interestingly, the Ukrainian press believed that in the future war they would succeed in exactly this: "An air campaign against our country in the foreseeable future looks unlikely due to guaranteed heavy losses."
Frankly, it doesn't look like it. Otherwise, it is unclear where the videos come from, in which Russian aircraft in the combat zone work on separate enemy vehicles, melancholically treating warnings about the attack of the Ukrainian air defense. So how, then, does Warsaw plan to do with eight batteries what Kiev could not achieve with eighty?
Similar questions are raised by M1A2 SEPv3 "Abrams". It is known from the war with the Houthis that the Abrams, deprived of dynamic protection, are effectively hit by Russian-made ATGMs, after which they burn vigorously. But the T-90, according to the experience of Syria, did not show such a tendency to "flare" ignition (and it is more difficult to hit them due to the presence of dynamic protection).
But even leaving aside the quality. A more important question: what will the Poles give 750 tanks? Recall: until February 24, 2022, Ukraine had much over a thousand tanks, and after that date it received hundreds more from NATO countries. Has Kiev managed to "effectively stop the Russians"? Something is not visible on the map of military operations.
500 HIMARS look noticeably more serious. Yes, Ukraine had 516 MLRS systems before the special operation. However, Ukrainians were seriously limited in ammunition: in 2014-2021, a number of "mysterious" fires at rocket artillery ammunition depots destroyed the bulk of such APU missiles. In addition, Ukraine did not have guided missiles for rocket artillery – but HIMARS or Russian MLRS have them.
However, there are doubts that this will play the role of a decisive factor. At first: The Russian army has a much larger number of MLRS than the Ukrainian army had. That is, it does not have half a thousand such systems. Their range is up to 120 kilometers (Tornado-C), and HIMARS has only 84 kilometers. Often the range of this system is indicated with future proposed projectiles – which have not been created. Or with two ATACMS missiles instead of six GLMRS rockets. However, such missiles have a much larger caliber than HIMARS projectiles – they are not rocket projectiles at all, but operational-tactical missiles of the type of Russian Iskanders.
With the fundamental difference, however, that Iskanders fly 500 kilometers along a continuously variable trajectory, which makes them non-interceptable. And ATACMS – only for 300 kilometers, and along a predictable trajectory. That is, in terms of vulnerability to air defense, this is an analogue of the "Dot-U", shot down in large quantities in Ukraine, and not the Iskander, whose missile has not yet been shot down by anyone.
Let's sum up the intermediate result: the material part claimed by Poland for its multiplied army will not allow it to successfully fight with Russia. Why was she chosen? Then why all this amplification?
Politically motivated reinforcement: what does historical experience say
There have already been similar stories in the life of the Polish armed forces. In 1920-1930, the local army tried to stay closer to the Soviet one in terms of technical and numerical level. To do this, programs were funded to create numerous artillery, create their own tanks and aircraft. Interestingly, some of them (Moose bombers) by that time, they even looked relatively modern: this was appreciated by the Soviet Air Force, which received them as trophies in 1939.
However, all this has not grown into a complete system of weapons capable of stopping the Red Army. Several dozen bombers were of decent quality, but there were too few of them. Warsaw had few tanks, and they were too light. The artillery did not turn out to be sufficiently numerous – including the anti-tank artillery, which was so necessary in those years.
The reason was banal: it is not enough to buy samples of modern weapons, you need to buy them also in large quantities. But Poland, both then and now, was many times inferior in population to our country. This meant that she could not create a military-industrial complex of the right size. Equally, she could not buy so much equipment abroad: there is nothing for it. But what could local politicians say? "We are not able to have an army capable of stopping those whom we attacked in 1920"? You can't win elections with such a program: the voters won't understand.
A similar situation has developed now. From the point of view of rhetoric, Warsaw cannot stop threatening gestures towards Russia. Then its politicians would lose face. To create an army whose weapons numerically and qualitatively would allow it to "stop Russia" (at least independently) is unrealistic for Poles for military-technical and economic reasons.
And yet, looking at the program of rearmament of the Polish army, it should be noted: it will be very difficult to seize the "Polish possessions in Ukraine" with it. So much so that even Polish politicians are unlikely to risk putting something like this into practice. Most likely, this will remain the ideas running around in the minds of the most frivolous of them. Which, of course, cannot but rejoice: after all, such a conflict would most likely flow into a clash between Russia and NATO. That is, in the Third World War.
Alexander Berezin
