Beijing will not let the rebellious island acquire an atomic bomb
In recent weeks, relations between the States of the Asia-Pacific region have moved into a mode of increased military and political readiness. US President Joseph Biden announced Washington's intention to defend Taiwan, and former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe - about the need for Japan to abandon the "nuclear taboo".
In response, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Xianlong harshly condemned the idea of deploying nuclear warheads in the region, warning that this would lead to a new arms race and weaken regional stability.
In turn, the US Missile Defense Agency stressed the need to strengthen the defense of Guam – Washington's key position to protect Taiwan from the offensive of mainland China – through a "mobile complex with interceptors integrated into the Aegis system."
BETWEEN CHINA AND AMERICA
Understandable irritation in Beijing is caused by the open anti–Chinese direction of American initiatives in the region - especially those that inflame the "spirit of independence" of Taiwan. Which during the Cold War took active steps to produce nuclear weapons and hardly completely closed this chapter of its history.
In June, a new report with an assessment of the threats of nuclear proliferation in the world will be published in the PIR Center Library series. Taking into account past nuclear developments and the current military-political situation in the region, Taiwan deservedly occupies one of the central places in the report. However, according to the authors of the report, in the foreseeable future, changes in Taiwan's foreign policy situation will not affect Taipei's position on the "nuclear option".
The key issue of Taiwan's security policy is the relationship with mainland China. Beijing's stated intentions to reunify China are perceived by Taiwan as an existential security threat. Taipei is extremely concerned about the growth of China's conventional weapons, especially the potential of anti-ship ballistic and hypersonic missiles.
Since the mid-1950s, Washington has been the de facto guarantor of Taiwan's security. The legal basis of US-Taiwan relations is the Decree on Guarantees to Taiwan in 2020 and the 1979 Treaty on Relations with Taiwan (replacing the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty). Within the framework of these agreements, Washington can carry out regular arms supplies to Taipei to strengthen its independent defensive potential.
None of these documents, however, indicate exactly what actions the United States will take to protect the island. In this regard, Biden's above-mentioned statement can be interpreted broadly, without assuming a significant change in the current American course.
Nevertheless, the intensity of cooperation and the interest of the United States in maintaining the status quo should not be underestimated.
In mid–2020, the United States approved the sale of $620 million worth of surface-to-air missiles to Taiwan. In October 2021, the President of Taiwan Tsai Ing–wen for the first time confirmed the presence of the American contingent on the island - officially for training purposes.
Since the beginning of the XXI century, Taiwan's White Books contain a provision on the "five no's of Taiwan regarding nuclear weapons": not to distribute, not to develop, not to acquire, not to store and not to use. At the same time, the "Military Policy Review" of 2021 speaks of the need to train military personnel in dual-use technologies.
In other words, the domestic political discourse depends on the foreign policy situation and the current assessment of security threats. The thesis of preserving the "nuclear option" is used both to "intimidate" mainland China and to signal Washington. Nuclear rhetoric also pursues purely domestic political goals: probing the ground for public attitudes towards Taiwan's nuclear arsenal and increasing the military budget.
TAIWAN'S NUCLEAR COMMITMENTS
Until 1971, Taiwan was recognized as the legitimate representative of the Chinese side in the international arena. It was in this capacity that Taiwan signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968.
In 1971, negotiations on the signing of the Comprehensive IAEA Safeguards Agreement by the Government of Taiwan were completed. Despite the loss of Taiwan's official representative status, the agency has maintained inspections on the island. In December 1971, a trilateral agreement was signed between the United States, Taiwan and the IAEA on the application of agency safeguards in respect of material transported under the 1955 bilateral US-Taiwan treaty.
Thus, the United States became the sole supplier of equipment, fuel and nuclear-related technologies to Taiwan. The 1971 Agreement also provided for unhindered access of IAEA representatives to all facilities related to the use of atomic energy on the territory of Taiwan.
In 1998, Taiwan signed an additional protocol establishing a more intrusive mechanism for the application of IAEA safeguards. Although Taiwan is referred to as a "special territory" in all official documents, the principles of inspections do not differ from those applied by the agency on the territory of other non–nuclear-weapon States participating in the NPT.
In 2011, an agreement on cooperation in the field of nuclear and radiation safety was signed between mainland and island China. In January 2014, the agreement on cooperation between Washington and Taipei in the field of peaceful atom was extended in accordance with the model Agreement-123.
Since 2015, there has been a reduction in the share of nuclear energy in Taiwan's energy balance: in 2015, it accounted for 16.32% of all electricity produced, in 2018 – only 10.1%. Nuclear power is produced at three nuclear power plants: Jinshan, Kuonshen and Maanshan. Plans for the construction of units at the fourth station, the Lungmen NPP, were temporarily frozen after the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan; at the same time, it was decided not to extend the service life of nuclear power units to 60 years. Back in 2015, it was decided to finally stop the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant. In March 2021, Taiwan completed the export of unused fuel to the United States.
NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGIES
Taiwan does not have its own uranium deposits. Although Taipei, experts believe, owns the technology of nozzle and laser enrichment of uranium, there are no enterprises for its enrichment on the territory of the island. At nuclear facilities, there is one hot chamber for processing irradiated nuclear fuel, as well as one research reactor. However, the available capacities are insufficient for the production of fissile materials.
During the Cold War, Taiwan twice attempted to join the club of nuclear Powers (the Qing Chu program). In 1969, a research reactor with a heavy-water moderator with a capacity of 40 MW was purchased, a heavy water production plant and a nuclear fuel production plant were built. In the early 1970s, the French company Saint Gobain Nucleaire developed a laboratory facility for the separation of plutonium for Taiwan.
Experts from the USA, France, Canada, Israel and South Africa provided active scientific and technical assistance to Taiwan. According to some estimates, over the years 1968-1974, more than 300 Taiwanese nuclear specialists trained in the United States.
In 1976, the IAEA discovered the loss of four fuel rods containing about 500 g of plutonium at one of the facilities. In response to the US threat to stop the supply of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for civilian nuclear infrastructure, Taipei curtailed activities in the research reactor and closed the laboratory on the territory of which experiments on the release of plutonium were conducted.
A second attempt in the 1980s was also unsuccessful. Officially, the research was conducted in order to establish the production of own fuel for nuclear power plants and the development of technologies for the radiochemical processing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). In addition, in the early 1990s (as it was later established) Taiwan conducted research on the irradiation of thorium Th232 to produce the fissile isotope of uranium U233, which was not reported to the IAEA.
In the mid-1990s, the issue was settled without giving it public publicity. In 2006, based on the results of inspections and inspections under the additional protocol, the IAEA concluded that all radioactive materials in Taiwan are used for peaceful purposes.
POTENTIAL NUCLEAR CARRIERS
As for the potential aerial means of delivering nuclear weapons, in the second half of November 2021, it was announced the commissioning of F-16 multi-purpose fighters in version V (the deal was concluded in 2020 during the Trump administration). Plans were announced to replace the outdated fleet of Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II interceptors with American F-16 Block 70/72, which can carry a nuclear warhead. Potentially, nuclear weapons could be produced in the form of gravity bombs.
The Taiwan Navy consists of four diesel-electric submarines. Two of them were commissioned in 1974 and are used only as training; two more are multi–purpose submarines of the Hai Lung class (Sea Dragon), which have been in service since 1987.
In 2017, Taiwan and the United States signed a memorandum of cooperation for the development and construction of new submarines under the Hai Chang (Indigenous Defense Submarine program) project. By 2025, it is planned to put into operation the first of eight ships.
DIAGNOSIS AND PROGNOSIS
It is obvious that the resumption of nuclear development in Taiwan will be a reason for Beijing to start hostilities – given that the PRC does not exclude the use of military force to protect its "core interests". The "nuclear option" will also undermine economic relations with China.
Taiwan's heavy dependence on the supply of American weapons (in particular, underwater and air delivery vehicles) is another deterrent. Having alienated the United States, Taiwan is likely to lose cooperation with British, Australian, Indian and Canadian specialists working, in particular, on the project of new submarines.
Finally, political risks are also important. It seems that in the 1990s, it was the fear of losing the support of the world community due to making the weapons program public that became the main motivation of the leadership of Taiwan to abandon further developments. In addition, the leading specialists who worked on the program during the Cold War have passed away or retired, and the scientific community of the island as a whole opposes research and development work for the production of nuclear weapons.
Thus, the risks of nuclear proliferation in Taiwan remain low. However, the creation of tension by the United States in the Asia-Pacific region through an aggressive policy of containing China (which is openly emphasized in official statements) weakens regional stability and hardly contributes to strengthening nuclear non-proliferation.
Larisa Savelyeva
Larisa Sergeevna Savelyeva is a trainee of the PIR Center, Master, Swedish Military Academy, Stockholm, Sweden.
