Moscow. November 21. INTERFAX-while the fight against the pandemic is going on all over the world, another struggle, or rather, a real war, was going on in a small patch of the Caucasus. We are talking about the Karabakh problem and the military actions between the Azerbaijani army and the Karabakh self-defense units.
Is it possible to compare the situation with the events in Yugoslavia and the war with the Kosovo separatists? Our special correspondent Vyacheslav Terekhov talked about this with Alexander Krylov, doctor of historical Sciences, chief researcher Of the IMEMO RAS center for post-Soviet studies, and Eduard Solovyov, head of the IMEMO RAS center for post-Soviet studies, candidate of political science
Russia has changed - from Kosovo to Karabakh
Correspondent: It is possible to compare the problems of Karabakh and Kosovo because in one case Russia was weak to protect a part of the Serbian population living in Kosovo from defeat, and in the other case it saved a part of the Armenian population living in the territory of Nagorno - Karabakh. Yes, the struggle in Kosovo unfolded in the nineties, when the state power in Russia was too weak to go against Europe and America. Today, the situation is different and the Russian state authorities are not afraid to intervene (with the consent of the two sides - Armenia and Azerbaijan - and with some opposition from Turkey) and stop the war, thereby saving part of the Armenian population living in Karabakh.
Of course, comparing America and Turkey is not exactly equivalent, but still Turkey plays a significant role in the region, and our relations with it are too important.
In the nineties, Russia failed to establish a national sector of Serbia in Kosovo, and Serbian Orthodox shrines there were looted by Kosovo separatists. In Karabakh, Armenians received the protection that the Serbs were denied. Instead of the sector, we took the airport near the Kosovo capital in Slatina and monitored the landing of aircraft of Western military contingents - what they arrive with. While the Serbian leadership begged Russia to occupy the Serbian sector. Thus, we left the Serbian population to its own fate, and in Karabakh, we did not allow the Armenians to leave their places that they had lived for centuries...
Soloviev: I still would not compare the situation in Kosovo and in Karabakh. Although, of course, in ethnic conflicts and unrecognized state entities, you can always find typologically similar features. But as for the position of the Russian Federation in both cases, I would say that everything is more or less clear on the issue of Kosovo.
If you look at the geographical map, you will see that there was no way to get to that sector of Kosovo by any transport-either by air, land, or sea – especially since all the neighboring countries that either aspired to join NATO or were already part of the bloc closed air corridors for our military transport planes to fly to Serbia. The airfield in Slatina could become a base for projecting the power and influence of the Russian Federation in the Balkans. But the plan didn't work.
Plus, Russia's obvious continued financial and other dependence on Western countries and Western institutions at that time, as well as the existence of serious economic problems in our country. This was an additional factor that, in General, did not allow, despite the high degree of irritation of the Russian elite with the behavior of the West in the Balkans, to make decisions that would allow us to stake out the Serbian sector in Kosovo. There was no political, technical, or economic opportunity.
Corr: Didn't have or didn't want to? We took the airfield, but we couldn't take the sector?
Soloviev: They did not want to and could not, in my opinion, these are still different things. We took the airfield, and then? We did not have the ability to transfer military units to the Slatina airfield (near Pristina), and, therefore, we did not have the ability to project force in this region. If you recall, the operation itself to take control of the Slatina airfield was carried out by our battalion from the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. But apart from this battalion, we had no opportunity to influence the situation "on the ground". Perhaps there was a desire of the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to demonstrate something to our Western partners, but this desire was very poorly combined with opportunities at that time. Then, however, the desire was dissolved, since the degree of dependence on financial and other Western institutions was quite large.
Reporter: After one press conference, I asked Boris Yeltsin about Kosovo. He said loudly and clearly:"I will not give up Kosovo." The phrase spread all over the world. And all.
Soloviev: In General, there is nothing to comment On. And all.
The situation with Karabakh is more complicated
Solovyov: as for Karabakh, it's a long story. The conflict broke out in the depths of the USSR. The situation with Karabakh worsened during the period of perestroika and democratization, especially when the Armenian population of the NKR demanded self-determination. The inter-ethnic conflict turned into a real war. It ended in 1994 with the Bishkek agreements, which actually secured the victory of the Armenian side, the Karabakh Armenians, with some support from Armenia, which at that time was already an independent state.
In military terms, the NKR army took positions that were advantageous from a military point of view, "straightened the front", but at the same time took full or partial control of seven surrounding Azerbaijani regions. And there was the problem of the so - called buffer zone, from which the Azerbaijani population was expelled or left (according to estimates, up to 400 thousand people). Karabakh has become such a bleeding wound for any political leadership in Baku, plus half a million refugees (including those who escaped from the territory of the NKR proper). Public opinion in Azerbaijan was clearly set up for revenge and the return of occupied areas in one way or another. And this became an opportunity to consolidate the nation in opposition to an obvious opponent, but also a political problem for Aliyev Sr., and for Ilham, who almost vowed to solve this Karabakh problem and tried to do it earlier by diplomatic and partly military means.
Corr: He not only tried, but actually created a strong Azerbaijani army, while the Armenians were engaged in internal political fights.
Soloviev: I would put it this way: for a while, the winner always thinks that he takes the dominant position, triumphalist moods prevail. This is unavoidable. But in the case of the NKR, this triumphalism of the Armenian side was somewhat delayed. As you know, the Minsk group on the settlement of the Karabakh conflict has been functioning under the auspices of the OSCE for all these years, offering several plans for its resolution one after another. The essence of these settlement plans has always been reduced to the formula of exchanging occupied territories for the status of Karabakh. The Armenian side had a strong negotiating position (following the 1991-94 war). but the status issue always remained suspended: the status (independence of the NKR) was a red line for official Baku, and the Armenian side was extremely difficult to negotiate the return of the territories of seven "buffer" regions to Azerbaijani control, especially Lachin and Kelbajar, through which the communications connecting Karabakh with Armenia passed. Therefore, the negotiations repeatedly came to a standstill. At the same time, Armenia itself did not recognize Karabakh as independent, perhaps fearing an international reaction and losing political positions in Western countries.
Krylov: They were afraid to allow Azerbaijan to accuse them of disrupting the peace process and thereby weaken their position in the international arena. Therefore, they sought recognition of the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by other powers, but they did not recognize it themselves. Which looked strange. And by the way, when Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Armenian press and political figures expressed dissatisfaction: why did Russia not recognize Karabakh at the same time, if it followed the path of recognizing unrecognized States? And it did not seem strange to them that in this case Russia would have recognized the independence of Karabakh before Armenia, although such recognition was a national idea for Armenia and the entire world Armenian community.
Correspondent: but at the same time, Azerbaijan was preparing its army in parallel with the negotiations. Didn't you see it?
Soloviev: As for Azerbaijan, it has been actively integrated into all energy and pipeline projects that have been implemented, including by Western companies. Azerbaijan managed to get into a period of rising oil prices. At the expense of this, he formed a significant "dollar canopy", that is, money appeared in order to use it, including for the needs of the army. At the same time, Armenia was in a difficult situation, we can say, in a blockade, permanently experiencing financial problems, and therefore simply could not allocate the same amount of funds for the re-equipment of its army as Azerbaijan did. Azerbaijan just had more opportunities. It is enough to mention that in some periods the military budget of Azerbaijan was comparable to the state budget of Armenia.
Corr: it was clear Then that we should wait for war.
Soloviev: It was necessary to find some options through diplomatic means and use its very strong negotiating position based on a real victory in 1994 and exchange this for issues of political settlement. But all the time something interfered, political problems arose, and as a result, a situation arose when Azerbaijan, as Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly said recently, lost patience: "We worked for a long time with this contact group and the OSCE, we were promised one or two districts each time, but the process did not go on."
Therefore, in parallel with the negotiation process, it is quite rational and logical, especially taking into account the demands of the population, Baku's policy was increasingly focused on the need for military revenge. In Azerbaijan, starting from childhood, from school, the main line of education of citizens has become the slogan that Karabakh is Azerbaijan, and it must be returned one way or another: either by diplomatic means or by military means. Even some of Baku's arms suppliers were not happy about Azerbaijan's military activation. But the Azerbaijani leadership has found an ally ready to act more actively. It was the Turkey of Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Turkey thereby increased its influence on Azerbaijan. A very close Alliance between Baku and Ankara has emerged. There was a question not just of weapons, they were supplied from different places, but also of serious training and advanced training of Azerbaijani military personnel. At that time, the Armenian society was more engaged in solving the country's economic problems and fighting corruption.
Reporter: I think it was a national idea in Armenia: fighting corruption?
Soloviev: No, well, she wasn't the only one, anyway. There was also the idea of reunification with Karabakh, for example. But at a certain stage of Armenia's development, due to objective and subjective circumstances, the system of control by a number of elite groups over significant segments of the economy - all this led to the fact that the fight against corruption captured the minds and became almost a dominating idea.
And in General, there was a desire to change elites in society. By the way, such sentiments from time to time cover different countries in the post-Soviet space. In the end, Nikol Pashinyan came to power at the beginning "by the will of the people" as a result of a series of mass actions, and then won the elections and consolidated his success by legitimate means. The idea of changing elites that" captured the masses " actually led to a split in society, as President Vladimir Putin noted in his interview.
Search for exes
Correspondent: Pashinyan started searching for enemies and former offenders.
Soloviev: Yes, this is true, but it further aggravated the internal social contradictions. It so happened that the last presidents in Armenia were representatives of the so-called "Karabakh clan", and Pashinyan entered into a tough political struggle with them.
Corr: Not the least role in Armenia's loss was played by the fact that Pashinyan removed virtually all the Karabakh generals who knew how to fight.
Krylov: I do not agree with this conclusion. The army was in rather poor condition even under the previous authorities. They were not able to adequately assess the threat level. They hoped that everything would be limited to local skirmishes, and in fact they did not prepare for a big war. Instead of purchasing modern anti-drone weapons, the Armenian leadership opted for the multifunctional su-30SM, which is designed to destroy ground targets and Iskander missiles. Apparently, they expect that Baku will take into account the probability of attacks on oil fields and pipelines and will not go to a big war. If the calculation was for this, it turned out to be incorrect.
Soloviev: Meanwhile, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan were heating up. But Pashinyan at the same time behaved quite peculiar. However, he tried to establish contacts with Aliyev and several of their personal meetings were recorded. Then he suddenly changed his tone and manner. It is enough to recall his statements that " Artsakh (Karabakh) is Armenia, and that's the point", visited Shusha, which certainly created political problems for the Azerbaijani leadership and simply provoked official Baku.
All this was perceived by Aliyev very painfully. How painful it is became clear only now, in November, in the context of Aliyev's video messages to Pashinyan after the cessation of hostilities in Karabakh. Azerbaijan had already "built up its muscles" by 2016, even before Pashinyan, and did not hide the fact that it was ready to try its hand at direct military confrontation. Well, after the incidents that aggravated the situation-especially painful on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan in July 2020, the situation escalated to the limit. The parties have reached an acute phase of the conflict.
Reporter: dancing in Shusha, did Pashinyan not see that his army is weak?
Soloviev: As a person who is very far from the army and military Affairs in General and does not have much political experience, he really could not see the problems and could not think about it at all.
Corr: Just as the US followed the events in Kosovo and looked for an opportunity to intervene in them, so Turkey followed the events in Azerbaijan. Naturally, if Azerbaijan were losing, it is unlikely that Turkey would remain such an ally of Azerbaijan, but realizing that Azerbaijan is winning, it can actively intervene without risking anything. And if they had completely won, Aliyev would have actually submitted to the Turkish President. And Turkey would come closer to implementing its idea: the new Ottoman Empire stretches from Yakutia to Libya. This would have been the case if not for Moscow's strong position.
I will return to the Kosovo problem again. Russia did not take this position in Kosovo. Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov turned the plane over the ocean and did not fly to the States for talks, while the United States began bombing Yugoslavia. This is significant, but it is not a force. Taking the airport is also not a strong position that would protect Serbia. And Russia left the Lachin corridor behind in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, contrary to Turkey's wishes. This is the only road connecting Karabakh with Armenia. Russia, having shown itself to be a strong state in this way, in contrast to the 90-ies, saved the Armenian population in Stepanakert and the district. Yes, this is true, but still, it does not completely solve the Karabakh problem.
Soloviev: It doesn't solve it yet, but it creates opportunities to find a solution. Recently, we have heard quite a lot of statements from the Azerbaijani side and President Aliyev personally that the Karabakh issue is closed for Azerbaijan, that everything is resolved, that the peacekeepers are here for the next five years, and then time will tell. On the other hand, there is a desire of the Turks to participate more actively in the events in Transcaucasia. At the same time, there is no certainty that Erdogan's desire to literally strangle Azerbaijan in fraternal embrace arouses genuine enthusiasm among the quite rational and Mature politician Aliyev and the Azerbaijani elite as a whole. In this context, further events will unfold.
Foreign countries didn't save you
Correspondent: you Can have a strong army, but without a strong political will, you will not achieve anything. And vice versa.
Soloviev: It's not just about the will. In September-October, a very favorable moment appeared for Azerbaijan, just a window of opportunity. Please note that the whole world is busy fighting the consequences of the pandemic and is sinking deeper into the"coronacrisis". Europe is preoccupied with brexit and its own problems. The United States plunged literally into the abyss of elections (I do not remember such a tense and scandalous election campaign in recent decades, and the case of non-recognition of the election results by one of the parties in General looks almost unprecedented) and got stuck in an unsuccessful fight against the epidemic. All of them were not up to Karabakh.
And if the Armenian side made serious calculations on the influence of the Diaspora in the United States and France, this card did not play during the crisis. Since Armenia has the largest American Embassy (two thousand people work there), it seems that official Yerevan believed that if Armenia is so important to the United States, then some more energetic measures will be taken by Washington in the event of a crisis. The calculations were based on Paris, in my opinion, completely unfounded. But the General world situation, when everyone is not up to Karabakh, has affected and untied the hands of Azerbaijan. Everything coincided well for official Baku. Azerbaijan advanced for 40 days, without fuss, without haste, effectively using the available forces and means that were at the disposal of its army, recapturing district after district. And we must admit that the Karabakh defense army suffered an obvious military defeat.
Reporter: but I think the Diaspora didn't help because it didn't support the new Armenian leadership.
Krylov: This is not entirely true, although relations with the Armenian diasporas in different countries are a complex issue for Yerevan. More Armenians live around the world than in Armenia itself. The war in Karabakh demonstrated different levels of social cohesion in Azerbaijan and Armenia and different levels of support for their leadership from national diasporas in different countries.
After the outbreak of hostilities, almost all opposition politicians, activists, human rights defenders, etc. declared their unconditional support for Aliyev. In Armenia, Pashinyan's political opponents did not stop, but significantly intensified their propaganda campaign demanding his resignation. The same demand was constantly voiced in the Russian media by well-known representatives of the Armenian Diaspora. As a result, the disunity of the Armenian Diaspora and political contradictions within Armenia contributed to the success of the Azerbaijani army and largely determined the outcome of the Karabakh war in 2020.
At present, Armenia urgently needs not to settle accounts and find out the degree of guilt of certain politicians, but to rethink the entire experience of post-Soviet development and develop new ideas and approaches that will unite the entire Armenian nation, ensure security, successful socio-economic development and well-being of the Republic's citizens. If the political strife continues, the consequences for Armenia may be the most unfavorable.
Corr: I drew attention to the words of our President, who hinted at Ossetia and Abkhazia that if any side does the same stupid things as Saakashvili did, then we know how it ended. It ended with the recognition of the independence of both Ossetia and Abkhazia. In my opinion, the President wagged his finger at both Baku and Istanbul: if you don't stop there and the status issue isn't resolved, it may end like this.
Soloviev: Of course, this is a significant political signal, and the very appearance of our peacekeepers in the region is not accidental.
Krylov: This statement is intended to be a deterrent and should not be overestimated or drawn too far-reaching conclusions. The deployment of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Nagorno-Karabakh ensured the cessation of hostilities and created favorable conditions for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. It is obvious that developing a mutually acceptable compromise will require a lot of time and effort on the part of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as those States that are interested in stability and security in the South Caucasus. At the same time, the continuing contradictions between external players and the difficulties in Russia's relations with the "collective West" will continue to complicate the peace process and have a negative impact on the situation in the region.
Turkey's recognition of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire will continue to be another obstacle to the settlement of the Karabakh issue. Armenia continues to seek official recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide from Ankara. Turkey and Azerbaijan categorically reject the idea of such recognition in any form.
It is obvious that normalization of Armenia's relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey can only be possible if mutually acceptable approaches are developed to resolve the Karabakh problem and the recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide. Even if there is a common desire on all sides to find such mutually acceptable approaches (which is difficult to imagine in the current situation), this will take a long time. Therefore, in the near future, the situation in the region will be determined by the high potential for conflict around and within the South Caucasus, as well as the chaotic, largely unpredictable nature of modern international relations.
