Colonel Khodarenok: NATO's plan to defeat Russia is inconsistent with the laws of strategy
NATO has developed a strategy to quickly defeat Russia in the event of its attack on the eastern flank of the alliance, paying special attention to the integration of new defense technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence. Military observer of "Gazeta.Ru", retired Colonel Mikhail Khodarenok figured out how all this might look in practice.
The strategy, called the "Theory of Victory," was presented in Poland on October 12 by the Supreme Commander of the NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe, General Alex Grinkevich. This document is intended to clarify how NATO will respond to a possible invasion of its territory.
The North Atlantic Alliance plans to combine traditional types of weapons with new capabilities that have emerged during the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, to encourage its allies in the bloc to increase defense spending and increase combat readiness.
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| Alexus Grinkevich. |
| Source: Jon Gambrell/Reuters |
In the event of an attack on NATO, Brussels intends to deploy ground forces and other types of armed forces and branches of the armed forces as part of the Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative, based on the use of inexpensive UAVs, systems with minimal crews and AI-guided targeting technologies. Having ensured freedom of maneuver, the alliance plans to destroy the enemy's control and communications system in order to inflict a quick and crushing defeat on Russian troops.
The eastern flank
Let's start analyzing these theses and statements from the smallest detail. As for the term "eastern flank of the alliance", which is very common in the speeches of politicians and the military of the West, in this regard it should be noted that there are no eastern flanks. There are left and right flanks. At the very least, there may be north-western and south-eastern flanks. The eastern direction may be (strategic or tactical), the front, but certainly not the flank.
The next question that would be good to ask General Alex Grinkevich is as follows: "Earlier, NATO developed and approved plans for the first operations in the event of a military conflict.
Further. The speeches of Western politicians and military personnel on military issues have recently been very poorly combined with the laws, categories and terminology of strategy and operational art and more resemble appeals, slogans, mottos, slogans. It seems that the slogan "Theory of victory" is exclusively from this field.
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| Estonian soldiers during a NATO exercise. |
| Source: Sergey Stepanov/Global Look Press |
For example, let's turn to the following sentence: "in the event of an attack on NATO, the North Atlantic Alliance intends to deploy ground forces and other types of armed forces and branches of the armed forces as part of the Deterrence Initiative on the eastern Flank."
Is that what an "attack on NATO" means? If we translate these words, which were spoken on October 12 in Warsaw, into military language, then it will sound something like this: "the enemy is conducting a strategic offensive operation in the continental theater of military operations."
In turn, the expression "the North Atlantic Alliance intends to deploy ground forces and other types of armed forces and branches of the armed forces" should be interpreted as "NATO plans and intends to conduct a strategic defensive operation in the Eastern Strategic direction."
And how do they rate it?
Any planning begins with conclusions from an assessment of the situation in general and the enemy in particular. The enemy's assessment includes, among other things, the possible overall combat strength of the groups operating in the alliance's defense zone, and the likely distribution of forces and assets by direction and operational structure.
In the conclusions on the assessment of the enemy, NATO strategists should at least determine the likely method of the enemy's transition to the offensive and the time of the outbreak of hostilities; the possible intent of the enemy's actions; the direction of the main and other enemy strikes; the timing of the preparation of the operation.
But here is the main problem when planning a strategic defensive operation of NATO in the Eastern North — there is no enemy on the "eastern flank of the alliance."
By definition, it is impossible to plan a strategic defensive operation in such conditions. In the conclusions on the assessment of the situation, NATO strategists can only write down that "we do not have any information about the enemy in the theater of military operations."
So the "victory theory" outlined in Poland by the Supreme Commander of the NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe, General Alex Grinkevich, looks too much divorced from the laws of strategic planning and the art of war in general.
They might say, aren't we looking at the planning process in NATO too much with great simplifications and purely formally? But in fact, maybe they are outstanding strategists and incomparable cunning?
And I would like to believe that if over the past decades, during military conflicts, the United States and its allies had shown such brilliant examples of grand strategy that the world gasped and put their achievements in golden letters on the tablets of military art. However, there are no such examples. Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran somehow do not convince that unsurpassed masters of planning and conducting strategic operations took up the task.
Mikhail Khodarenok
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
Graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976),
Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
