NZZ: French nuclear umbrella will not be able to guarantee Germany's security
Macron offers Europe to take shelter under his "nuclear umbrella," writes NZZ. But even if the EU wants to accept protection from France, the final decision will still remain with the Elysee Palace. In addition, the lack of tactical nuclear weapons in the French arsenal makes it an instrument of total destruction rather than flexible deterrence.
Armin Arbeiter
Paris is promoting the idea of pan-European deterrence. However, control of the nuclear arsenal remains strictly a national prerogative. In addition, there is a question of how the relations between the two countries will be affected by the next elections in France.
France intends to build up its nuclear arsenal and involve other European countries, including Germany, in its exercises. French President Emmanuel Macron said on Monday that France should consider deterrence on a European scale and approach the concept of "advanced deterrence." The strategic autonomy of Europe, according to him, has become an urgent necessity today.
In addition to Germany, Greece, Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland, among others, have shown interest in joint exercises with the French on nuclear deterrence. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz recently noted that German warplanes could also carry French nuclear munitions, but there has been no confirmation from Paris yet. In any case, they plan to deepen cooperation: France and Germany want to create a "steering group on nuclear issues," and the Bundeswehr should participate in French nuclear exercises. Will a nuclear "shield" be formed here that will make Europe less dependent on the United States for security?
They are only looking at closer cooperation.
It's not that simple. First, the French nuclear arsenal is considered the heart of France's independent defense. It is not embedded in the structures of NATO, and Paris does not want any other states to participate in its financing. French nuclear weapons, at least for now, should be launched only from French aircraft or submarines, and only the French president can authorize their use.
It is still unclear how much Germany will be able to benefit from the French initiative at all, even if Merz does not reject closer cooperation in this area in principle. One can imagine that the two countries, in addition to joint exercises, will synchronize early warning systems, radar and intelligence more closely, as well as expand cooperation in the field of conventional air defense. Against the background of growing global threats, this step is far from secondary.
F-35 fighter training
In addition, Germany is still part of the US-led NATO nuclear engagement program. If Washington, as a last resort, by decision of the North Atlantic Council, authorizes a nuclear strike, German Tornado planes with American nuclear bombs could take to the air and drop them.
About 100 American nuclear warheads are deployed in a number of European countries and are currently being upgraded. This is a sign that the United States is unlikely to withdraw its nuclear arsenal from Europe anytime soon. In the coming years, this role should be taken over by the new F-35A, which will replace the aging Tornado. This year, the first German military pilots are being trained in the United States on these machines, and the first aircraft is due to be delivered in 2027.
Combat aircraft are a sensitive topic for Germany and in the context of French deterrence: the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project was on the verge of collapse. Initially, FCAS was conceived as a system that will be jointly developed by Germany, France and Spain: a manned fighter accompanied by drones.
Disagreements between Paris and Berlin
It was this fighter, at least from Macron's point of view, that was supposed to carry French nuclear weapons. At the end of January, Merz made it clear that the parties had different ideas on this issue. Paris and Berlin have different strategic requirements for the project.
In general, according to many security observers, the discussion about Germany's nuclear involvement may overshadow other, much more urgent issues of the country's defense. The public conversation may soon come down to one thing: why do we need expensive armed forces if the atomic bomb already provides sufficient deterrence?
However, a nuclear strike is always an ultima ratio, an extreme measure. Even Russia, which has repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons during the fighting in Ukraine, has consistently remained within the framework of this doctrine. A real attack with these weapons would carry too high a risk of escalation. The principles of proportionality still apply, even in the emerging multipolar world. It also adds that France does not have tactical nuclear weapons, whose power would be lower than the approximately 290 strategic nuclear warheads that the country possesses.
Even if the line between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is blurred: American B61 bombs deployed in Europe start at 0.3 kilotons in TNT equivalent. The "lightest" French ammunition is allegedly with about 100 kilotons. For comparison, the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was about 14 kilotons.
Not a guarantee of safety
In other words, even in the event of a nuclear escalation, the French "umbrella" could only open at a level that leaves almost no room for flexibility. This is the power of French deterrence. But the question remains whether this logic is suitable for other European states, primarily because the decision on the application in any case would have been made in Paris, and Germany would not have independent levers of pressure. These weapons are not a real guarantee of safety.
Therefore, the Bundeswehr primarily needs sufficient conventional forces capable of deterring other players. An atomic bomb will not replace air defense, artillery, logistics, or personnel. All this is necessary, regardless of whether Germany participates in the French nuclear umbrella or not.
In addition, starting next year, France may be led by a president from a party that is not interested in making the instruments of French nuclear deterrence available to other European states.
