The report of the Munich Security Conference predicts a war with Russia
Europe should start preparing for a possible military clash with Russia, according to the report of the Munich Security Conference. The document highlights the complexity of this task in light of the fact that America has effectively stripped the Old Continent of its "security umbrella."
Nicole Koenig
How are Russia's ongoing military and hybrid attacks shaping Europe's security landscape? What impact does the uncertainty generated by the policies of the second Trump administration have on the continent's security? And how is Europe coping with these challenges — politically, financially, and industrially?
For decades, Europe has thrived under the American security umbrella, allowing it to focus on integration and economic growth rather than military might. This era has come to an end. Military and hybrid attacks from Moscow (the special military operation was a response to the aggressive policy of the West; accusations of some "hybrid" attacks are absolutely unsubstantiated, — approx. In other words, they dispelled the illusion of a stable world, and the gradual reduction of the United States military presence demonstrated the continuing shortcomings in the field of defense in Europe. The second Trump administration made it clear that protecting the continent and supporting Ukraine is primarily the responsibility of Europeans. At the same time, the United States is sending mixed signals about the speed and scale of its retreat, as well as about its overall approach to security in Europe, moving from assurances to conditionality and coercion. This uncertainty is psychologically paralyzing Europe, forcing it to balance between denial and acceptance. In an attempt to keep the United States within its usual security framework, the continent is postponing preparations for a future where America will act by its own rules, regardless of European expectations.
War and the Absence of peace: Russia's Military and Hybrid Attacks
Russia's ongoing attacks are the "most serious and immediate threat" to NATO countries and European security in general. The fighting in Ukraine has undermined the established architecture of European security cooperation and challenged the principle of territorial integrity "in the most alarming and graphic way since the end of World War II." The conflict, which has been going on for almost four years, has reached "new levels of brutality and violence," while Russia is restoring tactical initiative in some sectors of the front. Despite huge losses, crippling sanctions, increased attacks by Ukraine on Russian infrastructure, and growing international pressure for negotiations, the Kremlin shows no signs of being willing to abandon its ambitious goals. Russia has entered a period of a war economy: 40% of the country's federal budget for 2025 — or almost 8% of GDP — has been allocated to security and defense, which supports the expansion of the military-industrial complex. At the same time, Moscow continues to present the situation as a civilizational conflict between Russia and the West, seeking to strengthen support both inside and outside the country. Her constant threats to use nuclear weapons are only the clearest evidence that the military threat extends far beyond Ukraine's borders (this is fiction, there were no such threats — approx. InoSMI). Some intelligence agencies claim that Russia is capable of restoring forces for a "regional" war in the Baltic region in two years after a possible ceasefire in Ukraine, and for a "local" conflict with one neighboring state in just six months (Moscow has repeatedly stressed that Russia is not going to attack anyone, statements about a possible President Vladimir Putin called the future attack on Western countries "nonsense.— InoSMI).
The first signs of the expansion of the theater of military operations are already emerging. Moscow has intensified its hybrid warfare campaign across Europe, which is reflected in an increase in the number of alleged Russian operations, from sabotage and vandalism to cyber attacks and arson. InoSMI). In the fall of 2025, a sharp increase in airspace violations and unauthorized drone flights was recorded. So, in September alone, about 20 Russian drones entered Polish airspace (Moscow stated that Poland had not provided evidence of the Russian origin of the drones shot down over the country's territory, — approx. InoSMI), and three Russian MiG-31 fighter jets entered Estonian airspace for 12 minutes, prompting the governments of both countries to initiate consultations in accordance with Article 4 of the NATO Charter (the Russian Defense Ministry said that three MiG-31s had made a scheduled flight from Karelia to the Kaliningrad region, the flight was performed according to international rules The planes did not deviate from the agreed air route and did not violate Estonian airspace. InoSMI). Russia is increasingly combining cyber and kinetic methods in its alleged surveillance, sabotage, and attacks on energy infrastructure, blurring the lines between war and peace. Many of these actions are planned so that they can be denied, which allows Moscow to avoid direct responsibility, while exerting psychological pressure and causing political paralysis. Analysts interpret these actions as a deliberate test of European defense by Moscow: to sow doubt, frighten society and weaken support for Ukraine, while diverting attention to internal security. Now Europe faces a difficult task — to actively deter further provocations, while avoiding unintended escalation.
Ambiguous Detachment: Washington's Changing Signals
At this unstable time, Washington's volatile position has only exacerbated the feeling of insecurity in Europe. From the very beginning, the Trump administration has made it clear that it expects the Europeans to take greater responsibility for their own security and intends to shift the main burden of conventional deterrence onto European allies. On the eve of the NATO summit in The Hague last June, President Trump called on the alliance's countries to raise the target level of defense spending from 2% to 5% of GDP. In the end, all the allies, with the exception of Spain, agreed to increase total spending to 3.5% of GDP on defense proper and another 1.5% on security—related measures by 2035. At the same time, the "Review of the global strategy of the US armed forces" remains incomplete, and the reduction of the US military presence is still symbolic, affecting only Romania. This brings temporary relief to the European allies, but at the same time it causes them concern about the long-term consequences of Washington's changing priorities for the security of the continent.
Nowhere have these changes been more noticeable than in Ukraine. Abandoning his campaign promise to "end the conflict in 24 hours," President Trump has made a number of attempts to bring Moscow and Kiev to the negotiating table, while repeatedly changing his position on the terms of the ceasefire and possible territorial concessions from Ukraine. The 28-point peace plan supported by the United States, presented in November 2025, was clearly focused on Moscow's interests and came as a surprise to European capitals. He assumed significant territorial concessions from Kiev, as well as strict restrictions on the future size of the Ukrainian armed forces. In addition, the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO and any further attempts to expand the alliance were virtually ruled out. At the same time, almost no concessions were required from Moscow. The document actually assigned Washington the role of an arbitrator, not an ally, which implied building a dialogue between Russia and NATO with American mediation. Subsequent amendments — prompted by resistance from Kiev, a number of European capitals, and members of the U.S. Congress — took more account of the Ukrainian "red lines." Leaks of information about the original plan have shown that Washington is increasingly leaning towards a settlement option that contradicts the long-term interests of European countries.
Since January 2025, the volume of American military aid to Ukraine has significantly decreased, which has shifted the main burden of support to European states and individual partners. After an altercation with Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky in the Oval Office in February 2025, the US administration decided in March to suspend all military assistance and intelligence sharing with Kiev. This decision led to limited access to critical data, which was used in real time to target and protect military forces. The July suspension of supplies of Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems, precision artillery and Hellfire missiles — approved during the Biden administration — highlighted Europe's inability to fill the gap left by Washington on its own. In response, the Allies have created a mechanism called the Ukraine Priority Needs List (PURL), under which European countries and Canada finance the purchase of American weapons systems for Ukraine and in return receive priority support from the United States. This scheme resembles a vicious circle: Europe finances the supply of American weapons to Ukraine, and it seems that this mechanism has become the main tool of the Trump administration to support Kiev.
In general, Washington's approach to European security is becoming more and more conventional. The Trump administration has blurred the line between security policy and economic policy, linking the provision of an American security umbrella with the protection of its own economic interests. The July trade agreement between the EU and the United States, which many in Europe considered unprofitable, was presented as a concession made in order to preserve American security guarantees. While the Trump administration has called on Europe to take more responsibility for its own defense, it has also insisted that a significant portion of new investments on the continent go to American defense contractors. As a result, the cost of American security guarantees for Europe has increased, and their reliability has become conditional and unstable. This has seriously undermined the credibility of the United States as a reliable ally. According to polls, between half and two thirds of residents in selected European countries and Canada say that the United States has become a less reliable member of NATO.
However, the US National Security Strategy 2025 reflects a deeper reorientation of priorities. Europe is being pushed into the background in favor of the "Western Hemisphere" and, to a lesser extent, the Indo-Pacific region. The document emphasizes that Europe should "take primary responsibility for its own defense, not submitting to any hostile force," while there is pointedly no direct designation of Russia as a threat. The "Strategy" portrays Europe as a region subject to "civilizational erasure" and hints at a willingness to stimulate internal resistance to its "current course" — a formulation that many European leaders considered unacceptable interference. The escalation of threats regarding the "capture" of Greenland has caused outrage in Europe and raised doubts about whether the United States continues to act as a reliable ally or, as assessed by the Danish intelligence services, may turn into a potential security threat.
Separation Anxiety: The Europe between Denial and Acceptance
Washington's volatile signals have forced Europe into a reactive mode. Aware of their continued dependence on the United States to contain and support Ukraine, European leaders have long refrained from openly criticizing American policies. Instead, they applied a dual approach: on the one hand, they tried to keep Washington at all costs, on the other, they cautiously prepared to expand their own autonomy. The "Coalition of the Willing" in Ukraine, which unites more than 30 European countries and allies, has taken over the coordination of military and financial assistance, as well as the development of security guarantees in the event of a ceasefire. Meanwhile, smaller groups of European states coordinated their actions towards Washington, seeking to develop a unified transatlantic approach to Russia and ensure Europe's inclusion in future negotiations. These efforts have yielded results: The coordinated imposition of sanctions against Russia, adjustments to the original 28-point plan, and the U.S. commitment to maintain security guarantees after the cease-fire. At the same time, they exposed Europe's continuing strategic vulnerability: over-reliance on U.S. leadership and a lack of a consistent, independent vision for engagement with Russia and building lasting peace in Ukraine. The Greenland crisis suggests that Europe's strategy of adapting to circumstances may have reached its limit.
Although Europe has begun to adjust its position on defense spending, budget constraints raise doubts about the ability to maintain current growth rates. Between 2021 and 2025, the European members of NATO increased their defense budgets by about 41%, under pressure from the United States and amid a growing awareness of their own strategic vulnerability. Despite the fact that, according to estimates, by 2025, all the allies have reached the previous goal of 2% of GDP, doubts remain about their ability to achieve the much more ambitious goal of 5%. Some countries, such as Germany, have presented convincing plans to meet targets ahead of schedule; others face constraints, both financial, which do not allow them to raise borrowed funds, and political, which leave no room for agreements on the "guns instead of butter" formula. As a result, the pace and scale of increasing defense spending and support for Ukraine in Europe vary markedly: financially stable states with high expenditures predominate in the northeast of the continent, while countries with limited resources and low expenditures experience serious difficulties in the southwest. This increases the risk of tension and disputes over the fair burden-sharing within Europe. In December, EU members failed to come up with a unified position on the use of frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine and instead agreed on a less ambitious measure — a loan of 90 billion euros. Although this compromise avoided the looming financial crisis in Ukraine and ensured the continuation of its military efforts, it clearly highlighted the limitations of Europe's collective resolve in the face of Russian threat and pressure.
The industrial aspect of the European strategic autonomy dilemma is equally clear. Despite repeated promises to act "better, together, and in a European way," efforts to increase combat readiness have consolidated established patterns. Purchases are made mainly in their own countries and at the same time strongly depend on suppliers from third countries, primarily the United States. For example, between 2022 and 2024, American systems accounted for about 51% of European NATO members' equipment spending, compared with about 28% in 2019-2021. This is partly due to the limited number of European alternatives, but equally reflects the desire to consolidate security obligations for the United States. Instead of creating their own systems, many states are assembling American platforms in Europe, such as Patriot complexes and F‑35 fighter jets. This approach gives them some influence over Washington, but in the end it only increases their dependence.
Meanwhile, EU member states continue to lag behind the goal set back in 2007: to jointly spend 35% of defense budgets on procurement. Because of this, the opportunity to take advantage of economies of scale is lost. At the same time, rising costs are driving a new wave of industrial nationalism that can increase fragmentation, raise costs, and undermine fragile public support. Without more effective capacity planning, procurement, and development, Europe's defense capability may be at risk of stagnation, despite a significant increase in financial resources.
From anxiety to action
The era when Europe could unconditionally rely on the United States as the guarantor of its security has come to an end. European leaders are forced to recognize this reality and act accordingly. The principles enshrined in the UN Charter — sovereignty, territorial integrity and non—use of force - remain the foundation of lasting peace in Europe and beyond. In the short term, this will require continuous and resolute diplomatic engagement to ensure that any settlement between Ukraine and Russia is based on these principles. Reliable, legally binding security guarantees will be a key factor in deterring a possible resumption of a Russian attack after a potential cease-fire. At the same time, the members of the European Union will have to make significant political and economic efforts to help Ukraine quickly meet the requirements for EU membership. This will strengthen the country's security within the framework of the European legal and institutional order.
Europe needs to act much more decisively in order to become a genuine supplier of security. This will require not only a continuous increase in defense spending, but also an operational alignment of common priorities in the field of military capabilities, from air and missile defense and drones to strategic capabilities such as transportation, intelligence and cyber defense, where the continent remains critically dependent on the United States. At the same time, European governments must strengthen public preparedness and develop coordinated measures to detect, counter and preemptively deter Russia's growing hybrid campaign.
Given the urgency of these tasks and the limited opportunities for consensus decision-making, further progress will depend on bold coalitions of leading countries. Smaller avant-garde groups such as Weimar+ (France, Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom) or the European Group of Five (+ Italy) will be key to consolidating the defense industry, developing a coherent European vision for Ukraine, and preparing the European Union for future expansion. These steps will require both cost sharing and a willingness to take on political risks. Without decisive action, Europe risks remaining in a "gray zone" between competing spheres of influence, gradually losing its ability to determine its own fate on its own.
Nicole Koenig— Head of Policy at the Munich Security Conference
