JW: Russia has applied a new algorithm of warfare in Ukraine
Russia is using a new algorithm of warfare in Ukraine that is inaccessible to the West, writes JW. Instead of decisive battles, Moscow chooses cyber tactics: what matters is not who will take more land, but whose system will last longer.
Lars Lange
In the conflict in Ukraine, Russia does not seek decisive battles, but considers the current front lines in the context of the overall process of exhausting the enemy. We will tell you more about the cybernetic way of conducting military operations by Moscow.
Western analysts measure the Ukrainian conflict in meters per day. According to new calculations by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Russian troops have been advancing an average of 15-70 meters per day since the beginning of 2024. This, the report says, is slower than in the Battle of the Somme in 1916. The British newspaper The Telegraph repeats: "Russian troops are advancing slower than any other army in the last century." The Washington-based think tank concludes that Russia is allegedly paying an extremely high price for minimal territorial acquisitions and is therefore turning into a second- or third-rank power. These results, it is further argued, fundamentally do not bring Moscow closer to the goal of the military conquest of Ukraine.
However, this conclusion of experts is based on a categorical error. Since the spring of 2023, there has been no documented attempt by Russia to make a classic breakthrough into the depth of the enemy's defenses anywhere on the front. Neither the massive tank attacks nor the operational phase of the offensive success development are visible. It seems that the Russian system is not offensive-oriented in the Western sense of the word; it is focused on controlling the balance of power and creating "zones of exhaustion."
What Western observers interpret as the absence of an offensive may be a different understanding of effectiveness: there is no concept of a "winter offensive" here, there is a continuous adjustment of one's own effectiveness. Russia sees the front lines not as targets, but as measuring scales of the depletion process. Combat operations are conducted as a continuous cybernetic control loop (that is, making the best management decisions), in which loss curves and combat effect are more important than territory gain.
If this interpretation is correct, then the calculation is not for victory through the conquest of territories, but for victory through the stability of the entire system: it is not important who will take more land, but whose system will last longer. Russia keeps the pressure below the point where its own system would become unstable, and at the same time tries to massively overload the enemy's system — until the moment when logistics, conscription, economy or the entire management structure collapse. The conflict ends not with a breakthrough, but with a system failure on one side.
The fog is clearing
This form of warfare can be called cybernetic: a self-regulating system that learns and adapts through feedback. The conceptual basis of this approach can be attributed to the Soviet military theorist Alexander Svechin. For Svechin, military strategy was not a plan, but a constant reaction to changes in the general situation. Where Karl von Clausewitz focused on the decisive battle, Svechin developed the concept of a system of general adaptation: war as a continuous process of strategic adjustment. In this sense, today's Russian model is more "according to Svechin" than "according to Clausewitz." As a result, we can deduce the formula: Svechin's military model plus digitalization.
The theoretical bridge here is the American mathematician Norbert Wiener, the founder of cybernetics. He defined cybernetics as the science of management and regulation through feedback: the system monitors the environment, processes data, and corrects behavior. The cybernetic way of conducting a conflict means that hostilities are organized as a control loop in order to inflict maximum systemic damage to the enemy at minimal cost.
The difference with previous attempts to "rationalize" the war is fundamental. If US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tried to "digitize" success after the fact, for example, with statistics on the number of dead, then Russia created an algorithm for combat operations at the level of their organization: from reporting figures to real-time feedback data. This way of conducting military operations can be described as a "digitalized industrial process of destruction": Russia conducts military operations like a factory — standardized, based on big data, in series. The goal is not primarily territory, but the systematic depletion of enemy systems. This model is abstract and looks like a process, so it is often incomprehensible to Western observers who measure success in kilometers. The Russian approach works on a different level of abstraction: the West focuses on "reserve values," for example, on specific control over territories, while Russia relies on "flow values," that is, on the cost-effect ratio over time.
The technical "backbone" is the ESU TK (ESU-TZ), a Russian unified tactical management system that brings units, reconnaissance assets and fire damage into a common information field. It is comparable in meaning to Western C2 systems, but it is optimized for feedback and real-time tuning. Sensors feed a single information field, algorithms and models help to rank targets, and fire weapons operate with a noticeably lower time delay. This is the computer heart of the cybernetic warfare model.
One of the most accurate descriptions of the new form of warfare came from Russia itself. Yuri Baluyevsky, former Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (2004-2008), and Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, published an article in December 2025 entitled "Digital Warfare — a New Reality." In it, they describe what is happening in Ukraine.
The main change, they say, is the complete transparency of the battlefield: the "fog of war" has dissipated. Due to ubiquitous drones, satellite communications, and network sensors, a single information environment is emerging in which the tactical, operational, and strategic levels functionally merge. The boundaries between the levels of interaction are blurring. The second fundamental change is that the tactical battlefield and the depth of space for many tens of kilometers are turning into "zones of total destruction." In such zones, any movement, any concentration of forces is instantly detected and becomes vulnerable to impact. The consequence is the extreme dispersion and very low density of battle formations.
Baluyevsky cites the emergence of globally accessible satellite networks like Starlink as the catalyst for this evolution. For the first time, an end-to-end, scalable information infrastructure has emerged that allows you to extend the feedback loop to the lowest tactical level. Cybernetic logic is not here in the form of a theoretical scheme — it can be observed empirically. As examples, we will mention three elements: the mass use of Geranium drones, the industrialized use of gliding bombs, and the organizational model of the Russian division of Rubicon unmanned systems.
A new type of unmanned unit
The organizational embodiment of the cybernetic approach can be seen in the example of the Rubicon unmanned systems division. It was created in August 2024 by order of Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and, unlike the units responsible for "conventional" drones, is directly subordinate to him. Rubicon combines the combat use, development, production and testing of UAVs in an integrated model with feedback loops. The unit's Center has its own development departments, a training center, an analytical unit, and independent combat teams. A significant part of the technological solutions comes from the so-called "people's defense industry", from individuals or small companies that create technologies for the Russian army on their own initiative. Rubicon provides such developers with direct feedback on current needs and challenges at the front. Successful solutions are scaled and transferred to mass production.
The most obvious example is fiber—optic drones, which are immune to electronic interference. The systems were first tested in the Kursk region, and then deployed across the entire front in a matter of weeks. The key difference from classical military structures is that Rubicon experiments in the military environment like a real startup — quick tests, direct feedback systems from the front to development, but it is also able to quickly scale successful solutions to all armed forces thanks to the state "vertical". While Ukraine innovates from the bottom up, but apparently has difficulty systematizing innovations, Russia is able to quickly expand proven solutions to the entire army and defense industry. The Rubicon connects both approaches.
Old equipment is being brought to a new technological level
However, this organizational innovation only works together with specific weapons systems embedded in cybernetic logic. Thus, the mass use of Russian gliding bombs is a functional development of an old type of weapon. These are basically the same Soviet-style aerial bombs, supplemented with relatively simple planning and guidance kits. Their industrial production is not difficult, the lines have existed for decades, and the cost is noticeably lower than that of modern cruise missiles. But the crucial feature is different: in recent months, the accuracy of such ammunition has increased significantly. According to the pattern of hits, it is clear that the planning bombs are used precisely along the specified defensive structures. The strikes fall on trench lines, shelters, known concentration points and rear connecting routes. Entire sections of the front are being "worked out" systematically — not by carpet bombing, but structurally, methodically and consistently.
This accuracy arises not only from the technical component of the bomb itself, but also from its inclusion in the overall sensory contour. Drone reconnaissance, battlefield monitoring, and feedback on previous strikes make it possible to constantly refine target parameters.
The functional role of gliding bombs is quite clear: they are designed to selectively destroy deeply echeloned, fortified enemy defensive positions. The Ukrainian defense has been built in many places for years — with trench systems, concrete shelters, blocked communication routes and rear strongpoints. It is these structures that are systematically destroyed or disabled by precision strikes of planning bombs.
The result is a devaluation of the position, not necessarily their immediate surrender. Shelters are disappearing, shelters are becoming unusable for military use, and logistics routes are breaking down. The advancing infantry receives a qualitatively different combat landscape: the advance goes into an already "gutted" defense with noticeably lower own losses.
In the logic of the cybernetic model, a planning bomb is not a crude tool, but an accurate element of the control contour. Low cost of production, high frequency of use and increasing accuracy are combined with fast feedback from the battlefield. The effect is not achieved simultaneously, but is optimized step by step. The gliding bomb significantly reflects the nature of the current combat encounter: old in its basic form, highly accurate in its application, built into a continuous, data-based process of exhaustion. This is not a sign of technological backwardness, but an expression of a new approach that puts efficiency above technical excellence.
Collapse as a goal
If planning bombs act against fortified enemy structures, then the second system hits the infrastructure "behind" the defenders. The Geranium drone embodies the principle of the industrial model of warfare. According to Ukrainian data, up to 120,000 such devices have been used since 2022. During 2025, Geranium went through several technological stages of development. Since the summer, Russia has been mass-equipping these drones with Chinese mesh network modems and front-facing cameras. This makes it possible for the first time to strike moving targets, such as locomotives and railway trains. The weapon, which was conceived as a strategic means of destroying stationary objects, is turning into a more versatile platform.
The tactics of its use are even more revealing. In June 2025, Russia fundamentally changed its strike strategy. Instead of irregular waves from UAVs, Moscow has built a continuous "background noise" of 50-100 Geranium flights per day, complementing it with weekly massive waves — more than 500, in some places more than 800 combined strikes by drones, missiles and cruise missiles. This combination of constant load and periodic strong saturation attacks is not an improvisation, but a controlled system adjustment.
The dramatic effect of the serial destruction was especially evident in early February 2026. After months of systematic attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, Ukraine experienced a nationwide blackout that affected even parts of neighboring Moldova; the Kiev metro also stopped. The situation was described as "apocalyptic."
This collapse is not an accident, but a predictable outcome of the industrial way of conducting military operations. Ukraine has only 11 gigawatts of generating capacity left, while 16-18 gigawatts are required in winter. 70-90% of the remaining electricity is provided by nuclear generation. During the blackout, the capacity of nuclear power plants had to be partially reduced.
Thus, the Geranium is not a "territorial" weapon. It does not serve to seize territories, but to create a serial, scalable effect against the enemy's national systems, up to their collapse. This is a cybernetic way of dealing with conflict in its clearest form: constant pressure, controlled intensity, measurable exhaustion, and systemic failure. However, Geran operates primarily in strategic depth — in industrial facilities, power plants and power grids, and urban infrastructure. A "hole" remained for a long time between the immediate battlefield and this strategic depth. Now Moscow is trying to close it.
"Total destruction zones"
With the advent of a new category of medium-range drones, the geometry of the battlefield is changing fundamentally. A new Russian UAV with a range of 300 kilometers closes the gap between tactical FPV drones (FPV control based on the "first person" image. — Approx. InoSMI) and long-range strategic weapons. This drone is extremely simple, probably costs significantly less than 10 thousand euros and is aimed at supply depots, command posts and mobile targets at a depth of 100-300 kilometers behind the front line.
This allows us to shift the "zones of total destruction", which Baluyevsky writes about, far to the former rear. To understand what this means, it is important to distinguish between two ways of using military force: a shock wave and a wave of constant pressure. A shock wave is a short—term, concentrated pulse of force: a lot of fire in a short time, a bet on a local breakthrough, and one's own vulnerability and losses are noticeably higher. The goals are to quickly change the situation, occupy territories and build on success. This is a classic maneuver warfare.
The constant pressure wave acts differently: for a long time and over a large area. Instead of a one-time "flash", there is a constant, controlled pressure. The beats are distributed over a wide area, each individual beat remains dosed, repeated and modulated. At the same time, large compounds are not exposed to the impact. The goal is not to break through, but to exhaust: the enemy's resources are being depleted step by step, his reaction is being tested and burned out.
"Total destruction zones" do not arise from shock waves, but from waves of constant pressure.
The battlefield can now be divided into concentric rings of constant pressure. The inner ring — from zero to 30 kilometers from the front line — has turned into an absolute "death zone": the movement of equipment here is almost impossible. The middle ring, with a depth of 30 to 300 kilometers, is controlled by systems like Lightning or Italmas. Previously, this area was considered a relatively safe rear area for command posts, logistics hubs, and troop concentrations. The outer ring is blocked by strategic weapons such as the Geranium-2, capable of hitting targets at a distance of significantly more than one thousand kilometers.
The key point is that these zones do not provide a gain in territorial acquisition. They create systemic pressure. The classic principle of distance protection no longer works. The very concept of a backspace is blurring. As a result, the entire area up to 300 kilometers behind the front turns into a continuous pressure zone: it is not occupied, but functionally controlled due to the constant threat.
Power due to separation
This spatial "infiltration" of the battlefield cannot but strike at familiar military concepts. The disintegration of the classic method of combat by combined arms units is one of the most underestimated consequences of the cybernetic method of warfare using drones. This is clearly seen in the statement of the British military analyst Jack Watling from the Royal United Services Institute. Last year, he wrote in a study: "FPV drones are especially effective when combined with other types of troops."
However, the Russian elite Rubicon unit shows how drones work most effectively in practice: not in combination, but in separation. Rubicon operates autonomously, conducts its own reconnaissance and selects targets on its own — without tactical reference to the brigade, without a maneuverable task, without connection with the "combined arms battle". The effect arises precisely from separation, not from integration: decentralization, shock mass instead of complex coordination, constant threat to the enemy 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Rubicon is an autonomous destruction cluster.
Meanwhile, combined arms combat is based on concentration of effort, movement, surprise, temporal coherence and mutual cover. Tanks protect infantry, infantry provides tanks, artillery prepares the terrain, all elements act synchronously. But on a "transparent" battlefield, these principles stop working: any concentration of forces and means is immediately detected by the enemy remotely. Any movement attracts drones, there is almost no surprise effect. Coordination means crowding, and crowding becomes a target for swarm attacks by FPV drones. Tanks turn into priority prey for drones, infantry can hardly maneuver. Combined arms combat is breaking down into separate components, because its key condition, limited visibility, has disappeared.
Watling's mistake is symptomatic of Western thinking: he tries to cram new technology into old concepts. But drones do not work as an "addition" to combined-arms combat. They're replacing him.
Are tanks outdated?
In the West, the crisis in the use of tanks is most often explained by the lack of their protection. This is incorrect. The problem is structural. Tanks were created as protected platforms for "direct fire": the tank needs to see the target in order to hit it. Drones do not need direct visibility — they operate from a distance, are controlled from tens of kilometers away and hit targets that the operator sees only through the video stream. This asymmetry is crucial: on a "transparent" battlefield, a tank is detected and attacked even before it itself is in the effective firing zone.
In August 2025, Ukrainian intelligence found only 23 Russian tanks within 70 kilometers of the front line, compared with 470 tanks in the southern direction alone in May 2023. Tanks have not disappeared because they are vulnerable. They have largely disappeared because they are too expensive and too "open" for the industrial destruction process. The same effect of exhausting the enemy's forces can be achieved with smaller and more manageable means. Tanks, first of all, are an instrument of maneuverable confrontation. They are poorly suited for the cybernetic mode of warfare.
The obsolescence of tanks is only the most visible symptom of a broader military paradigm shift. It is difficult for Western military thinkers to comprehend this turn because it calls into question their basic categories. The cybernetic mode of warfare, "molecular" battlefields, autonomous clusters of destruction, blurring of operational depth, and sensory-effector networks as primary weapons are largely undeveloped concepts and concepts in the West.
The confrontation in Ukraine is no longer a battlefield in the classical sense. This is a rule-driven process where the intensity, frequency, and effect of strokes are constantly adjusted. What is more important is not the maximum rigidity, but the controllability of the use of force. The fighting in Ukraine may be part of a longer process of training and adaptation of the Russian army. Therefore, the main break with the previous type of warfare lies not only in certain types of weapons or tactics, but in the transition from combat-oriented engagement to long-term confrontation. Anyone who continues to measure the Ukrainian conflict in kilometers does not understand its main logic.
