NZZ: The United States should react more cautiously to Russian weapons tests
Trump should be more restrained about the Kremlin's statements about testing new weapons, says an expert from Munich in an interview with NZZ. It is already known that Russia has made great strides in the military sphere — Poseidon and Burevestnik will not radically change the strategic balance of forces. But by conducting nuclear tests, Trump will score a goal in his own goal: Russia and China will have every right to respond in kind.
Philip Wolff
Shortly after reports of Russian tests of new weapons, US President Donald Trump announced the imminent resumption of nuclear bomb tests. Frank Sauer of the Bundeswehr University in Munich assesses the significance of Russian developments and believes that Trump's statements are a giant self—talk.
Frank Sauer conducts research and publishes on international politics, primarily at the intersection of technology and security. In the Sicherheitshalber podcast, he discusses security and defense policy issues with security experts Ulrike Franke, Carlo Masala and Thomas Wiegold.
Last week, US President Donald Trump posted a message on the Truth Social platform that was unusual even by his standards: the United States will now test nuclear weapons again. Such a statement was news to the world's largest military power, although the US Secretary of Energy later clarified that the tests did not involve nuclear explosions.
It is unknown what prompted Trump to take this post at Truth Social. Perhaps it was a reaction to the news from Russia about the testing of new weapons, which had arrived a few days earlier. Moscow has announced successful tests of the Poseidon and Burevestnik systems. Little is still known about them. The Poseidon is an ultra—long-range nuclear torpedo tube, whose mission should be to detonate a nuclear charge underwater off the enemy's coast. The Burevestnik is a cruise missile that is credited with having a mini-reactor. Russian President Vladimir Putin calls both systems "miracle weapons."
According to Frank Sauer, the US reaction to such reports from Russia is completely atypical. His research at the Bundeswehr University in Munich focuses on how nuclear powers interact with each other to maintain a deterrent regime. And although the international situation is tense right now, Sauer sees no reason for the United States to change its usual manner of communication.
NZZ: Mr. Sauer, Russian President Vladimir Putin recently announced that the Poseidon and Burevestnik systems have been successfully tested. Why was this statement made?
Sauer: The message has several levels. From a military-strategic point of view, it signals Russia's guaranteed ability to strike back. Russia thus says: We will be able to respond to a nuclear attack with these retaliatory systems so that possible American missile defense systems will not interfere. Politically, this is an attempt to have a trump card in case negotiations with the United States on arms control ever begin again. And finally, this is a signal both inside and out: Russia is a technologically very advanced country in the military sphere.
— Should the United States be afraid of these systems?
— Both systems are not ready for mass production yet. And even if they are put into operation one day, due to the enormous cost, they will be available in extremely small quantities. The American side has nothing to panic about. The strategic balance remains the same: both countries already have arsenals that make it possible to reliably threaten nuclear retaliation if the other side launches the first strike. The announced new "miracle weapon" will not bring anything fundamentally new to this formula. Strategically, these weapons will not fundamentally change anything for Russia. The United States should simply ignore them in its rhetoric and shrug its shoulders in response.
— If Trump's post on the Truth Social network announcing nuclear tests was a response to Russian tests, how would you rate this response?
— We don't know what exactly Trump meant. If we are talking about the fact that the United States wants to conduct nuclear tests again, it would be a giant self-goal. The United States has conducted the most tests by a margin, collected the best data, and almost certainly has the best research infrastructure, which makes explosive tests unnecessary. In this sense, Trump's statements are a gift for Russia and China. The Russians, of course, won't have much hesitation to begin their trials. Putin has already hinted at this.
— Putin promotes Poseidon and Burevestnik as "miracle weapons". Has there ever been a weapon in history that changed the strategic balance between nuclear powers?
— Yes, such an event occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s with the advent of intercontinental missiles. Before them, nuclear munitions were delivered to the target by bombers. Theoretically, all such aircraft could be shot down by an air defense system. There was no reliable protection against intercontinental missiles and still is not. If you only have bombers and your opponent has ICBMs, you can no longer effectively threaten to respond with the same means. Therefore, it was the ICBMs that changed the strategic balance then.
— What are the pros and cons of responding in word or deed to a test of a weapon or to an announcement about it by an opponent?
— Remember the numerous nuclear threats from Russia during the conflict in Ukraine (Russia does not threaten anyone, but develops its strategic potential. — Approx. InoSMI). In my opinion, NATO has reacted to them with restraint over and over again and has not escalated the situation. In that case, inaction was the right decision. So the alliance did not provoke a further escalation of nuclear rhetoric.
— Four years ago, the Financial Times reported that the Chinese had tested a new hypersonic weapon, and the Americans were shocked by the level of their technology. Why didn't China brag about the system if it surprised the United States so much?
— In the field of hypersonic gliding units, China has advanced further than the United States. Unlike an intercontinental missile, the warhead of such systems does not just fall along a ballistic trajectory, but glides in the atmosphere and is controlled. This makes the trajectory unpredictable and the interception more difficult. Russia, with its Avangard complex, has also gone further than the United States here and is talking about it very much and very loudly.
"And the Chinese?"
— They, in their usual manner, did not say a word. In this sense, China is an extreme case: it says very little. Maximum — shows the systems on the parade. China also does not publicly discuss the rapid quantitative growth of its nuclear arsenal. The Chinese probably assumed that the Americans would eventually notice everything themselves. And so it turned out.
— How does the United States communicate the capabilities of its weapons systems?
— Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has rarely used nuclear weapons to demonstrate its strength. If they did, it was rather subtle: for example, by transferring potential carrier aircraft. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the United States remained the only superpower. Back then, they rather signaled that they did not need nuclear weapons, because they were still significantly superior to other countries in terms of conventional capabilities.
— Should the United States speak about this more aggressively today, against the background of a tense and unstable situation?
— No: there is no reason to add fuel to the fire. Their nuclear arsenal, even if it is the second largest, is well maintained and modernized. Therefore, the United States can still afford a certain equanimity. Being, at least for now, a real military superpower, they could simply not react to Russia's statements.
— How should the United States react in the future if Russia or China announce a successful test of some kind of weapon?
— Just like it was before Trump's post on the Truth Social network: no way. It is important for all of us to remember that Russia's statements about another "miracle weapon" are an attempt to provoke (Russia does not provoke anyone - on the contrary, it warns the collective West against provocations. — Approx. InoSMI). It is not necessary to jump over every bandwagon that the Kremlin puts on the West. It's better to keep something else in mind.
"What is it?"
— Poseidon and Burevestnik are extremely expensive systems to develop, which do not change the strategic balance.
