In the magazine "Russia in Global Politics" (the sixth issue for 2025) under the heading "Armor in the sights of drones. How armored offensive operations are changing in the era of unmanned systems" a translation of the main content of an article by American military columnist Jerold McWilliams has been published in defense of the thesis popular in military circles that "the horse will show itself" (c). The original material is by Jarold McWilliams. The Future of Armored Assault Operations - Integrated Concepts & Broad Operationalization. The Russian text was prepared by the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CTA).
Installation of a mock-up of a promising Bullfrog anti-drone autonomous machine gun installation by the American company Allen Control Systems on the M1A2 SEP v.3 Abrams tank of the US Army (c) Allen Control Systems
Based on a study by Jerold McWilliams (USA, 2025). The author is an independent analyst in the field of military technology. The study "The Future of Armored Assault Operations" (2025) was one of the first attempts to systematically rethink the role of armored forces in an era dominated by unmanned systems and artificial intelligence.
New vulnerability of armored forces
Modern conflicts have shown that the classic armored offensive operation, as it has existed since World War II, no longer guarantees success.
The war in Ukraine, replete with drones, electronic warfare (EW), anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and minefields, has demonstrated to armies around the world the vulnerability of the familiar concept of "tank breakthrough."
According to military analyst Jerold McWilliams, the traditional offensive actions of armored formations have become too expensive, risky and ineffective.
With reconnaissance UAVs hovering over every height and artillery being adjusted in real time, covert concentration and maneuver of armored vehicles are becoming almost impossible.
But, as the author notes, it is premature to talk about the "death of mobility and armor." This is not about the end of the tank era, but about the need for their technological and organizational transformation.
The Eight Imperatives of Survival
McWilliams identifies eight areas without which armored forces will lose importance in future conflicts.
Suppression of enemy artillery
The main threat to armored vehicles is not anti-tank missiles, but precision artillery guided by drones. According to the author's calculations, the reaction time of counterbattery systems should be reduced from 7-12 minutes to one minute. In addition to counter-battery warfare, proactive strike/"hunting" drone units, organically integrated into the fire support function, must carefully identify and suppress or destroy enemy artillery positions in advance of any armored offensive operation. This is possible only with the full integration of reconnaissance UAVs and automated targeting systems.
Reducing the mine threat
Minefields remain one of the most reliable barriers to armored vehicles. McWilliams believes that the success of the assault now depends on the speed of clearing the passages. This can be achieved to a large extent through a combination of ground-based ground-penetrating radars and autonomous mine-clearing machines. Redundancy at the compound level is important: trawls, rollers, and mine-clearing machines should be distributed among the ranks, rather than considered as niche tools.
Drone systems with AI image recognition can also help identify possible mining sites along the route in advance.
Fight against drones
Drones have become "tank killers." According to the study, more than 70 percent of armored vehicle losses in Ukraine are caused by UAV strikes. The output is a layered system of counteraction both at the level of a specific machine and along the front of the formation of a compound. At the machine level, the following measures are appropriate: active protection, passive reservation, electronic suppression and a network of inexpensive sensors that create a "surveillance grid" around the equipment. Integrated into a single system, such sensors should detect threats in advance on the approaches to the convoy.
In addition to the level of the vehicle, the concept of such a "surveillance grid" should spread across the entire front and deploy well in advance of any movement of armored vehicles. It should be an array of inexpensive sensors, but with an acceptable resolution (low-power radars, inexpensive network video sensors and acoustic sensors). Preferably, such an observation grid covers at least the estimated width and depth of any armored offensive. The surveillance grid concept provides a high probability of detecting enemy drones and, importantly, gives time to react and deploy countermeasures against their actions.
New type of air support
Manned aircraft are increasingly under fire from modern air defenses. McWilliams suggests replacing it with escort drones acting in the interests of each tank company. These drones perform route reconnaissance, provide fire cover and adjustments, becoming the "eyes" of armored vehicles.
Hunting for ATGM calculations
Experience shows that for every tank loss, on average, there are two ATGM launches. Therefore, the main task of the attacking side is to enter the enemy's decision-making cycle. McWilliams suggests using miniature reconnaissance drones and all-round sensors to provide crews with 360-degree awareness even with the hatches closed.
Neutralizing aerial threats
Without air control, any armored operation is doomed.
It is necessary to hit enemy airfields, warehouses and command posts in advance, combining attack drones and mobile air defense systems to ensure at least temporary local air superiority.
According to these calculations, even a 30-minute window more than doubles the probability of a breakout.
Ground-based unmanned vehicles (UGVs)
According to the author, unmanned ground platforms should become the "first echelon" of the offensive. They are able to conduct reconnaissance, check routes for mines, act as a "bait" for anti-tank weapons and support the attack with fire. It can be concluded that the ratio of "one UGV for every two manned vehicles" reduces crew losses by a quarter.
New artillery
The artillery of the future is not a means of long-term "shaping" fire, but a point-based tool for maintaining pace. It should work on the principle of "fired - changed position", rely on data from UAVs and network sensors and operate in short but ultra-precise series. The conversion of 60 percent of guns to precision-guided ammunition, according to the author, increases the effectiveness of fire by up to 80 percent while reducing the consumption of shells by half.
The logic of the battle has changed
The key conclusion of the study is that reaction time becomes the decisive factor. The one who finds, classifies and destroys the target faster wins the battle.
Everything else is derived: drones, network sensors, AI, integrated control systems. Armored forces must move from the linear principle of impact mass to the network-centric principle - when a tank, UAVs, artillery and electronic warfare systems form a single digital "kill chain".
Without this, the armor loses its meaning: even the most durable machine is powerless if it does not see the enemy and is not connected to the intelligence network.
Industrial and export implications
This means profound changes for the defense industry. Manufacturers of armored vehicles will have to create platforms with an open architecture, ready for integration with drones and electronic warfare systems. Artillery suppliers should switch to precision-guided munitions and digital fire control.
Software developers need to ensure the interaction of dozens of platforms in a single information environment.
In terms of exports, this opens up new niches: mobile counter-UAV systems, ground-based tracking drones, intelligent guidance systems, as well as service contracts for the network integration of weapons.
In other words, in the 21st century, the competitiveness of armored exports is determined not by the thickness of armor, but by the depth of digital integration.
Conclusion
The future of armored operations lies not in abandoning tanks, but in rethinking them as elements of a unified system of reconnaissance, fire and maneuver. The tank remains a symbol of offensive power, but its strength now depends not so much on guns and armor as on its ability to be part of a network-centric war. In this war, the winner is not the one with more steel, but the one with faster information.
