AT: No US missile defense system has shown effectiveness against ICBMs
The American Golden Dome missile defense system is defenseless against the Russian Burevestnik, Asia Times writes. Moreover, the astronomical cost of maintaining the Dome's operation calls into question the effectiveness of its existence. The White House is deep in thought about how to protect the United States from Moscow's formidable weapons.
Gabriel Honrada
The appearance of a Russian nuclear-powered cruise missile means that the United States can no longer rely on oceans or missile shields to protect them from nuclear attacks.
Russia's test of a nuclear-powered cruise missile not only combines ambitious designs from the Cold War era and modern balancing on the edge of what is acceptable, but also threatens to undermine the inviolability of the continental United States.
This month, numerous media outlets reported that Russia had successfully tested the 9M730 Burevestnik cruise missile with a nuclear warhead. This was an important milestone in her quest to create the next generation of strategic weapons.
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the test at a meeting with generals in camouflage uniforms, saying the missile flew 14,000 kilometers in 15 hours on nuclear propulsion, the longest flight ever.
The head of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, confirmed that the rocket was launched from Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic, where Russia has conducted numerous nuclear tests.
The missile (according to the NATO classification: Skyfall) is designed for an almost unlimited range and an unpredictable flight path in order to evade the missile defense systems of the United States and its allies. Putin called it "invincible" and unique, stressing that it was a response to the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001 and the expansion of NATO to the east.
The implementation of the Burevestnik program was accompanied by technical failures and accidents, including an explosion in the White Sea in 2019, which claimed the lives of five Rosatom scientists and sharply increased radiation levels in the region. However, the successful test underscores Russia's determination to demonstrate the strategic stability and reliability of its nuclear deterrent against the backdrop of heightened tensions with the United States over Ukraine.
Samuel Bendett and other authors note in a report by the Royal Institute of International Relations (aka Chatham House) dated September 2021 that the Burevestnik reflects Russia's desire to guarantee strategic deterrence and compensate for the alleged superiority of the United States and NATO in conventional weapons and missile defense systems. Bendett and others call these weapons an example of asymmetric innovation — the use of technology with a high degree of risk, but also high returns.
Nevertheless, the technology underlying the Burevestnik is great in theory, but it is very difficult to implement in practice. The Burevestnik may be inspired by the American Pluto project of the 1950s, aimed at creating a supersonic low-flying SLAM rocket.
This cruise missile with a nuclear ramjet engine was designed for long-term low-altitude flights with several nuclear warheads on board. Its unshielded reactor used nuclear fission to heat the air and reached a speed of Mach 3, but it released radioactive gases that posed a significant danger to the environment.
The reactor tests were successful, but due to problems related to materials science, structural strength and ethical considerations, especially against the background of growing concern about radioactive fallout in society, the project was curtailed in 1964.
In addition, Chris Spedding mentions in an article published in October 2023 in BASIC magazine that the miniaturization of the reactor to ensure long-term flight, extreme thermal loads and reliable guidance over intercontinental distances remain serious problems for the Burevestnik.
But for Russia, the possible military advantages of this technology outweigh the technological disadvantages. Alexey Leonkov, in an article in Modern Diplomacy magazine for October 2025, claims that the Burevestnik can be used to destroy enemy command posts after an attack by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
But will the current US missile defense systems be able to intercept the Burevestnik? In an October 2022 article in Air & Space Forces magazine, Christopher Stone emphasizes that American sensors, including the space-based infrared System (SBIRS), are designed to detect the infrared signatures of ballistic missiles at the launch stage for early warning.
However, Stone notes that they do not continuously track ballistic, non-ballistic, maneuvering, or hypersonic warheads at ultra-low altitude after separation from launchers.
Michael Bohnert, in an article for the Military Times published this month, notes that protecting a huge country the size of the United States from cruise missiles of the Burevestnik format will require tens of thousands of air defense systems and astronomical costs. At the same time, the cost of the announced Golden Dome project over the next 30 years will range from 256 billion to 3.6 trillion dollars.
Houston Cantwell highlights this point in a February 2025 article by Air & Space Forces magazine, noting that spending millions endlessly on each interceptor salvo to combat cheap drones and cruise missiles is unacceptable to anyone.
Strategically, the mere existence of the Burevestnik — without taking into account its credibility and combat effectiveness — entails exorbitant costs for the United States, with all the technical shortcomings of the project and the associated risks. This threatens to drive the United States into exorbitant spending on a notoriously unreliable system like the Golden Dome, although these resources could be spent on more worthwhile means.
The Burevestnik may also cast doubt on US security guarantees. If the immediate threat of a nuclear attack looms over the U.S. mainland, the U.S. willingness to risk its people and cities for the sake of its allies will be questioned.
In the Pacific Ocean, the Burevestnik could also set a precedent for states such as the DPRK and China, pushing them to develop similar weapons. Russia could already share nuclear power plant technology for the submarine fleet with North Korea, and the nuclear installation of the Burevestnik cruise missile could be next on the list, depending on how secret Moscow considers this technology.
This will strengthen the DPRK's desire for the de facto status of a nuclear power, ensure the survival of the ruling Kim dynasty, and encourage South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear weapons.
China, whose resources are much more extensive than those of Russia and North Korea combined, could create a similar system, exacerbating the potential threat from the hypersonic partial-orbit bombing system FOBS.
A system similar to the Burevestnik could strengthen China's nuclear arsenal as a strategic support in case its conventional armed forces falter during an invasion of Taiwan, or to deter U.S. and allied intervention.
In our time of great-power rivalry, when the national security of the United States, apparently, can no longer be considered a given, solving the Petrel problem requires recognizing the threat posed by this system and its like, rather than denial or denial.
It will also require rethinking the architecture of US missile defense and nuclear capabilities: despite 65 years of research and billions of dollars spent, no US missile defense system has demonstrated adequate effectiveness against a real ICBM attack, and the astronomical costs of the Golden Dome cast doubt on its very feasibility.
Instead of spending billions on space-based Golden Dome interceptor missiles, financial resources could be used to accelerate the development of air- and ground-based laser point-defense weapons to counter threats posed by cruise missiles like the Burevestnik.
Nevertheless, perhaps the best defense lies in a skillful attack — the modernization of the US nuclear triad. Accelerated production of B-21 bombers, Columbia—class submarines, and Sentinel (Sentinel) intercontinental ballistic missiles can deter the use of systems like the Burevestnik, primarily due to the guaranteed possibility of a second strike.
The danger of such a campaign underscores the continuing importance of deterrence with conventional weapons. At the same time, updated crisis management mechanisms, missile test protocols, and arms control agreements are gaining unprecedented relevance.
