The journal Russia in Global Politics (Volume 23, No. 5(135), September - October 2025) published an article by Yuri Lyamin, a leading researcher at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), "Without winners, but with a likely sequel. The military-technical lessons of the Israeli-Iranian war".
The McDonnell Douglas F-15A Eagle fighter (Baz, tail number "663", serial number 294/IA004) from the 133rd Squadron of the Israeli Air Force took off to participate in the operation against Iran. The aircraft carries old AIM-7M Sparrow and Python 4 air-to-air guided missiles and IAI Elta EL/L-8222 electronic warfare containers. 06/17/2025. This aircraft, built in 1976, is considered to be the first F-15 fighter to achieve an aerial victory - Israeli Air Force medic Moshe Melnik shot down a Syrian MiG-21 in combat on 06/27/1979 (c) Israel Defense Forces
The twelve-day war between Israel (with the support of the United States) and Iran in June 2025 was another confirmation that the confrontation between the states is increasingly shifting to the format of direct hostilities. And, as practice shows, attempts to stabilize the situation through limited strikes do not lead to long-term normalization, but to an expansion of the conflict. But if we move away from politics, the conflict has also taught a number of lessons in the military-technical sphere.
A threat from afar
First of all, it is necessary to note the enormous scale of the threat in the form of the massive use of remotely controlled small kamikaze drones and small-sized guided missiles to commit major terrorist and sabotage acts. The events in Russia and Iran have demonstrated this clearly.
First, on June 1, the Ukrainian special services staged a coordinated attack on a number of Russian military airfields using remotely controlled kamikaze drones launched from camouflaged structures on semi-trailers near the airfields. And on the night of June 13, the Israeli attack on Iran was accompanied by an even larger attack of this kind, organized by sabotage groups against Iranian air defense positions, as well as some other important targets.
In the Israeli case (in addition to remotely controlled kamikaze drones, which were launched from converted trucks, etc.), modified versions of Spike family anti-tank missile systems were also used, which are equipped with a remote control system via the Internet. Considering that Iran already lacks modern anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), especially long-range ones, for such a large and largely mountainous country, this attack has largely achieved a strategic effect. It sharply weakened the Iranian air defense in the direction of the Israeli Air Force strike, that is, in western Iran and parts of central Iran, including the air defense of the capital region. So, among the videos published by the Israeli side from optical-electronic systems of kamikaze drones and missiles, one of the radar stations included in the latest Iranian long-range air defense system Bavar-373 near Tehran is visible.
This is an important lesson that requires careful study. Until relatively recently, such a large-scale attack would have required the presence of operators somewhere near the site of the operation. But now the use of high-speed mobile Internet networks, low-orbit satellite Internet networks like Starlink, as well as more advanced homing and automatic target recognition systems using artificial intelligence, etc. allows you to organize coordinated attacks by small kamikaze drones and missiles at once at different points deep behind enemy lines, controlling them from afar, even from the attack organizer's own territory.. Of course, preparing such an attack still requires a lot of time and resources. But still, it's one thing to transport and assemble barrage munitions in another country, install them on camouflaged mobile platforms or in secluded places, and then remotely launch and control them. It is quite another thing to throw them into another country, place them near targets, and subsequently evacuate numerous operators of such barrage ammunition. These are completely different categories of risk and complexity.
The weakness and importance of air defense
At the very beginning of the war, Israel took advantage of Iran's vulnerability, its low missile defense capabilities, to suppress Iranian air defenses and defeat other important targets. Therefore, as far as can be judged, the Israeli Air Force launched the first wave of strikes with precision air-launched ballistic missiles from deep in the airspace of neighboring Iraq. Among other things, judging by the fragments of spent stages found in Iraq, the combat version of the Israeli Blue Sparrow and Silver Sparrow family of ballistic missiles was used again (presumably the missile is called Golden Horizon, according to last year's information leak from the United States), capable of hitting targets at a range of about 1,000-2,000 km, which allows strikes from Iraq against targets in the Tehran area. and Isfahan. These missiles have already been used by Israel to attack some Iranian targets, including air defense positions during limited exchanges of strikes in April and October 2024. Also, apparently, air-launched ballistic missiles such as Rocks and others were used.
This proves the danger of a complete loss of initiative in the air, when the enemy can methodically knock out ground-based air defenses using a wide range of long-range weapons, for which the Israeli Air Force is very well prepared and well armed. Thus, in addition to the above-mentioned air-launched ballistic missiles, well-known Delilah cruise missiles and other weapons were actively used against Iranian air defense systems, allowing them to attack air defense systems beyond their range. Various means of electronic suppression, etc. were also used.
It is not surprising that in these conditions, some new Iranian air defense systems with fully passive optoelectronic means of detecting and tracking targets, such as the Majid short-range air defense system, the Ghaem-118 short-range air defense system, and the 358 and 359 anti-aircraft missiles, seem to have shown the greatest survivability and effectiveness. Most likely, they shot down at least several large Israeli reconnaissance, strike and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), like Hermes-900, Heron TP, Heron, not counting numerous small vehicles like kamikaze drones.
Further development of such air defense systems seems to be a promising direction, but a lot of them are needed, and mass production in Iran has been established only in the last few years and there are clearly not enough of them.
As for Israel's seizure of the initiative in the air, Iran had no means of countering it. Given that the direct line between Iran and Israel is about 1,000 km through the airspace of Iraq, Syria or Jordan, only a very strong air force, which Iran does not have and could not have, could have prevented the Israeli Air Force from reaching the strike lines. Due to years of sanctions and the impact of the United States and regional opponents on potential sellers of aviation equipment, the Iranian Air Force has been steadily shrinking and aging over the decades. The backbone of fighter aviation is still made up of obsolete F-4, F-5 and F-14 fighters, supplied from the United States before the 1979 revolution. They are complemented by a small number of Chinese-made F-7 fighters purchased in the early to mid-1990s (upgraded copies of the MiG-21), French-made Russian MiG-29 and Mirage F.1 fighters (from among the Iraqi Air Force aircraft that fled to Iran from Iraq in 1991), as well as upgraded Iranian copies of the F-5. There is still no exact confirmation of the supply of new Su-35 fighters from Russia, and in any case, the machines that Iran would have received by that time would not have seriously changed the situation.
Thus, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the Iranian fighter aircraft was absolutely inferior to the Israeli ones, the latter consisting of more than 300 F-15, F-16 and F-35 fighters, which are supported by their own and American long-range radar detection and control aircraft, electronic reconnaissance aircraft, etc.
The information that Israel received from the American satellite constellation, radar stations, manned patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, UAVs, etc., played a very important role during the fighting. Just as Ukraine receives data on expected Russian missile launches from the United States and other NATO countries, Israel often seemed to have information about expected large group launches of Iranian missiles. It is likely that the capabilities of the American reconnaissance satellite group make it possible to detect high activity in known areas of missile bases, and the more launchers were moved from underground bases to ground positions for simultaneous launches, the higher the probability of their detection. Israel also has its own reconnaissance satellites, but they are too few to carry out such a large-scale control. But this is only a confirmation of the long-known fact that the United States has enormous intelligence capabilities, including space, on which all allies depend.
Rocket duel
Despite the advantage of Israel and the United States in intelligence, numerous air strikes on ground infrastructure and entrances to underground tunnels of Iranian missile bases, and the Israeli air force's hunt for Iranian missile launchers, Iran continued to launch ballistic missiles at Israel throughout the war. The Iranians suffered losses, they had to change tactics, significantly reduce the size of volleys for greater secrecy, etc., but the missile attacks did not stop.
Iran's problem remained the low accuracy of most of its medium-range ballistic missiles (over 1,000 km). If we talk about the less long-range modern Iranian shorter-range ballistic missiles and tactical missiles, they have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to accurately hit targets. As a recent example, although the Iranian missile strike on June 23 on the American Al-Udeid airbase in Qatar was largely symbolic, few missiles were launched and most were intercepted, but the only missile that broke through destroyed one of the priority targets, the antenna of the secure satellite communications terminal. Moreover, Iran is mass-producing high-precision versions of shorter-range ballistic missiles and tactical missiles equipped with various variants of homing heads capable of hitting even large moving targets such as ships and vessels on the high seas, which also has evidence, including very recent ones.
However, in the case of Iran's intermediate-range ballistic missiles, things are more complicated. Older missiles equipped with a single inertial guidance system (INS) have mediocre accuracy at such distances. As for the newer ones, the main focus in their development has long been on creating as high-speed types as possible to break through a potential enemy's missile defense system. In recent years, missiles with hypersonic maneuvering and hypersonic gliding warheads (Fattah-1 and Fattah-2) have also been shown. The accuracy was also improved due to improved ANN and additional satellite navigation, but in conditions of active electronic suppression of satellite navigation systems, their accuracy still decreases. Israel is actively suppressing satellite navigation systems.
Iran realized this after limited exchanges of strikes with Israel in 2024. Based on the experience gained, the Iranian missile industry urgently began to create a high-precision intermediate-range ballistic missile similar to shorter-range missiles and made it based on the Haj Qasem missile. The new version, called the Qasem Basir, has an optoelectronic homing head, but it was introduced only in early May 2025 and by the beginning of the war in June they simply could not produce significant quantities.
Nevertheless, the existing Iranian missiles of various types broke through the American-Israeli air defense "umbrella" and caused painful damage. According to various Israeli estimates, Iran has fired about 500-600 ballistic missiles and 1,000-1,100 kamikaze drones at Israel. While kamikaze drones were overwhelmingly intercepted (many were shot down by the forces of the United States, France and Jordan), in the case of ballistic missiles, Israeli sources recognize 36 missile hits in "populated areas" and, in addition, "some" Israeli military bases (judging by satellite images, at least five). According to an analysis by the British The Telegraph, the percentage of Iranian missile breakthroughs through the "umbrella" of missile defense even increased slightly during the war.
Moreover, judging by data from American sources, if the fighting continued, there was a possibility that the stocks of interceptor missiles from the missile defense systems covering Israel would have been mostly used up. And this would increase the effectiveness of the Iranian strikes and make even single missile launches successful.
It should be noted here why it is important to talk specifically about the joint US-Israeli, and not just the Israeli missile defense "umbrella". Israel indeed has one of the most powerful layered missile defense systems, but only the upper level of this system, the Arrow family missile defense system, can effectively intercept Iranian intermediate-range ballistic missiles. As far as we know, based on satellite images, there are four Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 battery positions in Israel. This is not enough against Iranian missiles, and back in the fall of 2024, one of the American batteries of the THAAD missile defense system was transferred to Israel, and recently it turned out that by the time of the attack on Iran, two THAAD batteries out of seven available to the United States were already deployed in Israel. Israel was also covered by American destroyers capable of shooting down Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles using SM-3 interceptor missiles.
Together with the aforementioned Israeli complexes, this ensured an ultra-dense and therefore quite effective missile defense system over Israel, but the cost was the high consumption of expensive interceptor missiles.
So, according to The Wall Street Journal, citing American officials, during the 12 days of the war, the United States spent more than 150 interceptor missiles for THAAD complexes and about 80 SM-3 missiles covering Israel. Thus, a significant part of all American stocks of these types of missiles has been spent. From 2010 to 2025, only about 650 interceptor missiles for ground-based THAAD systems were purchased for the US Army. As for SM-3 interceptor missiles for US Navy ships, 470 such missiles were purchased from 2010 to the end of 2024.
There are a number of other factors to consider. The destroyers need to return to their bases to recharge. The Americans cannot leave ships in other parts of the world without interceptor missiles, as well as THAAD complexes stationed in the United States, Saudi Arabia, Guam and South Korea. And to top it all off, some of the interceptor missiles delivered over the years were used up earlier.
The reserves of interceptor missiles for the Israeli Arrow missile defense systems were also rapidly depleted during the war. Israeli sources do not provide exact data, but again, according to The Wall Street Journal, if Iran had fired several more large volleys, Israel could have exhausted stocks of interceptor missiles for Arrow-3 complexes. And their restoration requires a lot of time and money. In the United States, the cost of each missile for THAAD complexes is $ 13 million, and only 37 of them are expected to be purchased in the next fiscal year. SM-3 interceptor missiles, depending on the options, cost from eight to more than 25 million dollars apiece.
Even after the war, Iran retained sufficient reserves of ballistic missiles and launchers for them. Even according to Israeli estimates, Iran had about 2,000-2,500 missiles capable of reaching Israel before the war, and about 400 launchers for them, of which, according to the Israeli side, more than 200 were destroyed. In reality, based on Israeli videos of the strikes and other open sources, the number of identifiable Iranian missile launchers hit is many times smaller. According to my calculations (based on available footage, etc.), about 30-40 Iranian launchers and a number of other vehicles for transporting missiles (as well as just false targets) were hit. There must surely be unknown losses, but they can't be as many as the Israelis claim, otherwise it would have become noticeable one way or another.
In addition, most Iranian missile launchers are simple and inexpensive structures based on conventional semi-trailers, which allows them to be produced quickly and in large quantities, if necessary. The missile stocks remained mostly untouched deep in the underground bases.
The underground component
Iran's extensive underground infrastructure helped in many ways to hold the blow and respond, and this is another of the lessons of the war. Realizing the weakness of the Air Force and the vulnerability of air defense, the Iranians have been digging deep into the mountains for many years, creating and improving underground bases for missiles, UAVs and manned aircraft, moving a significant part of the defense industry and key facilities of the nuclear program underground.
The fighting predictably demonstrated that without the use of nuclear weapons, the Israeli Air Force is unable to penetrate well-protected underground facilities. To bomb the facilities of the Iranian nuclear program, it was necessary to seek help from the United States, which for the first time used its heaviest and most powerful non-nuclear bombs, the 13-ton GBU-57, which can now only be used from B-2 strategic bombers of the US Air Force, to attack the underground uranium enrichment facilities at Fordo and Natanz. But the United States did not even try to hit the underground part of the Iranian nuclear center in Isfahan with GBU-57 bombs, since, according to the Americans, it is so deep that these bombs would not be effective[12]. And these are not all underground facilities related to the Iranian nuclear program.
Despite the statements of both sides, neither Israel nor Iran have achieved any decisive success.
Israel and the United States have caused significant but limited damage to Iran's nuclear and missile programs, and Tehran's capabilities allow it to be restored and further developed in even more secure locations. Iran has demonstrated a high level of stability and internal strength, and its missile and unmanned forces are ready to wage a major war and strike back in extremely unfavorable conditions of enemy air superiority. But he lost the previously functioning deterrence system against Israel and the United States, and the result of the fighting did not help restore it. The armed confrontation is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, much will depend on how fully the parties learn the lessons and draw the necessary conclusions.
