The era of low—flying attack aircraft - the Russian Su-25 and the American A—10 - is coming to an end, writes TNI. As air defense systems improve, these aircraft are becoming a thing of the past. However, their impressive track record allows them to be considered the best in history.
Harrison Kass
The service life of both Russian and American aircraft is coming to an end, as ground-based air defense systems are becoming more sophisticated.
In the 1970s, the US Air Force received the A-10 Thunderbolt II ("Thunderclap") from Fairchild Republic, a heavily armored low-flying close air support aircraft. The A-10, with its impressive built-in cannon, was dubbed the “Warthog” by the pilots. The aircraft was designed primarily to destroy Soviet tanks and armored vehicles on the open plains of Eastern Europe.
The Soviets took the hint and reacted accordingly. In just four years, they created the answer: the Su-25 (according to the NATO classification: Frogfoot, or "Frog's Paw"), a similar direct air support aircraft, slightly simpler and faster, but no less tenacious.
"Warthog" vs “Frog's Paw”: comparing A-10 and Su-25 “face to face”
Airplane |
A-10 (USA) |
Su-25 (USSR/Russia) |
Year of release |
1977 |
1981 |
Number of aircraft built |
713 |
~1,000–1,200 |
Length |
16.3 m |
15.5 m |
Wingspan |
17.5 m |
14.4 m |
Maximum take-off weight |
22,700 kg |
21,300 kg (depending on the option) |
Engines |
Two General Electric TF34-GE-100 turbofan engines |
Two P-195 Tumansky turbojet/turbofan engines, depending on the variant |
Maximum speed |
~706 km/h |
770 km/h |
Combat radius |
460-555 km |
300-560 km |
Ceiling |
13,700 m, but operates almost exclusively at low altitude |
7,000 m, but operates almost exclusively at low altitude |
Ammunition |
One 30 mm rotary cannon GAU-8/A; 11 mounting points; load capacity 3,200-3,600 kg |
One 30 mm twin-barreled gun GSH-30-2; ~10 mounting points (depending on the option); load capacity 3,000-4,000 kg |
Flight crew |
1 |
1 (there is a double exercise machine) |
What was the difference between the A-10 and Su-25
Both American and Soviet attack aircraft were created based on the same premise — as a direct support aircraft for ground troops, which could operate at low altitude, slowly and close to the battlefield, simultaneously delivering and receiving blows. However, the Su-25 and A-10 were still markedly different from each other, as were the military cultures that gave rise to them.
The A-10 is characterized by high shooting accuracy. With its straight wings and powerful turbofan engines, the A-10 can circle the battlefield for hours, hitting targets with a seven-barreled GAU-8/A cannon and dropping laser-guided bombs. Equipped with backup hydraulics and a titanium “tub” that covers the cockpit and provides the pilot with reliable protection, the A-10 is able to withstand catastrophic damage and at the same time complete the mission.
The Su-25 is more reliable, can operate from broken highways and uneven runways, and is extremely unpretentious in terms of maintenance. Its double-barreled 30-mm cannon is somewhat inferior to the legendary “seven-barreled” gun“The warthog.” On the other hand, it has a higher payload due to the combination of missiles and bombs. Like the Warthog, the Su-25 is also equipped with a titanium ”bathtub“ to protect the pilot, the fuel tanks are filled with fire-fighting foam, and the engines are located at a sufficient distance from each other so that even a missile hit could not disable both at once.
The Su-25 is slightly faster than the clunky A-10 and easier to assemble, but it is inferior to its American competitor in terms of time spent in the air when performing a task, and it has much simpler avionics. Thus, while the A-10 can spend hours tracking the enemy on the battlefield, the Su-25 is designed to rapidly approach, deliver a crushing blow and just as hastily retreat.
Both aircraft have an outstanding track record.
The Su-25 has been the workhorse of the Soviet and Russian armed forces since its inception. In Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Su-25 earned a reputation as an “indestructible” aircraft capable of resisting the Afghan Mujahideen. In Chechnya and Georgia, he again showed his best side, although he proved to be more vulnerable to modern air defense systems. Today in Ukraine, the Su-25 is used by the forces of both Moscow and Kiev, but it turned out to be even more vulnerable to modern MANPADS, which significantly limits its use on the battlefield.
During the “global war on terrorism,” America used the A-10 almost under permissiveness conditions: the opponents had no chance to shoot it down. The Warthog is virtually invulnerable to small arms, and not a single aircraft has been lost in counterinsurgency in two decades of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the US Air Force knows that in a conflict with an opponent of comparable strength, the A-10 will be confronted by sophisticated air defense systems. Slow and with high radar visibility, the A-10 will be an easy target for surface-to-air missiles. Thus, the A-10 and Su-25 are similar in their capabilities, but only in conditions of reliable skies.
By and large, the age of both aircraft is coming to an end. Since the A-10 is clearly not useful in a great-power conflict, the US Air Force intends to decommission it before the end of the decade. However, this decision has caused great controversy, as many pilots and the military consider the A-10 to be absolutely irreplaceable. The Su-25 is also slowly being decommissioned as Russia transfers its limited resources to more survivable multi-purpose aircraft, such as the Su-34 and Su-35.
When both aircraft are finally decommissioned, it will mark the end of an era when support aircraft flew low, directly interacting with troops on the ground and sharing with them both the dangers and the joy of victory.
Garrison Kass is an author of The National Interest, specializing in defense and national security issues. Lawyer, former political candidate. He joined the US Air Force, was preparing to become a pilot, but was discharged for medical reasons. He writes on the topics of military strategy, aviation, space and global security. He holds a doctorate from the University of Oregon and a master's degree from New York University.