Dmitry Kuzyakin, Chief Designer of the Central Design Bureau, talks about why the world overslept the drone war.
A Big Technological Leap is taking place on the battlefield right now. Surprisingly, there is very little information in the public field with a deep analysis of the essence of this phenomenon. Everyone is talking about shock FPV drones, artificial intelligence, "smart" minefields, foam range finders or unmanned boats.
But all these are details, just external manifestations. What is really behind this breakthrough? Why didn't anything like this exist before, and suddenly it suddenly appeared? There is something to think about here. Understanding the factors and causes of what happened will allow us to better navigate the current situation, predict the development of events and make the right decisions. Without knowing where we are and how we came to this, it is difficult to understand where the world is heading and what needs to be prepared for.
The future of states, entire military blocs, and cultures literally depends on understanding the causes and essence of the technological revolution on the battlefield. The events of recent years eloquently prove that no one is protected from new global threats.
This article is just a tentative attempt to start analyzing the military technological revolution. And we'll start with the key question.: how did it happen that not a single specialized military research institute, not a single military-industrial complex enterprise worked on FPV shock systems before the start of its? And it's not just about Russia. The whole world overlooked the ultimate combat technology, which was already more than ten years old at the time of the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine. By and large, the issue is broader than FPV, but we will develop the idea based on the example of this technology.
The issue of the blatant blindness of the military industry is especially important for understanding why all the developments that have been conducted or are being conducted by relevant structures around the world are so ineffective. Why they look great at exhibitions and presentations, but are completely useless on the battlefield. At the same time, completely different technologies suddenly appear on the very front, which rapidly break the established rules of warfare.
The key moment that finally confirmed the birth of a new type of weapon was the events of 2018, dubbed the "Gatwick Incident." That year in England, a group of intruders paralyzed the largest civilian airport located in the suburbs of London. It is still unknown who was behind this action and how many people participated in it. The violators simply "for fun" drove FPV drones over the runway, competing with incoming and departing civilian airliners.
For two days, British security forces — from the police and special services to army units and special operations forces — helplessly watched the impromptu FPV camera show. Neither electronic warfare (EW), nor trained falcons, nor drones firing nets, nor anti-drone guns, nor even combat lasers worked. The latter, by the way, were applied with special pathos. The British Defense Minister promised to resolve the drone crisis within a few hours. As a result, the official was forced to resign — the drones won. The airport resumed operations only when the hooligans got bored and stopped flying on their own.
It became obvious that the FPV is a new type of weapon that will radically change any parity armed conflict on the planet. A thorough analysis of other, similar technologies has only reinforced this confidence.
The Center for Integrated Unmanned Solutions (CCDB), which then existed as an initiative group, took up the work. We knew that FPV systems had already been used in Afghanistan, Syria and African countries. However, these were isolated episodes, not regular combat practice, but only experiments by disparate groups. Before full-fledged combat use, which could change the war itself, it was necessary to solve a number of important tasks: to develop scenarios for using FPV systems in combat, prepare methodological materials for training personnel, create special ground equipment, develop ready-made payload elements for future FPV attack vehicles and establish mass production of specialized drones.
When all these components were ready, in 2020 we started going to the offices of officials and specialized exhibitions. The calculation was to receive funding or at least instructions to the law enforcement agencies to seriously deal with this topic. For almost a year, we were told that "these toys" would not change anything, that they were difficult to control, that they would be suppressed by "any electronic warfare device" and that they were assembled from Chinese parts, which is unacceptable!
That time turned out to be extremely difficult, but it gave us a clear understanding of why FPV technology could not originate in any military department in the world. Faced with complete rejection, we decided to take a desperate step.
We turned to our friends, the airsoft team, with a request to help in shooting a short film about the combat use of FPV drones, presenting it as if they had already been adopted. The film was shot, and we made it publicly available on YouTube.
A couple of days later, representatives of the departments came to us. They asked to delete the video and offered to start a direct dialogue with the security forces. They promised us support and attention. And what is important is that they did not deceive.
After the meeting with the Minister of Defense, all the necessary instructions were given, and in 2021 we began training Russian special forces for the combat use of FPV systems. We knew for sure that together with our fighters we were the first along this path and were literally opening Pandora's box. We were lucky to be heard and to start preparing the armed forces for new types of warfare in a timely manner.
It was then that the key question arose again: why had none of the relevant military institutes, research institutes, or military-industrial complex enterprises, with their vast resources, been involved in this area before us? This applied not only to our country, but also to the whole world. And if so, what other "surprises" remain beyond the attention of traditional structures?
It's hard to believe that advanced military engineers and scientists did not consider FPV technologies as a potential new type of weapon. However, the fact remains that the large-scale implementation of these systems in the US army, for example, did not begin even in 2019. The sudden triumph that FPV drones are experiencing on the battlefield today has exposed systemic problems in the perception of innovation by the military-industrial complex. There are several reasons why the "drone revolution" did not come from above, but grew from below. The main ones are in the field of stereotypes, finance and international cooperation.
The first and most powerful obstacle is the deeply civilian origin of FPV systems. For a long time, they had a reputation among the army as technologies of a narrow segment of "nerds"-amateurs. It is very difficult to break such an established image in order to convince customers of the shoulder straps. Many enthusiasts who tried to convey the value of their developments to military structures simply did not find the strength to overcome bureaucratic barriers and prove the potential of these systems.
The second stereotype that got in the way was the unshakeable belief that civilian developments were a priori inferior to military ones. However, reality has shown the opposite. Thus, some civilian means of communication turned out to be exceptionally resistant to electronic warfare. This is due to the fact that they have been developing for decades in extremely competitive, "noisy" radio bands. The developers did not have the opportunity to work at high capacities, which forced them to create cunning, smart and tenacious solutions that today demonstrate their effectiveness.
For specialized military research institutes and design bureaus, there are always many tasks that guarantee significant budgets. These areas are much more monetary and, therefore, priority areas.
FPV technologies do not require the huge investments typical of the "classical" areas of military thought development. And where there are no huge budgets, there is no motivation for large structures to seriously deal with these issues. As a result, it is impossible for large businesses to make money using the usual schemes in the new technological wave. In fact, all development and progress are provided by passionate engineers.
It is impossible to create combat FPV systems within the framework of one country or a military-political bloc. It is a deeply international product. Some countries are capable of launching spacecraft on their own, building nuclear submarines, and developing nuclear weapons. But no power in the world can fully assemble its own FPV drone.
Despite the misconception of simplicity and cheapness, the combination of technologies assembled in a conventional FPV drone will easily give a head start to the nuclear or space industry in terms of its complexity. FPV has been developed by literally the whole world, and the whole world is required for a drone to take to the air.
At the same time, there is a misconception that the entire element base is exclusively in the hands of China. This is far from the case. One such drone can have more than four computing complexes with their own processors. Even Chinese factories are forced to purchase some components around the world in order to assemble the finished products for sale in other countries.
Separately, we should mention the most complex software under which the drone operates. Almost everywhere, Open Source is used — a product created, without exaggeration, by the work of thousands of programmers around the world.
Unlike the space or nuclear industry, where there are specialized universities and established scientific schools, the new technological wave is not represented by departments and doctoral degrees. We are still in a paradigm where it is generally assumed that if a doctor of science understands the topic, it means that if there is a department, they know better.
As a result, it is more certain that money will be allocated to an institute or a specialized military industrial complex corporation than to a group of talented students or young engineers. This has led to the fact that there are so few specialists in new technologies and engineering teams working in this field in the world. Many of them could not survive economically, so the remaining ones are worth their weight in gold today.
Perhaps, of all these factors, the financial one turned out to be the most decisive. The lack of a quick and guaranteed income did not allow the giants of the military-industrial complex to see FPV technologies as a strategic resource.
Large military departments and corporations tried to ignore FPV technologies and similar solutions, literally stuffing them under the table. Meanwhile, these systems began methodically "biting off the legs" of those who found themselves at this table. This is especially evident now, when the so-called advanced NATO countries are demonstrating helplessness in the face of new threats posed by drones of all stripes.
Should we expect breakthrough solutions like combat FPV systems from the classic development and deployment scheme? Military history proves conclusively: no, it's not worth it. Combat aviation did not originate in cavalry institutes, and gunpowder and small arms were not invented by crossbowmen. New technologies always overtake and destroy old structures.
Today, two fundamentally different approaches to military developments have spontaneously emerged.
The first one is classic, bureaucratic, with contests, projects, approved budgets, long trials, and testing grounds.
The second is spontaneous, developed by the fact of effectiveness right on the battlefield. He works with minimal injections, which, as a rule, are provided by the engineering groups themselves, the fighters, their commanders and concerned citizens. The main advantage of this approach is instant results.
The latest achievements of the second approach include the emergence of new communication systems and technologies, for example, "Meshtastic" (tactical radio chat without cellular communication and the Internet). No military research institute could either justify the budget for it, or develop it independently. Meshtastic is also an international project created by the "whole world", and it has already occupied its niche not only at the front, but also in civilian life.
The classical approach to development can be considered as a specific environment of natural selection. As in any evolutionary mechanism, those solutions that are maximally adapted to survive in conditions of competitions, budgets and presentations win. The selection conditions in this environment filter out the "weak" and nourish the "strong".
There is even a special term — "combat exhibition drone". These are projects that have been traveling from one exhibition to another for years, allowing developers to feed on budget funds. The laws of evolution say that any environment of selection generates species adapted to survive in it. Exhibition drones are a natural result of this paradigm. However, such projects, as a rule, have little chance of surviving in the conditions of real military operations or the national economy.
We will not get breakthrough solutions by continuing to use the old, classical development paradigm through project management, competitions and large budgets. We haven't received them before, and the classic system won't allow new FPV-like technologies to develop.
A new paradigm of technological development is being formed right before our eyes. Its essence is to transfer the natural selection of solutions directly to the environment where they will live.
There are no preliminary contests, budgets, or commissions. If you have an idea and a desire to test it, go ahead! The engineer or the group is given the opportunity to experiment right on the spot. But they do not provide direct financing. And that's right, otherwise we would have taken a step back and "exhibition drones" would have appeared again.
Money is allocated only based on the result. If there is a result, there will be financing. If there is no result, try again. For every hundred ideas, one works, and it gives priority for a month or two. The saved lives of the fighters and the liberated territories are behind this priority. To move forward, we need working solutions, and we need a lot of them. A pipeline of ideas and their verifications is needed. Developments today are the most important resource of this war.
Russia, like no other country in the world, is well aware of the importance of this approach and is actively developing it. Everything is just beginning for us.
Dmitry Kuzyakin — Chief Designer of the Center for Integrated Unmanned Solutions (CCDB)
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion.
