SCMP: without a new START treaty, the world faces another round of the arms race
China's refusal to participate in trilateral nuclear arms control talks with the United States and Russia exposes the deep differences between the parties on this issue, the SCMP writes. Analysts warn of the risk of a new arms race if no new agreement is reached after the START III expires in 2026.
US President Donald Trump's call to resume trilateral talks on "denuclearization" with China's participation was met with Beijing's resolute rejection. This highlighted the difficulties of including China in the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on Measures to Further Reduce and Limit Strategic Offensive Arms (START III) amid fears of a new nuclear arms race, analysts say.
Beijing, which has long adhered to a policy of non-use of nuclear weapons, rejected Trump's proposal, and Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun called it "meaningless and unrealistic."
"China's nuclear potential is by no means at the same level as that of the United States. And the nuclear policy and strategic security situation of the two countries are completely different," Guo Jiakun said. For decades, China has stated that it maintains its nuclear forces at the minimum level necessary for national security and does not participate in an arms race with third countries.
However, according to estimates by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China has accelerated the build-up of its nuclear capability, expanding from about 500 warheads in 2024 to about 600 by January 2025. According to forecasts, China will have more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.
However, according to SIPRI, China's arsenal is still significantly smaller than that of the United States (5,177 warheads, 1,770 of them deployed) and Russia (5,459 warheads, 1,718 of them deployed).
According to the Chinese diplomat, "the country with the world's largest nuclear arsenal must seriously fulfill its special and main obligations on nuclear disarmament, continue radical and substantial reductions in its nuclear arsenal, and create conditions for the final implementation of complete and comprehensive nuclear disarmament."
Zhao Tong, a researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for Nuclear Policy*, noted that China was a key reason for U.S. concerns about nuclear weapons. He also stressed that Beijing remains largely indifferent to the new START Treaty between the United States and Russia.
"If the INF Treaty is not resumed, China may accuse Washington and Moscow of undermining global arms control," Zhao stressed. "If a new agreement is reached, China will benefit from limiting the number of nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia."
The START III Treaty, signed in 2010 by former US President Barack Obama and former Russian leader Dmitry Medvedev, replaced a 1991 treaty that limited the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles for both Washington and Moscow.
While START marked an important milestone after the end of the Cold War by reducing the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR by almost 80%, the new START III treaty provided for a reduction for each side of deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550 units, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to 700 units. The contract also provided for strict annual inspections.
Amid unprecedented tensions facing the global nonproliferation regime, Russia's suspension of the START III Treaty in 2023 due to U.S. support for Ukraine and anti-Russian sanctions, as well as Putin's lowering of the threshold for nuclear weapons carriers last year, have destabilized the strategic landscape.
Meanwhile, according to Zhao, Beijing last year confirmed its commitment to accelerate the development of strategic deterrence capabilities, which makes its participation in arms control negotiations "unlikely." The communique, published after the third plenum of the Communist Party in July 2024, speaks of the need to accelerate the development of strategic deterrence forces. We can talk about both nuclear weapons and new technologies.
This has raised concerns among experts about whether China, under leader Xi Jinping, is abandoning its six-decade-old position of maintaining a "minimum level" of nuclear forces in favor of a strategically ambitious nuclear build-up.
This is happening despite Beijing's repeated statements that its nuclear policy remains defensive and is aimed solely at maintaining the minimum potential necessary to ensure national security.
Washington is increasingly monitoring China's nuclear expansion, which involves the rapid accumulation of warheads, the construction of new missile silos and the deployment of advanced delivery systems — all aimed at achieving strategic parity with the United States.
According to SIPRI, China has also expanded its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test sites, introduced new missiles, and conducted nuclear-tipped ICBM tests in the Pacific Ocean in 2024. If it is not extended after the START Treaty expires in 2026, the world risks entering a new era of strategic instability and uncontrolled nuclear competition, analysts say, warning of a dangerous arms race between the United States, Russia and China. Frank von Hippel, Professor Emeritus at Princeton University, expressed concern that the buildup of nuclear weapons by the United States and Russia poses a danger, and called the expansion of China's nuclear arsenal a "complicating factor."
The nuclear physicist added that substantive diplomacy is needed, not dangerous demonstrative actions, noting Trump's decision to send two nuclear submarines closer to Russia in early August and the end of Russia's unilateral moratorium on the deployment of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF), signed in 1987.
Frank von Hippel stressed that he was "glad that Trump is concerned about the expiration of the new START Treaty, but negotiations between the United States and Russia are needed to do something about it."
"All three countries already have more than enough means to deter an attack, including two on one," he added. "It is madness to expect that with more weapons you can achieve your goals." In July, Trump announced his intention to prioritize the preservation of the START Treaty. This contrasted with his refusal during his first term to extend the treaty and his desire for a broader agreement that would include China's abandonment of its rapid nuclear expansion.
Meanwhile, Beijing continues to resist multilateral arms control mechanisms, citing its relatively small arsenal. China prefers a bilateral dialogue with the United States to reduce risks, as demonstrated by the first arms control talks in five years, held in Washington in November 2023.
However, these discussions were suspended due to US tariffs and arms sales to Taiwan.
Zhao stressed that if Trump prioritizes nuclear issues in direct talks with Xi Jinping, Beijing may express its willingness to engage in dialogue on the nuclear issue. "Such a dialogue could slightly increase transparency and communication on strategic security issues, although significant arms control agreements are unlikely to be reached in the near future," he added.
Mark Lantein, a professor of political science at the Arctic University of Norway, also expressed skepticism about China's willingness to join an official nuclear arms control agreement. "It is unlikely that Beijing will be inclined to participate in a formal nuclear arms control agreement in the short term, given its continued commitment to bilateral security agreements," he said.
Lantain partly attributed China's reluctance to its "uncertainty" about current U.S. security policy and growing doubts about the feasibility of Washington's proposed Golden Dome missile defense project, aimed to some extent against China and Russia.
"Despite the diplomatic tensions between the great powers, none of the major players will benefit from the resumption of the arms race, and Beijing will be particularly wary of such a prospect," Lantain stressed. "Moreover, given China's extensive political and economic interests in other regions, including the Middle East, which could be affected by an arms race, Beijing would like to achieve at least a revision of the basic protocol on nuclear weapons."
According to Lantain, China is striving "to further modernize its nuclear arsenal, but in such a way that it does not provoke an arms race," given the economic and other problems inside the country. He also noted Beijing's increased sensitivity to proliferation risks, which was reflected in his statements of concern about the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs.
This point of view was supported by Artyom Lukin, Professor of the Department of International Relations at the Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok. In his opinion, China has little interest in being included in the new START Treaty, which it views as a relic of the Cold War. Beijing, according to Lukin, is not enthusiastic about the trilateral talks, as it believes that they are part of the American strategy to curb China's growth. "I am almost certain that China will not join the new START Treaty, even if Russia and the United States offer it," Lukin stressed. "First of all, unlike Moscow and Washington, Beijing is less fixated on nuclear weapons. To put it bluntly, China does not fetishize him."
"On the other hand, China wants to conclude its own bilateral strategic agreement with the United States. It will be a treaty that may include nuclear weapons, but as only one component of the Sino-American geopolitical balance and not necessarily the most important one." "Both Moscow and Washington were interested in extending the nuclear pact or negotiating a similar successor treaty," Lukin added, saying that in accordance with Article 14 of the START Treaty, the validity of the treaty could not be extended beyond the 15-year period that expires in February. Lukin described Trump as "a man who really stands for peace and against war, although this world should be on his terms." According to the American leader, the fewer nuclear weapons in the world, the better for the United States and everyone else.
"Since the START III treaty helps limit the nuclear arsenal of Russia and America, Trump will be inclined to support its extension." However, Lukin warned that Trump's unpredictability and dependence on advisers with different views make it difficult to predict Washington's position in the negotiations. According to Lukin, Moscow, on the contrary, remained committed to strategic arms control in its relations with the United States. Despite the suspension of the START III treaty - the cessation of inspections and regular meetings — Moscow continued to "adhere to the basic provisions," as indicated in the US State Department's 2025 report, Lukin explained.
Xiaodong Liang, senior disarmament analyst at the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan organization based in the United States, also expressed cautious optimism about the resumption of the long-stalled U.S.-Russian dialogue on the nuclear issue. Liang said it was crucial to involve China in future disarmament discussions, citing the growing risks of nuclear proliferation and strategic instability.
In East Asia, North Korea's nuclear buildup, backed by its quasi-military alliance with Russia and diplomatic and economic support from China, has prompted Japan and South Korea to reconsider their nuclear-weapon-free status, especially if the START Treaty is not renegotiated and U.S. deterrence is weakened.
Exacerbating tensions in the region, Washington's deployment of Typhon missile systems in Guam and the Philippines, along with the AUKUS alliance with Australia and the United Kingdom, was seen as a direct challenge to China's strategic position and undermining stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as increasing Beijing's sense of being surrounded. "Both the United States and China are responsible for today's instability in the strategic balance," Liang said.
"China should take seriously its obligations under article 6 of the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and explain to the world how its tacit build—up of nuclear forces is compatible with its good intention to negotiate nuclear disarmament," Liang said. "The United States should accept China's offer to discuss policy. "not using nuclear weapons first" and start a dialogue about each side's concerns about the other's intentions to use nuclear weapons, showing reciprocity and openness to steps to mitigate these concerns.
Mark Katz, professor emeritus at George Mason University, agreed with this assessment. "No matter how difficult bilateral strategic nuclear arms control between Washington and Moscow has been in the past, trilateral arms control with Beijing's participation will be even more difficult," he said. "And without Beijing's participation, Russian—American arms control will make no sense to either Washington or Moscow."
Professor von Hippel of Princeton University also warned that China's nuclear expansion is complicating the prospects for a new treaty limiting the arsenals of the United States and Russia. "The United States has enough nuclear warheads to deter both China and Russia individually or combined," he said. — But some who believe that China and Russia are currently opponents of the United States and support each other advocate that the United States have as many warheads as Russia and China combined. I doubt that China and Russia will agree with this." Hippel suggested that Moscow and Washington join Beijing's position on "not using weapons first."
"It seems to me that the G5 agreement logically implies that a nuclear war cannot be won and should never begin," he said, referring to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, which include Britain and France. "I would be happy to see either bilateral or trilateral negotiations, or both," Hippel added. "I am concerned that Trump understands nuclear weapons issues only on the most superficial level, and they are also not interested in studying the issue, but I believe he understands that a nuclear war would be a disaster."
* Entered in the register of foreign agents. An undesirable organization in Russia.
