Yu Koizumi examines in detail the Fundamentals of state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence, approved by Putin in early June. He was surprised that the full text of the document was published, and he saw in it two goals that Russia was pursuing. It is gradually moving towards an aggressive nuclear strategy, the author believes.
Koizumi Yu
On the evening of June 2, when I turned 38, my gaze froze on the news that appeared on Twitter.: "Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed a document called the Fundamentals of state Policy in the field of Nuclear Deterrence."
As far as we know, similar documents were previously approved in 2010 - the "Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence Policy" and the "Military Doctrine." This means that adjustments were made to the nuclear strategy after about ten years.
Moreover, I was surprised that the full text was revealed. In 2010, nothing but the title was published. For this reason, Russian nuclear policy has caused various speculations.
Since the entire text became known this time, it is quite natural that the world's military experts on Russia, including me, drew attention to its content. Because of an unexpected birthday present, I had to devote that evening to translating Russia's nuclear doctrine.
So, what is written in the document covered in secrecy? I will present the main content.
Is nuclear weapons the main target now?
The fundamentals of the nuclear deterrence policy consist of the following four points:
1. General provisions;
2. The essence of nuclear deterrence;
3. Conditions for the transition of the Russian Federation to the use of nuclear weapons;
4. Tasks and functions of federal government bodies, other government agencies and organizations for the implementation of state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence.
The first paragraph, as the title suggests, contains general ideas about nuclear deterrence, but the fifth article is of interest.: "The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons solely as a means of deterrence, the use of which is an extreme and necessary measure, and is making all necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent an escalation of interstate relations that could provoke military conflicts, including nuclear ones."
The main purpose of nuclear weapons is to stop (deter) the enemy's attack. The idea of not using nuclear weapons before the enemy appeared in the 2010s under the administration of American President Barack Obama and caused both positive and negative assessments.
The United States has always adhered to tactics that do not exclude the possibility of launching a preemptive strike if necessary. In the end, the Obama administration was also forced to abandon the idea of not launching a preemptive strike until better times (the new nuclear strategy formulated by the administration of President Donald Trump clearly denies this principle).
Meanwhile, the published Russian nuclear deterrence policy says simply: "solely as a means of deterrence." Has Russia adopted a doctrine that even the Obama administration would doubt?
A preemptive strike is not excluded
Naturally, this cannot be the case.
The USSR, which prided itself on its overwhelming advantage over the West in the field of conventional weapons, followed a policy of not using nuclear weapons before the enemy, but this is not the case in modern Russia.
Despite the impressive development in comparison with the times of post-Soviet chaos, conventional Russian weapons are not comparable either in quantity or in quality with American ones. And in the Far Eastern direction, China, one of the world leaders in conventional weapons, is waiting for Russia.
For this reason, the first military doctrine, which was adopted after the collapse of the USSR in 1993, abandoned the policy of non-preemptive nuclear strike.
In the 2000 version, it was stipulated that if there was a threat to state security, even if the enemy attacked with conventional weapons, Russia would use nuclear missiles. In the 2010 and 2014 (current) versions, the texts are almost identical, except for some nuances.
In other words, Russia has the right to use nuclear weapons in two cases.: (1) if nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction have been used against Russia or its ally, (2) if the enemy's conventional weapons endanger Russia's very existence.
The wording is slightly different: in 2000, the condition for using nuclear missiles was "state security", and in 2010 and 2014 - "existence of the state", but this does not change the essence of the matter.
At the level of official statements, Russia also did not rule out the possibility of a preemptive strike, so it is obvious that the phrase "... the use of which is an extreme and forced measure ..." implies other cases besides a nuclear attack.
By the way, the expression "when the very existence of a state is threatened" is also included in the new "Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence Policy."
A preemptive strike and in case of danger of losing part of the territories
So, what exactly does the phrase "when the very existence of the State is threatened" mean?
First, there is no doubt that Russia will use nuclear weapons if, for example, NATO tanks approach Moscow.
In such a situation, strategic nuclear weapons (intercontinental ballistic and other long-range missiles that reach the United States) can be used. At the same time, after the Cold War, Russia also followed a military strategy, according to which it believed that the outbreak of a full-scale nuclear war could be avoided if small-scale (tactical) nuclear weapons were used on the battlefield.
The so-called "theory of limited nuclear war" (or "regional nuclear deterrence" in Russian), according to which nuclear weapons are used during combat, thereby ensuring victory.
The Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence Policy also states: "Nuclear deterrence is carried out continuously in peacetime, during the immediate threat of aggression and in wartime, up to the beginning of the use of nuclear weapons." In other words, it is assumed that nuclear deterrence continues to function even after the clashes have begun.
But what steps will be taken if the case is not so extreme?
For example, a war broke out, and soon the lack of strength of the Russian troops became obvious to everyone? Or is the situation close to a war in which Russia has little chance of winning?
Such cases were not specified in previous military doctrines.
Meanwhile, a recently published document talks about the goals of nuclear deterrence.: "The state policy in the field of nuclear deterrence is defensive in nature, aimed at maintaining the potential of nuclear forces at a level sufficient to ensure nuclear deterrence, and guarantees the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, deterring a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, and in the event of a military conflict, preventing the escalation of military actions and their cessation on terms acceptable to the Russian Federation and (or) its allies."
This means that even in the absence of an immediate threat to the existence of the state, the possibility of losing part of the territories falls under the postulates "... the use of which is an extreme and forced measure ..." and "when the very existence of the state is at risk."
Suspicion of using nuclear weapons to prevent escalation
Of even greater interest is the final part of this paragraph: "... in the event of a military conflict, the prevention of escalation of hostilities and their cessation on terms acceptable to the Russian Federation and (or) its allies."
The use of nuclear missiles to prevent escalation, or the so-called "containment of escalation" and "escalation for the sake of containing escalation" - these ideas have attracted the attention of Western military experts over the past ten years.
For example, as it was during the 2014 Ukrainian crisis: Russia used military force against a neighboring country, and if NATO tried to stop it with military steps (in other words, in the event of an escalation), the Russian army would launch a targeted nuclear strike (to suppress the forces by launching a nuclear strike on facilities where there are no or few people at all), this would frighten NATO, and it would not interfere.
To put it another way, there are suspicions that in the event of a war with NATO, Russia is analyzing the possibility of using nuclear weapons not after the fact, but even before the conflict begins.
Perhaps there is a "hidden doctrine"
Similar suspicions of NATO have deepened in connection with the "Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence Policy," which became known in 2010, but which were not published.
As I have already noted, the military doctrine of 2010 did not prescribe the use of nuclear weapons to prevent escalation.
Nevertheless, answering questions from Izvestia in 2009, Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, said: "We assume the use of nuclear weapons during regional conflicts and local wars. We do not deny the possibility of a preemptive nuclear strike against the aggressor in conditions of a threat to the country's security."
It can be assumed that this "hidden doctrine" was part of the "Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence Policy" in 2010.
By the way, it is known that in Russian defense circles, a nuclear strategy in the form of "deterring escalation" has been discussed since the 1990s. I have no doubt that the Russian army has discussed the use of nuclear forces in this form.
In the review of the nuclear forces configuration adopted by the Trump administration in 2018, this issue was also the main topic. A course was taken to equip Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles with low-power nuclear warheads in order to deliver a balanced retaliatory strike in the event of a targeted use of Russian nuclear forces.
These are the so-called low-power Trident (LYT), which were produced in 2019 and adopted in February this year.
Deliberate mixing of a "deterrence strategy" with a "nuclear use strategy"
Let's return once again to the "Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence Policy" for 2020. As we noted, in the first paragraph there are words about preventing escalation.
This means that the West's suspicions were not unfounded - Russia had a nuclear strategy in the form of preventing escalation.
But the strange thing is that in the third paragraph, "Conditions for the transition of the Russian Federation to the use of nuclear weapons," nothing is said about this. According to some reports, Russia uses nuclear forces in the following cases::
(1) When there is reliable information about a ballistic missile strike on Russia or its ally;
(2) When the enemy used nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its ally;
(3) When an enemy invades important Russian government or military installations, the disruption of which prevents a retaliatory nuclear strike.;
(4) If an attack on Russia using conventional weapons endangers its existence.
Paragraphs (2) and (4) were also included in early military doctrines.
(1) is a launch based on long-range detection data - a retaliatory strike when a message about the launch of nuclear missiles at Russia is received. (3) is a new doctrine on retaliatory measures in the event of a cyber strike on Russian nuclear facilities. At the same time, nothing is said about "deterring escalation."
One interpretation of "escalation deterrence" is a strategy of intimidating a potential adversary in order to deter it. Perhaps it does not involve the actual use of nuclear power.
That is, the bottom line is that Russia will be satisfied if NATO believes that it will respond with nuclear missiles to any military action against it, but in fact it is not going to launch a preemptive strike.
However, if this is stated officially, there will be no confidence in deterrence, so perhaps the phrase "preventing escalation" was added to the first chapter.
According to Olga Oliker, director of the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), such uncertainty is strategic in nature - the strategy of deterrence and the strategy of using nuclear weapons are deliberately mixed.
Official policy is only half the truth.
Nevertheless, based on the above, it is premature to say that Russia does not have a strategy to "prevent escalation." Like the American review of the configuration of nuclear forces, the "Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence Policy" is not a working strategy.
A work strategy is a top-secret document, the contents of which are usually not disclosed. It specifies specific targets and a list of means to strike them.
In the case of the United States, there are documents such as the previously existing "Unified Operational Plan for Nuclear Strikes" or the current "Operational Plan." Only their names and the period of amendments are known, but Russia has never disclosed such information and is unlikely to ever do so.
Article 15 of the second chapter of the Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence Policy states: "Uncertainty for a potential adversary about the scale, time and place of the possible use of nuclear deterrence forces and means."
Based on this, it is obvious that Russia is not going to publish the full content of the nuclear strategy.
Michael Kofman, an expert on Russia at the Center for Naval Analysis Corporation, comments on the Russian work strategy in his usual ironic way - it is determined in a windowless room. The official policy ("Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence Policy" or a review of the configuration of nuclear forces) is only half the truth, expressed in general terms.
The strategic meaning of official statements
The current "Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence Policy" indicate that Russia is gradually moving towards an aggressive nuclear strategy.
Meanwhile, due to the fact that the texts of previous documents are unknown, it is difficult to judge how much the 2020 version has changed compared to previous doctrines.
Moreover, its content is not much different from what was discussed by Russian military experts earlier, and "preventing escalation" has never gone beyond a simple threat.
In this regard, I believe that by publishing the nuclear doctrine, Russia pursued two goals. First, this year Russia plans to update the "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation", the basic document for planning the development of the national security system, in connection with which the military doctrine, which is the guiding principles in the military sphere, will also be revised.
I think the norms for the use of nuclear forces in the new military doctrine will differ insignificantly from the 2014 version. The goal is not to arouse suspicion of the existence of a "hidden doctrine."
It is worth noting, and I have already said this, that the existence of such a "hidden doctrine" cannot be denied.
This goal leads us to the second one. In 2019, the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-range Missiles was annulled, and START-3 is about to expire. In this regard, Russia is forced to reconsider the conditions of nuclear deterrence.
Perhaps Russia wanted to put pressure on the West, so it noted that the nuclear arsenal could be used in response to the long-range launch doctrine and cyberattack, which previous military doctrines did not contain, and unveiled a nuclear strategy that does not deny the possibility of "preventing escalation."
That is, apparently, Russia's strategic intentions were to strike both transparency and uncertainty at the same time.
