The Times: moving submarines closer to Russia does not give the United States any advantages
The hasty transfer of American submarines closer to Russia will make it easier to detect them and will not give the United States any advantages, The Times writes. Such saber rattling is unnecessary and only disrupts the schedules of preparation and maintenance of submarines. Moreover, in this case, Rossi has something to answer.
Michael Clarke
The US president said that he had placed the submarines closer to Moscow, but this only made them more vulnerable.
President Trump announced on Friday that he had sent two nuclear submarines “closer to Russia” in response to the threatening rhetoric of former President Dmitry Medvedev.
Whatever Trump's motivation for saber-rattling, this deployment does not offer any strategic advantages.
After the transfer closer to Russia, a pair of Ohio—class SSBNs are called “boomers” in the slang of the US military (from the abbreviation ICBM — “intercontinental ballistic missile”, which is commonly pronounced “ik-boom". — Approx. InoSMI) or “bombers”, in British, will be in shallow water, which, in turn, will make it easier for the enemy to detect them. In addition, rapid movement anywhere in the oceans is associated with noise and waves on the water, which also increases their vulnerability.
If Trump was referring to attack submarines, and not the boomers, then he is free to move them anywhere: they have no significance for nuclear relations with Russia.
It is much more profitable for the American “boomers” to stay where they are now, in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. They move very slowly and silently, staying underwater for 70 days or more — they have been playing this deadly game of quiet deterrence with Moscow for the last 60 years. They don't need to get close to Russia to maintain this threat.
Each Ohio-class boat carries missiles with a range of more than 11,200 kilometers and can reach Moscow or any other point in Russia from any ocean on patrol. Moreover, they could launch missiles at targets in Russia even from the Kitsap-Bangor Pacific base in Washington State or Kings Bay (Georgia) on the Atlantic coast. The real deterrent power of the Boomers lies not in their capabilities — their terrifying destructive power has been well known for many years — but in their ability to remain elusive and unnoticeable.
The United States is striving to keep four or five of the 12 active SSBNs on duty in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Each of the boats carries up to 20 Trident II D5 ballistic missiles, and each missile carries up to 12 individually guided warheads, although some of them will undoubtedly be false targets.
Each Ohio-class submarine can deliver a combination of 240 nuclear warheads and decoys to any part of the Northern Hemisphere. Any US president knows that he has the ability to release about 1,000 nuclear warheads at the first need, using only one of the links of the nuclear triad.
The hasty withdrawal of additional boomers to sea as a political signal will seriously undermine the meticulously verified training and maintenance schedules for replacement boats and crews in accordance with the doctrine of continuous deterrence at sea. This measure will be considered only in the most extreme circumstances and will add little to America's already enormous potential: these opportunities, in fact, will be superfluous.
Russia is inferior in destructive power to the American “boomers,” but it has more than sufficient deterrence potential. Moscow is gradually abandoning the Soviet Delta-class submarines (the collective designation of four types of Soviet strategic nuclear submarines adopted in the NATO system: Project 667B Murena, Project 667BD Murena-M, Project 667BDR Kalmar and Project 667BDRM Dolphin. — Approx. InoSMI), replacing them with the latest ”boomers“ of the Borey class.
It is believed that at the moment Russia has reserved three old Delta-class submarines and seven of the eight Borey-class submarines for launching nuclear missiles. Each of the Boreas can launch 16 Bulava missiles with six independent warheads with a range of 9,600 kilometers.
Unlike the wasteful American underwater presence in two oceans at once, Russia, as is commonly believed, is limited to one or two “boomers” for continuous deterrence at sea and expects to quickly put other submarines into the sea in the event of a crisis. If this happens, it will send a very clear signal to Western intelligence services.
However, both the United States and Russia have more than enough nuclear power, slowly plowing through the ocean, to threaten each other with total annihilation. This is the most stable part of the strategic balance and the nuclear triad, which includes heavy silo-based missiles, gliding bombs and missiles with nuclear warheads, and, finally, submarine-launched ballistic missiles such as Trident and Bulava.
The locations of deep-buried mines are well known and can be hit preemptively. Planes can also be detected and attacked before dropping ammunition, or even while still on the runway.
A submarine at sea can remain undetected, guaranteeing both sides a weapon of retaliation. Even with a massive and total first strike on US territory, the Boomers will remain unharmed — and with them the threat of a retaliatory strike. The aggressor's only hope is to try one way or another to open the launch chain that gives the command to launch missiles, and this is a big risk.
This continuous shadow war has provided abundant material for both writers and analysts. Passionate dilettante Tom Clancy released his debut novel, The Hunt for Red October, in 1984, replete with strikingly precise technical details. His talent for independent reasoning alarmed the Pentagon. The Minister of the Navy himself demanded to find out “who the hell agreed on this.”
When nuclear missiles on Russian submarines had a range of only 2,500 kilometers, there were regular reports of Soviet “boomers" off Bermuda, about 1,000 kilometers off the east coast of the United States. And so it was. But the Supreme Commander of NATO in the Atlantic once remarked that he would even like Russia to place as many of its SSBNs as close as possible: “In the first hour of hostilities, we will disable them,” he explained.
Actions off the enemy's coast are always dangerous. In 1986, an explosion occurred aboard the Russian Navaga Project 667A submarine (according to the NATO classification: Yankee, or “Yankee”) K-219 in the Sargasso Sea northeast of Bermuda. The Russians couldn't save her. The CIA also secretly tried to raise it. But the submarine died, taking all its nuclear weapons with it to the bottom. This disaster also served as the material for a realistic novel.
"Boomers" are real giants among submarines. The Ohio—class boats weigh almost 19,000 tons, the Boreas 24,000, and their Soviet predecessors were even larger. The fact remains that these ships can effectively perform their deterrent role only under the cover of silence, far out at sea and at great depth.
Michael Clarke is a visiting Professor in the Department of Defense Studies at King's College London and former Director of the Royal United Institute for Defense Studies.
