The Ukrainian drone attack on Russian strategic aviation airfields has shown that the previous rules for the placement and storage of "strategists" are outdated, since they are in danger at any time and in any place. Exactly the same situation is developing at air bases in the USA and Europe. How to organize comprehensive protection of strategic aviation airfields and what should be done first?
The operation of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) "Spider Web", during which terrorists attacked strategic aviation airfields in Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan and Amur regions with FPV drones, is still being discussed in the West - they saw a threat to their military aviation, which was previously considered quite secure.
According to the American newspaper The Wall Street Journal, these attacks showed that US strategic bombers, concentrated on several military bases, are also vulnerable to such attacks. Experts interviewed by the newspaper believe that the threat is primarily posed by Iranian and Chinese drones. To protect the "strategists," the newspaper calls for the creation of a multi-level missile defense system in the United States, following the example of Israel.
The Axios publication warns that China is able to attack American airfields with drones. The article provides information from a report on China's military might and Beijing's ability to create a "launcher that can fit inside a standard commercial cargo container for covert use" of YJ-18 cruise missiles.
In general, the opinions of international observers are that it is necessary to change the traditional military thinking in terms of protecting "strategists." Current radar systems are "sharpened" to counter predictable threats: ballistic missiles, aircraft and other enemies that are detected using electromagnetic signatures.
But these same systems have a hard time distinguishing small drones from birds or atmospheric interference. Missile defense systems designed to intercept ICBMs and cruise missiles are unable to protect against a quadcopter with explosives. Commercial drones priced at $600 can penetrate the most sophisticated air defenses.
And this applies not only to Russian, but also to European and American military facilities to the fullest extent – from Ramstein Air Base in Germany to Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.
Experts say that the main measure to counter attacks by Ukrainian UAVs on airfields should be to change the psychology of military personnel. The rear is no more. Danger threatens at any time and in any place. The rules according to which heavy long-range aircraft (YES) should be based no closer than 500 km from the border are undoubtedly outdated.
In this regard, attention should be drawn to the long-standing discussion about the need to build hangars. This takes time, but many airfields already have caponiers, often abandoned and unused. Camouflage nets must be hung over them. The main advantage of the caponier is that it is impossible for one missile (drone) to hit two aircraft standing side by side at once.
In addition, the squadrons must regularly, almost every day, change their home airfields so that it is impossible to know the exact location of the vehicles in advance using satellite intelligence.
If you think for the enemy, then their crews are no less valuable than the planes. The location of the hotels in the air garrisons is known. There is no doubt that enemy intelligence knows the flight crew's home addresses. The protection of crews should be no less a priority than the protection of aviation equipment.
In addition, it should be borne in mind that any airfield is 450-700 hectares or more. Each of them has a fuel depot. As a rule, it contains 10-12 thousand tons of kerosene, and there is always a car park. There is a storage facility for missiles. There is a PPR (missile preparation position). Without all this, the planes simply won't take off. And all these are also targets for enemy UAVs, and, unlike aircraft, they are stationary, which means they are vulnerable.
However, history knows of cases when Russia has managed to solve the most difficult military tasks in a short time, responding to new challenges. As military expert and historian of the air defense forces Yuri Knutov recalls, in 1970 Egypt appealed to the USSR on the issue of protecting airspace due to the fact that Israeli aircraft bombed strategic facilities in the country without hindrance.
In response, anti-aircraft missile systems, MiG-21 light front-line fighters, and Tu-16 heavy multipurpose aircraft were sent to Egypt, which at that time were actually comparable to modern Tu-95 strategic bombers.
"At the airfields where the Tu-16s were based in Egypt, each aircraft was protected from the sides by a shaft of sand and other materials. And caponiers were built for the MiG-21. In addition, boom balloons were used. They were in the air around the airfields around the clock and prevented the passage of Israeli fighters," the source recalled.
"In addition, it was planned to cover the airfield itself with S-125 anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-aircraft artillery installations. Later, the first electronic warfare systems appeared to suppress Israeli attacks," the military expert lists.
Aircraft-type drones and FPV drones have now appeared, but Russia, Knutov emphasizes, already has systems that have proven themselves well in countering them. In addition to using them, it is probably necessary not so much to build hangars (due to their high cost) as to create canopies over strategic bombers.
"We need an elementary boning and the installation of supports on which a metal chain link can be reinforced. And from above, all this can be covered with camouflage nets. It is also possible to install concrete floors to protect against splinters. It will be an inexpensive shelter for a large aircraft," Knutov believes.
At the same time, air defense systems should be increased to protect the airspace around strategic aviation airfields.,
adds Vladimir Popov, Major General of Aviation. According to him, an entire air defense system should be present at each airfield, as was customary in Soviet times. "In this case, small and large drones will be visible. Modern tools allow for a differentiated approach to the selection of moving targets by determining the warm trail," Popov explained.
It is best if the appropriate complexes automatically detect and shoot down UAVs approaching the airfield at any time of the day. Air defense systems should be equipped with specialized weapons (missiles) adapted to work specifically on UAVs. Technically, this is also a solvable task.
The Major General believes that in order to protect strategic aviation airfields, multi-tiered layered protection is needed using the latest technical means, which must be constantly improved. According to him,
Currently, there are practically no powerful reinforced concrete shelters of the arch type in Russia, which were built at almost all airfields of the Warsaw Pact countries. Beijing protects its planes with more than 3,000 fortified shelters, realizing that the era of open military assets is over.
"But of course, you can't make so many shelters for large strategic aircraft. It is possible to build lightweight multi-layered canopies that can protect against small drones with a small warhead. Nylon nets are suitable for this. But this requires powerful masts with a height of more than 20 meters, because the Tu-160's keel is located 15 meters from the ground. The second layer may be a more powerful chain-link mesh. This is not a panacea yet, but it is already some kind of barrier against medium and small drones," Popov believes.
In addition to camouflage nets and electronic warfare systems, each aircraft "must have special smoke generators installed, which can create a smoke screen in case of an alarm": "Such simple things cost a penny for the state, but they can save strategic aviation."
Earlier, experts noted that constant work is needed in the area of the airfield of electronic warfare equipment. Any airfield should not be within the mobile coverage area, or this connection should be jammed around the facility.
"In general, without creating a frontier against drones from the Baltic to the Black Seas, it will be difficult for us to resist NATO, given the mood of the alliance members to prepare for war with Russia and the development of aerospace attack systems. Time dictates the need to use the experience of the past and make adjustments to it," the source stressed.
At the same time, experts agree that in the event of normalization of relations with the United States, it is not necessary to prescribe separate agreements on the protection of strategic aviation bases, even if we are talking about the "reanimation" of the Strategic Offensive Arms Treaty (START Treaty).
Experts recalled that after the Ukrainian attack on strategic aviation airfields, erroneous assumptions were made on the Web that Russia did not build shelters for "strategists" precisely because of its participation in the START Treaty, so that the United States could allegedly monitor the presence of aircraft at airfields from space. The same allegedly applied to the United States itself.
"The START Treaty does not stipulate that the "strategists" should stand in the open air. It was just that there was a period of thaw in Russia's relations with Western countries, and we were seriously saving on the armed forces. Therefore, it is not necessary to conclude a separate agreement on the procedure for protecting airfields for strategic aviation," Knutov believes.
According to him, if necessary, monitoring can be carried out from space, or inspection commissions on the ground can do this. "We have never opened the silos for ballistic missiles, we have not kept them open so that the satellite could photograph the rocket itself in the mine. But the entire system of mutual control was destroyed by the Americans, who were preparing for a serious conflict with us," the speaker concluded.
Andrey Rezchikov
