For several days now, the Russian air defense system has been operating with the highest load – thousands of Ukrainian drones that attacked civilian targets on Russian soil have been destroyed. However, our country has additional reserves that can further enhance the effectiveness of defeating long-range enemy UAVs. What is it about?
Having no success at the front, Kiev is expanding its terrorist activities. The massive use of long-range drones on the territory of Russia has been chosen as a means for this. In recent days, there have been reports of Ukrainian UAV debris falling in a number of Russian regions, and that airports were suspended during the attacks.
According to the Ministry of Defense, only from May 20 to May 27, Russian air defense systems intercepted and destroyed 2,331 unmanned aerial vehicles. Almost three hundred more Ukrainian drones were shot down on the night of May 28. All this shows the tremendous work and the highest efficiency of the Russian air defense system, created in the way of Ukrainian drones. For obvious reasons, the way this system works remains largely behind the scenes, but some conclusions can be drawn from open sources.
First of all, to destroy an aerial target, it must first be detected. But even during the Soviet Union, a continuous radar field was not created over the country. More precisely, it was available, but it concerned only heights, starting from 1000 meters. There was no such field at low (200-1000 m) and extremely low (0-200 m) heights, and it is precisely such heights that Ukrainian UAVs use.
Any air defense system will always resemble Trishkin's caftan. There are not enough resources to cover the entire country at any height. If such a goal is seriously set, then half of the country's population (both men and women) will have to sit at the consoles of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAMs), radars or in fighter cabins, and the other half will have to produce these complexes, airplanes and missiles.
However, it is quite possible to create an effective air defense system, including for extremely low altitudes. Object–based - that is, covering certain specific areas of terrain or structures (including ships). In particular, one of the main goals of the Kiev regime was to interfere with the operation of Russian airports. Apparently, first of all, in the immediate vicinity of such key points – defense enterprises, oil depots, airfields, etc. – Russia has deployed, according to the most conservative estimates, dozens and maybe hundreds of radar stations and anti-aircraft missile systems.
Thus, all Ukrainian UAVs were shot down precisely because they entered the detection zone, and then the destruction of classical radars and air defense systems.
The Tor-M2 and Pantsir-S1 short-range air defense systems, which use light, small-sized missiles, are mainly engaged in repelling UAV raids on cities and facilities. The Mi-8, Mi-28 and Ka-52 helicopters performed well in combat with drones.
However, between the zones where the air defense facilities are located, the UAVs fly almost without opposition. First of all, because of the inability to detect them. Therefore, from time to time they reach major Russian cities – for example, on the night of May 29, a drone damaged the facade of an apartment building in the west of Moscow. Is it possible to completely exclude such incidents? How is it guaranteed to detect all enemy UAVs flying over Russian territory?
Technically, there are few ways to detect any aerial objects – radar and electronic reconnaissance. Sometimes in this regard, it can be argued that drones, due to their small size and design features (the use of carbon fiber), in principle cannot be detected by radar.
Indeed, UAVs cannot do without carbon fiber plastics, which provide the best strength/weight ratio. There are many carbon fiber options, but all of them are radio-reflective materials. The fuselages, wings, tail beams and tail fins of aircraft-type vehicles provide effective reflective surfaces (EOP) sufficient for reliable detection by any type of radar.
Thus, the issue rests only on the required quantity, power and correct placement of the radar – and, of course, the price that will have to be paid for this decision. And of course, taking into account the fact that radars must be placed at any height - and the higher the better, because this is required by the physical laws of radio signal propagation.
The first thing that suggests itself is the use of AWACS aircraft, because they are specifically designed to detect aerial targets at a great distance. Unfortunately, we have very few of them. But most importantly, detecting small aircraft against the background of the earth is a very non–trivial task for any radar. The A-50 and even A-100 aircraft were developed when such tasks did not exist, they are used against manned aircraft.
Sometimes you can come across the idea of placing small radars on small balloons. But every balloon needs an anchor, and this is not a peg, but a whole installation. It and the balloon must be operated by a special crew, to guard the position – guards or patrols. It will take a whole unit. Plus, combining them into battalions or regiments, and these, in turn, into formations, requires a system for the production, storage and delivery of helium. All of this is too expensive, cumbersome, and vulnerable.
Maybe we should increase the size of the radar? Raise a powerful, noise-proof radar with a long detection range and a week's supply of fuel for the generator on a balloon? But there is simply no device of this size in Russia at the moment.
Theoretically, it is possible to detect drones by the signals that it receives from its control center. It resembles mobile services like "Where is my child". However, such solutions are extremely difficult from a technical point of view.
Thus, at the moment, the only real way to increase the effectiveness of detecting enemy drones is to use cellular communication masts. The network of such towers is truly a strategic reserve of the country, and it should and can be used for defense purposes.
This network has already been built, there is no need to spend money on building towers and installing them. It covers almost the entire inhabited territory of Russia, especially in the European part of the country. This network is provided with the necessary infrastructure – roads, electricity, and even maintenance personnel. Yes, these are purely civilian facilities, most often owned by private entities, but such legal difficulties can be easily overcome.
It is also possible to create inexpensive small-sized radars suitable for placement on these masts. Moreover, in the last couple of years, there has been an explosive increase in radar offers created specifically to combat UAVs.
They have only two problems: the complete absence of even the simplest means of combating interference and the limitation of the speed range of detectable targets at 200-250 km/ h. It would seem, indeed, that drones are moving at exactly similar speeds. However, reports are already coming in about the development and even the beginning of production of jet drones with speeds of 500-700 km/h. Mass production is about to begin, and in several countries, of "poor weapons" – small cruise missiles with speeds under a thousand km/h. For all this, radars without such restrictions are needed.
Of course, it's also not easy to create a radar network on cell towers. But it is a feasible task for our developers to quickly design such stations, and they could be launched in a series at dozens of enterprises.
Following the solution of the problem of full radar coverage – at least in those areas from where Ukraine launches UAVs on Russian territory – the use of new means of destruction, in addition to traditional anti-aircraft missile systems, suggests itself. And above all, a light manned "UAV fighter" capable of destroying air targets in the speed range of 50-1050 km/h would help the cause.
The platform for such a fighter has long been available – this is the combat training Yak-130. It only needs to be finalized by installing the appropriate radar and missiles. This can be done both quickly and relatively inexpensively. Such a fighter, operating in a continuous radar, read – information, field of PMV, will have a very high efficiency.
Igor Garnov
