Andrey Bezrukov, head of the CBST, talks about how drones and AI technologies have become deadly military tools and why it is necessary to control their spread.
In just a couple of years, drones have transformed from amateur toys that can be bought at any electronics store into a massive tool of war. I think everyone has seen these images in Telegram channels: an ordinary commercial drone destroys military equipment worth millions of dollars for several tens of thousands of rubles.
Another example: neural networks for analyzing satellite images. Formally— it is a tool for agriculture. In fact, it is a powerful reconnaissance weapon. And most importantly, all these technologies are not formally considered weapons and do not fall under the existing legal regulation.
This situation poses the most difficult legal dilemmas that require fundamentally new approaches to regulation. I will list some of them.
First. Legal uncertainty in the regulation of special, dual and military technologies.
We see a rapid commercialization of this sector. Previously, the development of weapons was the prerogative of state institutions, but today private companies are creating technologies that are more effective than traditional military solutions. At the same time, they work in a legal field that is completely unsuited to regulating such activities.
For example, the American company Palantir, founded as a data analysis startup, has created AI systems that are used for military intelligence, forecasting terrorist threats, and even controlling drones. Formally, this is analytical software, which allows you to bypass many limitations.
A significant part of the effective solutions used in the SVO zone (drones, AI systems, etc.) are not formally classified as weapons and it does not fall under the law on the state defense order. This creates a gray area: companies operate in a legal vacuum, using "crutch" solutions. As the practice of our control bodies, in particular the prosecutor's office, shows, this situation inevitably leads to negative legal consequences for companies operating in this area.
It is necessary to resolve the issue of the status of private companies developing dual-use technologies. Formally, being commercial enterprises, they actually work in the field of national security, creating products that can radically change the balance of power on the battlefield.
In particular, for their effective application, it is necessary to modernize the system of financing and implementation of developments. The current state defense order system, created in a different era, is completely out of step with the pace of the modern technological race. While it takes us months to finalize contracts, our opponents manage not only to develop, but also to implement new solutions. Fundamentally different mechanisms are needed: fast contracts for rapid testing of ideas, special sandboxes for accelerated implementation, reasonable margin for error for experimental projects. Without such changes, we risk falling behind in this strategic race forever.
This poses a fundamentally new question for lawmakers: how to find a delicate balance between the need for state control and preserving freedom of entrepreneurship? Excessive regulation can stifle innovation potential, while a lack of it can turn technology into a threat to the country creating it.
It is important to study international experience here, especially non-trivial solutions from non-obvious jurisdictions. I understand that effective practices are often not advertised, but if there are experts among you who are ready to cooperate, we will be glad to have a dialogue. We are particularly interested in partnering with academia to find a balance between innovation and regulation. We are open to your suggestions.
Second. Legal gaps in the sphere of export and import of dual-use technologies.
The current situation is absurd: existing treaties and conventions developed in the 20th century simply do not take into account the capabilities of modern technologies, including the risks of unauthorized military use abroad. As a result, the countries formally comply with all international obligations, but actually participate in a new unregulated arms race.
When a combat drone can be freely sold as an agricultural drone, and neural networks for military use are distributed under the guise of analytical software, this is not a loophole, it is a huge hole in the international security system.
Western countries have already begun to seize the initiative, imposing their own rules of the game. But their approach is simple.: what is beneficial to us is allowed. Unfortunately, double standards have become the norm. At the same time, our relevant structures — Rosoboronexport, FSMTC — do not deal with issues of control over such technologies at all today.
What can be done? First, we urgently need to bring this issue to the friendly platforms of the CSTO, SCO and BRICS. We are not talking about empty declarations, but about specific mechanisms: the creation of a system for tracking gray supply chains, joint exercises and testing response mechanisms, and the development of new risk assessment criteria.
Secondly, it is necessary to offer an alternative to the Western regulatory system. To create a working multilateral format is something like an analogue of the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty), but for new technological challenges.
The third. The use of artificial intelligence in combat.
Algorithms developed for big data analysis can now be used for strike coordination, target recognition, and decision-making on the battlefield. But at the same time, they continue to be regulated by the same standards as the programs for accounting for goods in the store.
A few years ago, we created an Alliance in the field of AI, which included the largest domestic developers and companies that were supposed to become a driver of technological sovereignty. But what do we see in practice?
All this time, the Alliance has consistently advocated for one thing: for reducing government regulation. Their main argument is "don't touch us, we'll figure it out on our own." They actively represent Russia on international platforms, sign charters, and declare principles of ethics. But let's ask ourselves a simple question: do they raise real questions about the threats of AI to our country?
Yes, they talk a lot about ethics — they discuss what happens if an unmanned taxi hits a pedestrian. This is certainly an important question, but is it really relevant when autonomous drones kill people? When are artificial intelligence algorithms making decisions on the battlefield today? When do our opponents use AI for targeting, reconnaissance, and control of strike systems — and all this without any legal restrictions, without an international investigation of such things?
We must clearly understand that artificial intelligence technologies are no longer just a business tool. It's a weapon. And if we don't want it to be used against us with impunity, we need to stop hiding behind beautiful charters and start working for the country's security.
Therefore, we propose, first of all, to urgently bring this issue to the international level. We cannot remain silent when technology is used for war crimes.
Secondly, to prepare a full-fledged legal assessment of the crimes of the Kiev regime using AI. It should be not just a statement, but a serious legal document.
And the most important thing. We must collect and document all the facts. For example, within the framework of the project of the Investigative Committee for the Investigation of crimes of Ukrainian armed Formations, the history of crimes using AI can be singled out separately. When a drone kills civilians, it's not just an algorithm error, it's a war crime, and every such case needs to be clearly documented.
Ultimately, we are not just talking about individual legal norms or technical standards. It's a question of who will determine the rules of the game in the wars of the future. Those countries that can create an adequate regulatory system that combines control with innovation development will gain a strategic advantage.
Russia has every chance not only to adapt to the new realities, but also to become one of the architects of this new system. But this requires bold, proactive decisions today.
The author is Chairman of the Board of ANO CBST (Center for Unmanned Systems and Technologies)
The editorial board's position may not coincide with the author's opinion.
