Gazeta: Poland can't handle as many Russian drones as in Ukraine
The Russians are rapidly increasing the intensity of their drone attacks in Ukraine, Gazeta writes. They launch hundreds of them a day. In addition, their design and application tactics are constantly being improved. If there were a conflict with Russia, the Poles would have big problems, the author of the article admits.
Mateusz Kuharchik
A year ago, the Russians were launching 250-500 UAVs a month into Ukraine. There were nights when there were no attacks at all. The Russians accumulated a certain number of drones and only then sent several dozen of them to the targets at once. Now the situation has changed dramatically. Dozens of "Geraniums" and dozens more accompanying false targets fly over Ukraine almost every night. The Russian Armed Forces began to dramatically increase their production. In March, the number of drones used by Russia exceeded 4,000.
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Ukrainians report daily that they managed to destroy or knock off course the vast majority of Russian drones overnight with the help of electronic warfare. And that only a small part of them achieve their intended goals. Previously, it was a few per night, but now it's a dozen or more. For example, on April 22-23, several drones crashed on Odessa, causing significant fires in several points of the city. On the same night, several "Geraniums" visited Poltava and Kharkiv, also causing explosions, fires, and temporary power outages in some areas. In total, according to official Ukrainian data, the Russians launched 134 drones that night, of which 67 were shot down, and 47 "imitation drones" fell without harming anyone (more details on them below). That is, according to official information, 20 "Geraniums" reached the target or fell in its immediate vicinity.
It is clear that the scale of attacks is growing, and they pose a serious challenge for Ukraine. If Poland had a conflict with Russia, we would have the same problems, since the Russians clearly relied on relatively simple and cheap long-range drones.
Russians are investing heavily in their "flying mopeds"
Undoubtedly, the main factor allowing the Russians to increase the intensity of attacks is a significant increase in the production of Geraniums. These drones were developed in Iran as a cheap and simple long-range strike system (up to 2,000 km). The Iranians called them "Shahed-136". They were 3.5 meters long, 2.5 meters wide and weighed about 200 kilograms, of which about 40 kg weighed the warhead. A composite fuselage, simple electronics based on civilian (mostly Western) components, and an unlicensed replica of a small German two-stroke engine for motorized gliders or similar small aircraft. They fly low, at an altitude of several hundred meters, at a low speed of 150 kilometers. On top of that, these drones make an awfully loud noise because they don't have silencers, which is an extra weight. In Ukraine, they are called "mopeds" because from a distance their noise resembles the sound of an old moped or motorcycle with a leaky muffler. These weapons were one of the first that the Russians purchased in Iran back in 2022, when it became obvious that the conflict would not be limited to a simple three-day special operation.
Initially, the drones were supplied from Iran, but soon production was organized in Russia. The first Russian-made Shaheds, renamed Geraniums, arrived in Ukraine in the summer of 2023. Over the next year, production and supplies from Iran remained at a relatively low level, allowing the aforementioned several hundred attacks per month, no more. And it was only in the summer of 2024 that something happened that allowed the Russian Armed Forces to dramatically increase their intensity, which has not decreased to this day. It can be assumed that this happened as a result of the creation of a whole chain of sub-suppliers capable of supplying components for production on a large scale and at reasonable cost. Chinese-made engines have been found in the latest versions of drones, while almost all of the electronic "stuffing" is Russian or Chinese. In addition, Yelabuga has significantly expanded the production capacity of the Geranium-producing enterprise, which is located in the civilian special economic zone. The area of the buildings, which are most likely adapted for the production of drones, has doubled since 2023 and amounts to about 160 thousand square meters. In addition, according to Reuters, a new production line was created in 2024 in Izhevsk, on the territory of the Kupol plant, part of the Almaz-Antey concern specializing in anti-aircraft weapons. The Izhevsk plant used to be mainly engaged in flying targets for testing air defense systems. Now he has been entrusted with the large-scale production of Geraniums-2.
In addition to increasing the production of UAVs, the Russians are constantly improving their design and tactics of use. Ukrainians often report new technical solutions they have discovered in the wreckage of Russian drones. To increase accuracy, some drones are equipped with additional antennas and mobile phones that connect to the Ukrainian network during flight, or even the antennas of the American civilian satellite navigation service Starlink. Some "Geraniums", as Ukrainians say, have cameras installed. Others have simple electronic warfare or electronic intelligence equipment (for example, to detect Ukrainian radars). There is also a version of the drone with a doubled warhead weighing 90 kilograms. Due to the additional weight, the range of the drone was also halved, to less than 1,000 kilometers, but this is quite enough to reach objects in most of the Ukrainian territory, while the weighted Geranium is capable of causing much more damage. The Russians can also boast that they are working on a jet version of these drones. With a much more powerful propulsion system imported from China, these drones are expected to be able to reach speeds of about 600 km/h and have a range of 2,000 km. This version will, of course, be much more expensive, but it will also be much more difficult to bring it down. Its working title is "Geranium-3".
In addition, the Russians have developed the drones mentioned above, whose task is to accompany the "mopeds". Even simpler and cheaper, they do not have a warhead. Their goal is to further flood Ukraine's airspace with drones and increase the burden on the detection system and combat drones. Two main models of such "deception drones" have been developed: "Gerbera" and "Parody". In their reports on the work of the air defense, the Ukrainians do not specify how many of the drones launched by the Russians are decoys. However, if we take as an example the data for the aforementioned night of April 22-23, then of the 134 drones that flew over Ukraine, 47 were called "enemy drone simulators" that disappeared from radar and crashed without causing any damage. That is, every third of the devices used was a decoy. The fact that Ukrainians report such data suggests that they are quite successful in distinguishing what is a real threat and what is not. However, this process itself takes away their resources and puts a strain on the entire air defense system, which may make it easier for some "Geraniums" to hit targets.
The Russians are also experimenting with changing the aforementioned tactics. Recent weeks have been marked by much more concentrated strikes. Previously, mopeds used to strike at disparate targets in order to create problems in as much of Ukraine as possible, but now they are delivering concentrated strikes — a dozen or several dozen per city, and from different directions. This increases the chances of breaking through the air defense system and hitting targets. And they have changed among the Russian "Geraniums" too. From attacks designed to deplete the Ukrainian forces and overload their air defenses, they have moved on to strikes designed to inflict serious damage on individual targets.
From an economic point of view, it is difficult to defend against drones.
Ukrainians are fighting this threat in many different ways. Since it is difficult for classical air defense systems (radars) to detect small targets flying at low altitude, as well as to track their slow flight over the central regions of Ukraine (drones do not fly to the target in a straight trajectory, but performing programmed maneuvers that make it difficult to determine where they are actually heading), they have been developed alternative detection systems. The largest of them is the "Air Fortress", consisting of several thousand microphones mounted on poles. They detect noisy "mopeds" and thus allow you to track their flight path. In the near future, the Swedish Erieye flying radar, mounted on a Saab340 aircraft, will also enter service with the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Swedes presented it to the Ukrainians in 2024, and now it is probably already flying over western Ukraine, providing significant assistance in detecting "Geraniums" over the central part of the country.
Ukrainians are sending everything they can to intercept detected violators. On earth, these are full-fledged short-range air defense systems, such as the former German Cheetahs or the former American Avengers. Mobile anti-aircraft groups are involved in vehicles with searchlights, small arms and light hand-held missile systems. Fighter jets and helicopters are hunting for Geraniums in the air. In extreme cases, the most expensive short-range anti-aircraft missile systems, such as Western NASAMS and IRIS, or various post-Soviet systems, can be used, but in this case the price/result ratio becomes extremely unprofitable. This is the main problem of the fight against "Geraniums". One piece in the basic version, apparently, costs the Russians the equivalent of 30-50 thousand dollars. Western anti-aircraft missiles are ten times more expensive, and most of the post-Soviet ones are priceless because there is nowhere to get them. Sometimes, however, there is no choice, because the Russian drone is heading for an even more valuable object that needs to be protected. Thus, it takes more resources to protect against Geraniums than the Russians spend on their production and launch. This is their main advantage. They overload and deplete the Ukrainian air defenses. In addition, they have been hitting the target more often lately, causing significant damage.
It is clearly beneficial for Russia to use cheap attack drones. Therefore, if it ever has a conflict with NATO, it will certainly need them, and the Russians will use them on an even larger scale, since the production of drones in the Russian Federation is constantly growing. This would be a serious challenge, for example, for the Polish air defense. Our military is preparing for more traditional threats in the form of planes and missiles. A massive threat in the form of drones, such as the Geranium, did not exist until a few years ago. Currently, Poland still has no plans to create an inexpensive and mobile very short-range air defense system, except for equipment purchased for direct protection of troops using Pilica and Poprad systems. So we are facing a serious challenge.
