How can NATO effectively deal with this upgraded air defense system?
Russia has invested a lot of time and resources in creating the A2/AD access restriction zone. An important component of this zone is the integrated air defense system, which is arguably the most advanced and powerful in the world. Its advantages are range, accuracy and mobility. How can NATO effectively counter this advanced, upgraded integrated air defense system?
While the United States is investing heavily in improving stealth technology to overcome air defenses, Russia continues to invest in air defense technologies to counter this threat and ensure that in implementing any of its plans regarding Russian airspace, NATO risks encountering a comprehensive system of restriction and prohibition of access and maneuver (A2/AD).
Russia has an integrated air defense system at its disposal, which has a multi-level structure and includes long-range medium and short-range air defense systems, which have been significantly improved since the collapse of the Soviet Union. We often hear reports of Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles shooting down enemy aircraft around the world, as well as reports of crashes involving Allied aircraft and civilian airliners. Indeed, Russian-made air defense systems are ubiquitous, like the Kalashnikov assault rifle, and have been used in many hot spots since the end of the Cold War, including Kosovo, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the 2014 invasion of Ukraine, and the current war in Syria. Although obsolete weapons are still in service, it is important to note that Russia's airspace is already protected by the latest technologies.
During the recent Vostok-2018 military exercises, the Russian integrated air defense system resisted a simulated massive air and space attack. Various surface-to-air systems were involved in these exercises, including the S-300 long-range systems and the newer S-400 complexes, the Buk medium-range complexes, as well as the Tor and Pantsir-S1 systems. The modern Russian air defense system includes equipment designed to withstand combat aircraft at various altitudes, drones and cruise missiles. And the Vostok-2018 military exercises, during which these systems resisted massive air strikes, were supposed to show NATO that Russia is a real minefield for enemy aircraft that dared to invade its airspace.
The US Air Force is the most advanced in the world, and it has extensive experience in successfully countering enemy air defense systems through electronic warfare technologies, stealth technologies, and the suppression of surface-to-air missile systems using cruise missiles launched from ships. Most of the air defense systems that the U.S. Air Force has had to deal with are the outdated Soviet systems mentioned above. However, they have not yet had to deal with a powerful air defense system like the one that can be observed inside the borders of Russia. Despite all the shortcomings of the Russian army, which became apparent during the war in Chechnya and the invasion of Georgia, it would be foolish to underestimate the air defense system that Russia has modernized and deployed to counter the West, which has concentrated on strong military aircraft.
Michael Kofman, in his recently published article on plans to establish a permanent US military base in Poland, opposes the use of the term A2/AD because it reduces the analysis of Russia's military potential to "threatening red circles on the map" and does not allow to get into the essence of the conflict. I don't agree with that. These "threatening red circles on the map" represent an aerial minefield that NATO planners will either have to neutralize in some way with great difficulty, or circumvent in the event of a conflict.
An excellent example of the effectiveness of ground-based air defense systems is the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Instead of measuring success by the number of Israeli planes shot down during this conflict with Egypt, the declassified CIA report demonstrates the effectiveness of Soviet-made aviation missile systems in disrupting Israeli missions. This report shows that the Egyptian ground forces managed to avoid significant losses at some points because the Israeli Air Force simply did not want to conduct operations over the main air defense zone. And the dangers that Israeli planes faced in 1973 are only a small fraction of what NATO would face if its planes dared to invade Russia's well-protected air defense zone.
The advantages of the Russian air defense system are range, accuracy and mobility. The S-400 is a highly mobile system with a range of up to 400 kilometers against some aircraft. Due to this range, these complexes can cover not only the Baltic States - provided they are deployed in Kaliningrad - but also part of Poland. Regardless of whether you believe that Russia is planning to invade the Baltic States or not, it is imperative that military strategists recognize the reality that any Russian ground forces invading this territory will operate under the cover of a mobile and very powerful integrated air defense system.
This leads us to the idea of effectively overcoming air defenses, or at least sending a strong signal to Russia that its systems can be overcome, and thus keeping Russian President Vladimir Putin from making mistakes based on excessive self-confidence. The best way to counter air defense systems is to avoid them, but based on the features of this multi-layered integrated system, it will be extremely difficult to do this if we are considering the possibility of invading Russian airspace.
The next option is to focus on suppression tactics that have been used in past conflicts: electronic warfare, anti-radar air-to-ground missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and stealth technology. The problems associated with these methods are cost, reliability, and the potential inability to disable all systems. The number of missiles and aircraft needed to disable all systems can be quite significant, and it is worth noting that many of these air defense systems are supposedly capable of shooting down cruise missiles, which are relatively slow-moving targets. The high mobility of Russian air defense systems also prevents their effective suppression, since the attacking aircraft needs to determine their location, which can change frequently.
Given how much money and time is spent on developing and improving stealth technologies, it can be assumed that such aircraft will be invisible to Russian ground-based radar systems. But this is not the case. Although the B-2 bomber is a remarkable platform and has a low radar visibility configuration, it may be vulnerable to new radar systems and combat aircraft. The expensive F-22 and F-35 bombers are even more vulnerable, given their shape and design, which is necessary to ensure the maneuverability of a combat aircraft. Stealth technology has failed in the past, as exemplified by the crash of the F-117A shot down in the skies over Serbia in 1999. Stealth technologies are not capable of making aircraft completely invisible, and Russia's successes in developing air defense and radar technologies indicate that they have a short shelf life. The S-500 long-range system under development may be able to further shorten this period, but it's too early to talk about it yet.
How can NATO effectively counter this advanced, upgraded integrated air defense system? If you rely only on traditional tactics of suppression and familiar methods, then with great difficulty. The Alliance needs a credible plan of action that will not only imply the existence of effective instruments of warfare, but will also serve as a signal to Russia that its air defense system can be overcome - with great losses for Russia itself - if it tries to cross the line and invade the territory of NATO countries, including the Baltic States.
The answer here is low-power sea-based ballistic missiles, which were mentioned in the 2018 Review of the Composition and Quantity of Nuclear Weapons. Although some analysts doubt the feasibility of such systems, given that long-range cruise missiles are replacing outdated air-launched cruise missiles and that further deployment of short-range sea-based cruise missiles is being considered, it must be recognized that these are cruise missiles and there is no guarantee that they will be able to overcome the Russian integrated air defense system. Deployed long-range cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles will become advanced systems that will provide an effective response to a potential threat from Russia, but in some cases they may not be suitable means to overcome modern air defense systems such as the S-400 and the S-500 under development. Low-power sea-based ballistic missiles are missiles with greater penetration capability compared to relatively slow-moving cruise missiles. They are also characterized by a shorter flight time. In times of crisis, when it is necessary to destroy a mobile system such as the Russian Iskander missile with a nuclear warhead, protected by air defense systems, low-power sea-based ballistic missiles are capable of providing a flexible and proportional response.
The 2018 review of the composition and quantity of nuclear weapons is aimed at filling in the gaps in the strike options available to the United States and helping to deter possible enemy aggression. Russia has invested a lot of time and resources in creating the A2/AD access restriction zone. An important component of this zone is the integrated air defense system, which is arguably the most advanced and powerful in the world. It is imperative that NATO deploy powerful assets such as low-power sea-based ballistic missiles in combination with other nuclear and non-nuclear forces to counter access restrictions and prevent possible miscalculations. Failure to adequately assess the limitations can lead to conflict between major powers. To avoid conflict, it is necessary to deploy and develop flexible options to increase the effectiveness of deterrence.
Adam Kabo holds a master's degree in international relations and is currently studying Russia's nuclear strategy.
