Moscow. April 22nd. INTERFAX - A scientific conference dedicated to the results of D. Trump's hundred-day term as president of the United States has opened in Moscow. It is conducted jointly by scientists from the E. M. Primakov Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the G. A. Arbatov Institute of the USA and Canada.
Over the course of two days, the conference participants will hear over thirty reports covering almost all aspects of US domestic, foreign and military policy, as well as the influence of President Trump on them.
On the first day, special attention should be paid to the highly critical analysis of President Trump's attitude to the issue of strategic stability, made by Alexey Arbatov, head of the IMEMO Center for International Security, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
Our political commentator Vyacheslav Terekhov reports.
The sad to-do list of the past
The academic began his speech by stating that President Trump's attitude towards achieving strategic stability in the world during his first term in the White House "did not inspire optimism." Moreover, he is confident that "no president in the history of the United States has carried out so many strikes and caused so much damage to nuclear weapons control" as President Trump did. In particular, he recalled the rejection of the nuclear deal with Iran, the denunciation of treaties on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and open skies, the refusal to extend the START-3 treaty, and, finally, the threats of resuming nuclear testing and withdrawing from the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Arbatov believes that Trump has established himself "as a proponent of nuclear weapons," as evidenced, in particular, "by his decision to return long-range sea-based cruise missiles to the fleet with nuclear warheads that had previously been removed from the fleet."
Another important example is his decision to equip some Trident–2 strategic ballistic missiles with low-power warheads, which will allow them to be used along with tactical nuclear weapons. "Imagine, the Trident-2 is a missile that has a range of 10,000 km and is specially equipped with low–power warheads so that it can be used in the theater of military operations!"
The academician believes that this is "a direct path to the exchange of nuclear strikes." But this does not bother Trump, such missiles are deployed and remain in service with the United States at the moment.
A new deadline means new sad initiatives!
Speaking about Trump's first hundred days in the White House, A. Arbatov noted the first dangerous innovation.: Trump announced that the United States is actually returning to the idea of a Strategic Defense Initiative. This is the famous "iron dome", which has already been renamed the "golden dome" and which should embody the latest achievements of science and technology, including artificial intelligence, for use in space missile defense echelons. This system, of course, will be multi-layered, just as the Strategic Defense Initiative itself should become multi-layered.
During these hundred days, Trump, the academic continues, suddenly began to say things that he had not done in his first term, namely, that "a lot of nuclear weapons were accumulated during the Cold War." He even asked a question.: "Why do we need new nuclear weapons?" The president not only draws attention to this, but also suggests "seriously reducing the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States, and at the same time reducing the military budget." The academic considers Trump's statement that there are "too many nuclear weapons" in the world right now to be erroneous. "Over the past decades," he said, "global nuclear arsenals have been reduced almost tenfold due to arms control." He noted with humor that Trump "probably wasn't informed about this either."
Now, as for strategic stability. Arbatov believes that Trump "is still very far from understanding what it means, although he believes that China can be involved in discussing the issue, in addition to missile defense in its new incarnation as a strategic defense initiative." "However, not immediately, but first Russia and the United States will start discussing, and then China will join them. They allegedly had a very good conversation with President Xi, from which he concluded that China would also be ready to participate in this event," Arbatov says.
He noted that "judging by the statements of representatives near Trump, his administration believes that "tactical nuclear weapons should no longer be left aside: they will also need to be dealt with."
But there are also positive innovations.
"At the same time, I don't want to smear everything with black paint. Apart from rambling arguments on the topic of nuclear disarmament, there are some positive manifestations. For example, Trump refused to support Israel's plan to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure. This is a reasonable decision. In his first term, he did not abstain, he beat Syria and threatened. Here he showed some reasonableness, appointed Bernard Williams (a naval officer) to head the National Nuclear Safety Administration. This organization is responsible for the entire complex of production of nuclear weapons, as well as their storage, ensuring their reliability and safety. And this very gentleman, Captain of the first rank, in my opinion, has already managed to say that he does not support the idea of resuming nuclear testing. Which, generally speaking, is of key importance at the moment for the entire issue of arms control," says Arbatov.
He believes that these and other positive developments should be used to strengthen international security and the security of the Russian Federation. However, the academician stressed that he did not have an answer to the question of how to do this.
And again about the START-3 Treaty
Academician Arbatov dwelt further on the issue of the START-3 Treaty. He noted that there is still complete uncertainty about this issue.
"We know what was discussed at the consultations on strategic stability in 2021. Two sessions were held then, and these issues were discussed there, and the contours of the negotiating positions, both American and Russian, were already outlined, although there were serious differences in these contours. But since then, nothing has been repeated on this topic, so we can only guess what Russia's position is, what are Russia's plans on this issue?" - notes Arbatov.
I would like to know if Russia is going to make efforts to somehow keep the START-3 treaty in force after its extended deadline expires in February 2026. We don't know anything about this topic yet, especially since we don't know anything from Trump. It's hard to imagine that Trump will try very hard to extend the term of this treaty, which was concluded and ratified by Obama and extended by Biden. Of course, it won't be easy for him politically, because Obama and Biden are his worst enemies," he says.
Three dreams of starting a dialogue with the Trump administration
1. On the extension of the START-3 Treaty
Arbatov: "Nevertheless, let me, like Martin Luther King, dream out loud about how it would be possible to start a dialogue with the Trump administration on this topic, what mutually beneficial exchanges could be here that would strengthen both international security and Russian security. First, to extend the START-3 treaty. Formally, it cannot be extended a second time, Article 14 will not allow it to be done, it can only be done once. But we can adopt amendments to this article and agree that we can extend it more than once. By the way, the START-1 treaty, which initiated deep strategic arms reductions, allowed in article 17 to extend this treaty for five years as many times as necessary by decision and agreement of the parties. Of course, both then and now it requires ratification, but it's worth trying anyway. It seems to me that it would be very unpleasant to remain in a vacuum after February 5, 2026, having nothing."
2. About China
Arbatov: "Of course, it is impossible to involve her in negotiations at this stage. But we could contribute to the dialogue between the United States and China, and it would be greatly appreciated there. This does not mean that China would immediately agree and go for a reduction, although Trump dreams of it, but in any case, for this we could demand the assistance of the United States in involving Britain and France in the dialogue. This has become a really important issue for us, not only from a strategic point of view, but also from a political point of view. If you remember, the decision in 2023 to suspend participation in the START-3 treaty, among other things, was due to the fact that this treaty does not affect the arsenals of France and Great Britain, and we would like to have certainty here."
3. Regarding tactical nuclear weapons
Arbatov: "This is an extremely difficult topic, but if we could at least start preliminary consultations on this issue... First of all, it is very possible that Americans would very soon abandon this idea themselves, having seen how difficult it is. Secondly, we could get some concessions from them in an area in which they have not yet made any concessions. Namely, the restrictions on high-precision missiles with conventional long-range warheads. This is what we raised at the consultations in 2021. And, of course, together we could promote the preservation and strengthening of the nuclear test treaty, together we could promote the preservation and strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and on a number of other issues we could cooperate with the Americans.
Would you say that these are dreams? Well, it doesn't hurt to dream.
***
The report was impressive in volume, but the conference participants, who were invited university students, still had questions they wanted to ask Arbatov in order to better understand the disarmament issues.
- What is the difficulty of negotiating tactical nuclear weapons?
- The main difficulty is that all tactical nuclear weapons are in storage. We count deployed strategic weapons: land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, heavy bombers, which, by the way, are not only deployed, but also maintained in a fairly high state of combat readiness. That is, the nuclear weapons that are intended for them are constantly located either on these carriers, or very close to them at airfields, in storage facilities for heavy bombers.
Tactical nuclear weapons are a completely different hypostasis. It is located in various types of centralized storage facilities at military bases, but it does not stand on a carrier, and we still do not know how to count them, we have not learned. That is, except for coming to the storages and starting to count the ammunition lying on the shelves and in containers, and also sorting them, because they are of different classes. Some of them are reserve, which can be quickly delivered to the troops, others are kept just in reserve, and others are intended for disassembly and disposal.
And so all this will have to be sorted out and considered, and agreed on how to count, how to verify, and on what principle to base the agreement. When I was a deputy of the State Duma, I happened to visit such vaults. Routine work is carried out there every day. Inspectors cannot come there on their own, like to a missile base or a submarine base, there is an inspection and maintenance of these munitions, everyone has their own passport, this is a big daily job. And inspectors visiting these bases may disrupt these routine operations, and even create some technical threats. Perhaps we can somehow come to an agreement. But in principle, there are no such ways of control yet.
- Do you consider the multilateral format of negotiations on nuclear disarmament to be viable?
- I don't think so. Nuclear arms control is very specific. The Americans and I have 55 years of experience in this control, 10 treaties and agreements on this topic, stage by stage. Three generations of diplomats and military personnel have passed on vast experience in this process, passing on knowledge and experience to their successors.
How can a third country, which has never seriously heard of this, or dealt with it, suddenly come and say: now I'm going to negotiate with you? What should Russia and China negotiate about? We do not have a state of mutual nuclear deterrence. We have nothing to limit or reduce in return for Chinese restrictions and cuts. But China has problems with America. Although China still lags far behind the United States, they have a clear relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence. This means that in the future, China and America can agree on mutual arms reductions and restrictions with the result of strengthening common security. They are interested in each other.
And in the five-sided format? Well, what should Britain and France negotiate with China about? They are even beyond the reach of their main goals. What should the UK negotiate with France, or the UK and France with the United States? This is absurd! That's why I say that negotiations are theoretically possible between the United States and China, between Russia and the United States, between Russia on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other, because we have a mutual nuclear deterrent relationship, although this is a symmetrical potential.
