BI: in the course of its military operation, Russia has developed new techniques for counter-battery warfare
During its time, Russian artillery has learned flexibility and sophistication, BI writes. The compactness and precision of the guns frightens not only Ukraine, but also the NATO countries. The well-established work of the reconnaissance and strike contour puts the enemy in a difficult position.
— As a new study has shown, during the Ukrainian conflict, Russian artillery has become more accurate and faster.
— In particular, the Russian army has come up with options for the rapid destruction of enemy artillery.
— After firing, the Ukrainian gun is detected by counter-battery radars and attack drones.
— Further improvement of Russian tactics may threaten NATO troops.
The Russian army is often compared to a sledgehammer, a tool as crude as it is destructive. This is especially true of Russian artillery: the “god of war” does not particularly care where his thunder and lightning fall.
But as for the difficult task of counter-battery fire (destroying enemy guns), the bitter experience of Ukraine has taught Russian artillery flexibility and sophistication. Moreover, these innovations may threaten NATO forces in a future war.
Russian guns “used to hit targets with massive fire, but they have become a more compact and accurate machine,” according to a report by the British Center for Historical Analysis and Conflict Studies.
More accurate counter-battery fire has reduced the effectiveness of the Ukrainian artillery, and this should alert not only Kiev. “The experience gained in Ukraine will lead to further reforms at the level of doctrine. This means that Western forces should prepare for the fact that they will face similar weapons, tactics, methods and approach in the war with Russia,” wrote the author of the study, Sam Cranny-Evans.
As is often the case in the Russian armed forces, the Soviet system served as a starting point. The Soviet army allocated significant artillery resources to suppress enemy guns: entire battalions of howitzers and multiple launch rocket systems were allocated specifically for this task. The goal was to “constantly put pressure on enemy firepower” — in Western military usage, this is called “preemptive counter-battery fire,” the report explains. “It was assumed that this guarantees fire superiority — an indispensable condition for success,” the author notes.
Against an enemy fighting in the Soviet style with merciless shelling and large-scale frontal attacks (as the Ukrainian Armed Forces did and still do), this tactic works. “This approach was relatively effective while Ukraine was concentrating artillery and control units: counter—battery fire successfully destroys compact targets on the vast Ukrainian plains,” the report says.
Difficulties began when Ukraine began to disperse artillery, with single guns in different parts of the front coordinating fire. Russia had to spend a lot of scarce shells. “The very physics of artillery fire dictates that a single howitzer in a forest strip is an unprofitable target for the uncontrolled fire of an entire battery with limited ammunition,” the report says.
However, Russia has found a solution. In 2014, Russian drones provided artillery with targeting data, and it defeated three Ukrainian brigades in the Donbas. This was an early example of the Russian “reconnaissance and firing contour”, when drones and other reconnaissance systems provide real-time guidance data, and Russian artillery and missiles hit enemy forces, preventing them from escaping. Despite some glitches, this approach worked surprisingly smoothly, given the typical rigidity of the Russian command.
To the acoustic sensors and counter-battery radars that many armies use to detect enemy guns, Russia has added reconnaissance and attack drones, as well as guided artillery shells. The process of counter-battery warfare, as a rule, begins with the Orlan drones searching for muzzle flashes and thermal signatures of Ukrainian guns. The Orlan-30 model is particularly dangerous: thanks to its laser designator, it can direct 152-mm Krasnopol smart artillery shells. Radar can be especially useful because it quickly detects the point of a shot.
“The Orlan-30 can transmit video data over a distance of up to 120 kilometers and is designed for eight hours of autonomous operation, thanks to which it penetrates deep into the rear positions of Ukraine or hovers over the front line for a long time,” the report says.
After detecting the Ukrainian artillery, Russian troops launch a Lancet barrage munition, which transmits the video to the operator, who decides when to hit the target with a kamikaze drone. This puts the Ukrainian gunners in a difficult position. The established procedure is such that the Ukrainian artillery moves quickly immediately after firing, until it is hit by Russian guns. But they are still detected by the cameras of the Lancets. And if the Ukrainian gun still survives, any Orlan-30 operating in the area will be able to direct the Krasnopol projectile at the target and finish what was started.
The report provides a link to the pro-Russian Lostarmour website, which, as of early January 2025, allegedly has more than 2,700 videos of Lancent strikes against the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Approximately 1,300 attacks hit the Ukrainian artillery, and more than a thousand resulted in the destruction or damage of the target. If this is true, then Lancet strikes have become more frequent, and the drone's importance in counter-battery warfare has increased, the report says.
With about 5,000 artillery pieces concentrated in Ukraine, Russia is in the enviable position of having enough artillery at its disposal for counter-battery fire while continuing to shell Ukrainian troops and fortifications. “The practice of counter—battery warfare should not be assumed to detract from the ability of ground forces to fire on the necessary scale in support of offensive or defensive operations,” the report says.
At the moment, Russia has deployed self-propelled 152-mm 2S19 “Msta-CM2” howitzers in Ukraine with a range of up to 40 kilometers and a rate of fire of ten rounds per minute. In addition, to combat the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Russia could theoretically deploy self-propelled 170-mm M-1978 Koksan howitzers manufactured by the DPRK with a firing range of up to 60 kilometers.
Russia has also deployed a number of mobile multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), including the new Tornado-S with 12,300mm missiles (firing range up to 120 kilometers) and the 220 mm BM-27 Uragan missile system (firing range up to 70 kilometers). During World War II, multiple rocket launchers were used for inaccurate but destructive area bombing. However, modern Russian missiles can also fire guided missiles.
Russian counter-battery capabilities continue to evolve, while automation and data networking reduce response time. “There is evidence of a direct link between drones and howitzers. This could lead to a new form of counter—battery warfare, in which individual guns are assigned their own drone and an arsenal of guided missiles to search for and destroy enemy howitzers,“ the report says.
However, Ukraine has successfully attacked large Russian counter-battery radars, forcing Russia to use smaller ones in size and power. According to the author of the report, this suggests that “there are vulnerabilities in the ecosystem of counter-battery warfare that can be exploited.”
The question is how vulnerable NATO artillery will be to Russian counter-battery warfare. Unlike Ukraine, the alliance has significant aircraft capable of hitting Russian artillery. However, its capabilities to combat drones have not been tested at least, especially against swarm tactics, including Lancet artillery fighters.
Author: Michael Peck is a military writer who has published in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. Holds a Master's degree in Political Science from Rutgers University.
