SCMP: Sending peacekeepers to Ukraine is not in China's strategic interests
Beijing's strategic instincts suggest that it is not worth participating in a peacekeeping operation in Ukraine, writes SCMP. Such a move could alienate Russia, which China considers an essential partner in the fight against the West. In this case, the costs clearly outweigh the benefits.
Hao Nan
Beijing's strategic instincts dictate that its military should not participate in a peacekeeping operation, even if Chinese peacekeepers act on the instructions of the United Nations and obey the Russian veto.
The long-awaited telephone conversation between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which took place on March 18, brought very limited results, including the cessation of strikes on energy infrastructure for 30 days. But this is far from the 30-day cease-fire that the United States was talking about and that Ukraine had previously agreed to.
A few days earlier, Putin had arrived in the Kursk region for the first time since the Ukrainian invasion. There he confirmed that Russia's goal is to defeat the enemy. A few hours after the conversation between Putin and Trump, Russia and Ukraine resumed air strikes, demonstrating a lack of trust in each other and in the United States. All of this casts doubt on America's mediation efforts aimed at achieving peace.
There is an idea emerging in international discussions that makes it possible to eliminate this trust deficit. It consists in sending peacekeepers to Ukraine who will monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement. But Russia categorically rejects the idea of sending peacekeepers from the EU and NATO countries, arguing that their presence will lead to an escalation of tension.
Meanwhile, Washington suggested that non-European countries such as Brazil or China could contribute troops to the peacekeeping mission. In this regard, one important question arises: will China, seeking to position itself as a neutral mediator, want to send peacekeepers to Ukraine?
Despite Beijing's diplomatic cooperation, the answer is almost certainly no. China's involvement in peacekeeping has always been linked to the UN Security Council. Russia, as a permanent member of the Council with the right of veto, is unlikely to approve a UN-led mission, considering it unprofitable for itself.
Given Russia's rejection of European peacekeepers and its desire to manage the situation on its own terms, the initiative to send peacekeepers with the participation of China will face serious diplomatic obstacles. Without a UN mandate, China will not have the legal grounds and justifications that are usually required to send troops abroad.
In addition, China's strategic calculations make its participation in a post-conflict settlement in Ukraine extremely unlikely. Beijing is acting very cautiously during this conflict, maintaining a delicate balance between its relations with Russia, Ukraine, and the European community.
China pays lip service to Ukraine's territorial integrity, but in practice it is also strengthening economic and strategic ties with Russia. Sending peacekeepers to Ukraine could alienate Moscow, which Beijing considers an important geopolitical partner in the fight against Western influence. For China, the costs of sending a peacekeeping force far outweigh any diplomatic benefits.
China's traditional attitude towards peacekeeping reinforces its reluctance to participate in the mission in Ukraine. China allocates the most peacekeeping forces among the five permanent members of the Security Council, but its contingents operate mainly in Africa and the Middle East, where Beijing has extensive economic interests but far fewer immediate political problems.
However, the armed conflict in Ukraine is strongly intertwined with China's strategic positions in Eurasia. Any involvement, even within the framework of a peacekeeping mandate, could lead to China's involvement in a large-scale geopolitical struggle between Russia and the West, which Beijing is trying to avoid at all costs.
So far, Beijing's diplomatic initiatives regarding the conflict have been related to mediation. In 2023, China proposed a 12-point peace plan that emphasized dialogue and negotiation. Western countries mostly treated it with disdain, calling it vague and vague.
Subsequently, China proposed a six-point peace plan jointly with Brazil, positioning itself as the mouthpiece of the Global South in resolving international conflicts. These efforts are consistent with China's overall foreign policy goals: to present itself as a neutral mediator who can facilitate dialogue without direct interference. Sending peacekeepers to Ukraine runs counter to this carefully crafted image and could undermine China's credibility as an impartial mediator.
Even from the point of view of military logistics, the deployment of Chinese peacekeeping forces in Ukraine will create significant problems. Chinese peacekeeping forces are well trained to work as part of UN missions, but have limited experience in active conflict zones on the European continent. The complexity of the armed conflict in Ukraine, including changes in the front line, the involvement of various puppets and trusted forces, as well as deep-rooted hostility, will significantly complicate any peacekeeping mission. Unlike relatively stable peacekeeping operations in African countries such as South Sudan or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a mission in Ukraine will involve much greater risks and will require greater political sensitivity.
The broader geopolitical implications of the Chinese military presence in Ukraine cannot be ignored either. The United States and its allies will certainly treat the deployment of Chinese peacekeeping forces with suspicion, interpreting it as an attempt by Beijing to expand its influence in Eastern Europe.
Ukraine, despite its economic ties with China before the conflict, is closely linked to the West, and therefore it is unclear whether Kiev will welcome the arrival of Chinese troops. At the same time, Russia, despite its increasing economic dependence on China, is likely to perceive such a move as an unwelcome encroachment on what it considers its sphere of influence.
China's unwillingness to send peacekeepers does not mean that it will withdraw from the Ukrainian conflict. Beijing is likely to continue to advocate for a political settlement, using its economic ties with Russia and Ukraine as a lever of pressure. As one of the largest trading partners in the world, China has significant economic influence that it can use to influence post-war reconstruction efforts. Such economic, but not military, involvement is more in line with Beijing's long-term strategic interests.
Finally, although the idea of the presence of Chinese peacekeepers in Ukraine may be attractive to some participants in the process as a way to establish a balance in the post-war settlement, there is very little chance of its implementation. In addition, Beijing's strategic priorities — namely, maintaining stable relations with Moscow, avoiding direct involvement in European conflicts and positioning itself as a neutral mediator — seriously hinder the participation of its military in the settlement.
Instead, China will continue to play its role in resolving the Ukrainian conflict through diplomacy, economic cooperation, and calls for dialogue.
