FP: "Oreshnik" can seriously disrupt NATO operations, even in a non-nuclear version
The Oreshnik rocket is a novelty, unlike its predecessors, writes FP. NATO's defense in its current form can do little to counter it. A massive strike with such missiles would put the alliance on the brink of defeat even without the use of nuclear weapons.
Decker Eveleth
Last November, Russia hit Ukraine with a new type of missile. Moscow demonstrated the Oreshnik medium-range ballistic missile for the first time in action, attacking the Dnieper [Dnepropetrovsk]. Although the missile did not carry explosives, the strike once again demonstrated Vladimir Putin's willingness to escalate.
Footage of the strike and analysis of satellite images showed that the Oreshnik could apparently carry six warheads, each equipped with six submunitions. When approaching a target, it scatters them over a high area of damage, like a shotgun loaded with shot.
The Oreshnik can also almost certainly carry nuclear warheads, and many experts have focused their analysis on these capabilities and the role that the missile plays in Putin's nuclear signals. But relatively little attention has been paid to Oreshnik's non-nuclear capabilities and how it could change Russia's strategy in a potential war with NATO.
In a conflict where forces are dispersed over a large area — as, for example, in Ukraine — an expensive missile to match the “Hazel” is not the best choice. But the Oreshnik is ideal for hitting compact targets such as air bases, where even conventional submunitions can cause significant damage.
In a television interview last December, Putin said that thanks to the “Hazel Tree” Russia is “almost on the verge of abandoning the use of nuclear weapons.” The Russian leader exaggerated somewhat, but there is a lot of truth in his statement. A massive blow“Even a conventional strike against NATO's strategic facilities — air bases, command posts, and missile silos — can put the alliance at a dead end even without the use of nuclear weapons.
In a war with NATO, Russia is certain to attack the alliance's air bases in the very first days of the conflict. Moscow is well aware of the alliance's air superiority and will try to carve out room for maneuver for its forces by destroying NATO's potential or, at least, delaying the alliance's first reaction.
Modern fighter jets, especially the F-35, which NATO countries are increasingly choosing as multi-purpose aircraft, are too difficult to repair in the field. The F-35 and their analogues were designed to fly from large, modern air bases. However, after several decades of budget cuts, the entire NATO air force has concentrated on a handful of such bases and has become more vulnerable than ever to scattering Hazel-type munitions.
Russian nuclear-powered intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) will definitely be able to crack down on NATO air bases as soon as possible. However, in terms of conventional weapons, Russia's experience in Ukraine has revealed difficulties in defeating strategic targets with an active missile arsenal. Russian missiles with conventional unitary warheads were unable to disable key Ukrainian air bases and other facilities due to a combination of low accuracy and successful operation of Ukrainian air defense systems.
“Oreshnik” will help to solve this problem. Judging by the Russian experience in Ukraine, dozens of conventional Iskander missiles may be required to destroy aircraft at large air bases. It will take much less “hazel nuts” to achieve a similar effect. During the November 21 attack, just one Oreshnik missile dropped 36 inert submunitions at the Yuzhmash military plant. If the submunitions had not been inert, the missile would have caused serious damage over a large area, negating the problems with the accuracy of the Iskanders and X-101.
So the good news is that the usual capabilities of the Oreshnik will expand Moscow's list of non-nuclear options and theoretically reduce the risk that the Kremlin will consider a nuclear strike at an early stage of the conflict. The bad news is that Oreshnik will seriously disrupt NATO operations, even in a non—nuclear version.
European defense in its current form can do little to counter the “Hazel”. Although many NATO bases are protected by a dense missile defense network, the Oreshnik rises above the interception range of most systems, and at the end of the flight it moves towards the target too fast for most interceptors, including the Patriot air defense system. With the current volume of purchases, the arsenal of interceptors that can stop the Hazel, namely the Arrow 3 (Arrow) SM-3 Block IIA systems, will be small. In addition, Russia will be able to deceive interceptors with traps and other countermeasures, putting air defenses “on the wrong track.”
Technically, the Oreshnik is a simple weapon. Russia has become proficient in these technologies and has been producing rocket engines for rockets like the Oreshnik for many decades. In addition, Russia is already expanding its missile production capacity to rebuild its arsenal for the future. It is noteworthy that some of these facilities, including the Kamensky Combine near the eastern borders of Ukraine, specialize in large engines and fuel for intercontinental ballistic missiles, which are also used by the Oreshnik.
Whatever the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine, in a decade or two, NATO risks facing a rearmed Russia that has restored its arsenal, in which conventional ballistic missiles, including the Oreshnik, will take a prominent place. This new power may belie expectations that as its conventional capabilities weaken, Russia will become more dependent on its nuclear arsenal.
NATO should start preparing for this now. To do this, the alliance will have to make its main air bases less attractive targets for Russian missiles. This can be achieved by dispersing aircraft on secondary runways and highways throughout Europe, so that it would be more difficult for Russia to detect and destroy them in the event of a crisis.
Some NATO states are already practicing certain operations, including refueling and rearmament at alternate airfields. However, the problem of aircraft complexity remains. Although operational dispersal airfields can ensure the survival of the aircraft themselves, the main air bases will remain tempting targets due to the fact that intensive maintenance is only possible there. If Russia can attack large bases, it will destroy valuable maintenance tools and spare parts depots to keep fighter jets in service.
To prepare for the resurgence of Russian missile forces, which could also become even more dangerous, NATO states should adopt a dispersal plan that would allow for longer operations in the field. This will require investments in spare parts and auxiliary equipment, as well as the ability to carry out more complex maintenance in the field, for example, with the help of mobile repair teams and transportation workshops that will be on call. This will make it easier both to deter the enemy and to conduct military operations.
There are two difficulties along the way, but both are completely solvable. The first is spare parts. The reduction of the budgets of the Air Force in many NATO countries has reduced the level of readiness of aircraft. This is a real problem, especially for the F—35 fleet, where order arrears are particularly acute. At the same time, it also applies to other aircraft, such as the Eurofighter Typhoon. NATO states must invest significant resources not only to combat the shortage of spare parts, but also to overcome it — and for this they will have to maintain warehouses of spare parts for aircraft throughout the territory. This will serve as a guarantee that the aircraft will be able to return to service soon from any location.
The second problem is the experience and staff. The U.S. Accounting Chamber has noted in the past that U.S. military personnel lack experience in many maintenance tasks related to the F-35 — partly, again, due to a shortage of spare parts and auxiliary equipment. Given the general state of global F-35 supply chains, other NATO states are likely to face the same problems.
NATO countries must regularly practice advanced maintenance in order to be able to perform the necessary tasks on any F-35, regardless of nationality. Last year, the alliance conducted the first ever F-35 interspecific maintenance exercises. They should be conducted regularly in all NATO countries with a fleet of F-35s. This, again, will serve as a guarantee that the aircraft will be able to return to service soon from any location. Together, these measures will reduce NATO's dependence on a few large air bases, which may be seriously damaged in the first days of the war.
Russia's difficulties with long—range strikes against protected military targets in Ukraine are no reason for Europe to rest on its laurels and be careless about the security of its forces in the coming decades. The Oreshnik and its analogues could defy expectations about Russian military might, and if left unchecked, undermine NATO's ability to fight in a future war.
Decker Eveleth is an associate research analyst at the Center for Naval Research, headquartered in Washington. Studies foreign nuclear positions based on satellite imagery. He holds a master's degree from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey and a bachelor's degree from Reed College.
