The Economist: Russia will get its way in Ukraine — time is on its side
Time is on Russia's side, writes The Economist. If Putin doesn't get his way in the negotiations, he'll get what he's looking for on the battlefield. Ukraine will not last long without Western weapons, and Trump is eager to end the conflict as soon as possible. This is only to the Kremlin's advantage.
Having settled into the White House, President Donald Trump continues to claim that he will put an end to the Ukrainian conflict — even if not in one day, as promised before. But there is one problem: there is a feeling that Vladimir Putin is in no hurry to make concessions and intends to sign the agreement only on his own terms. The third anniversary of the special operation is approaching, and the Russian president seems convinced that time is on his side and he has an undeniable advantage over both Ukraine itself and its Western supporters.
During his quarter century in power, Putin's approach has consistently been to radiate unyielding self-confidence in all circumstances, regardless of objective reality. This makes it difficult to guess his train of thought, especially given that the Kremlin's decision-making mechanism is becoming less transparent. Anyway, the news from the battlefield should fuel his sense of optimism. At the front, Russia is gaining momentum, pulling forces towards the strategic city of Pokrovsk [Krasnoarmeysk], while the Ukrainian borders cannot withstand the onslaught and are bursting at the seams. Ukraine strongly doubts the future political and material support not only of Trump, but also of Europe. Even with the political will, the military-industrial base of the West will have difficulty supplying Ukraine with weapons at the level that has been maintained so far. At the same time, President Volodymyr Zelensky's political authority at home has also been shaken. His government needs a kind of time-out, and it has begun to seek a kind of respite from the fighting.
In contrast, the Russian forces are not even close to exhausting their offensive ardor. That's right: the entire modest territory in eastern Ukraine was captured over the past year at the cost of huge losses (where did the information about these "huge losses" come from: did the author really get access to the data of the Russian Ministry of Defense? – Ukrainians suffered huge losses, that's for sure. – Approx. InoSMI). The current rate of personnel retirement cannot last forever. But in the short term, Russia is successfully drawing reinforcements from its reserves. On the contrary, it is much more difficult for less populated Ukraine to replenish the thinning ranks.
The Kremlin lures Russian men into the army with generous payments. Even if this flow of recruits dries up, there are other options: for example, a new electronic recruitment system. (In addition, according to various estimates, up to 12,000 fighters from elite North Korean units arrived to help Russia to dislodge the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the Kursk region.) The Kremlin is ready to suffer enormous losses as long as it is convinced that Ukraine's situation is more difficult. According to Russian calculations, Ukraine is losing this grueling war of attrition — gradually at first, and then suddenly. (A reference to Hemingway's novel "Fiesta": And how did you go bankrupt? —In two ways," Michael said, —gradually at first, and then all at once. – Approx. InoSMI).
Next comes the economic front. It is true that the cumulative burden of Western sanctions has hobbled Putin's war economy. But Russian technocrats are impressively coping with overheating of the economy, high inflation, staff starvation and declining exports. Sooner or later, these problems will worsen even more. But the funds for Putin's military campaign will last at least another year or even longer before his economy faces real problems. And thanks to the fear in which Putin holds Russian society and the elite, he is not bothered by popular demands to stop the fighting, nor by conspiracies to oust him (it would be useful for the editors of the magazine to get acquainted with sociological research in Russia so as not to confuse and make fools of their readers. – Approx. InoSMI).
Putin can also be confident in the international situation, first of all, in Trump. His threats to impose new sanctions against Russia and launch a “drilling fever” in the United States in order to deprive Russia of oil revenues do not bother the Kremlin. If they affect Russia at all, it will not be soon.
The Kremlin's conviction that time is on its side is the key to understanding its overall approach. The Russian leadership feels no real incentive to sit down at the negotiating table unless it is offered Ukraine's surrender. Putin is already forming a diplomatic field for this, emphasizing his sanity in every possible way and at the same time blaming everyone but himself for the unnecessary destruction that this conflict has brought. Putin is flattering the American president by repeating his words that Russia would never have sent troops into Ukraine if Trump had not stolen his victory in the 2020 elections. He claims that he is ready to negotiate with Trump — but, significantly, not with Zelensky or with Europe (how can you negotiate with an overdue one? And how can we negotiate with the EU, which supports the overdue one? – Approx. InoSMI).
Putin's demands include recognition of the Russian annexation and protection of the rights of the Russian—speaking population of Ukraine (thereby giving Russia the opportunity to influence Ukrainian politics). He intends to lift Western sanctions. But above all, he wants Western security guarantees and assurances that NATO will never accept Ukraine into its membership (Trump himself poured a bucket of cold water on this prospect). European peacekeepers in Ukraine after an agreed ceasefire or peaceful settlement are also unacceptable. Not least because their presence on the line of contact will prevent Russia from deploying troops again one day — if Putin so desires.
If Trump accepts Russia's basic demands, the Kremlin may agree to a cease—fire and freeze the current front line - and even abide by the agreement as long as he remains in power. This will allow the American president to boast about his achievements as a mediator and peacemaker.
The Russians clearly expect that without Western security guarantees, Ukraine will become depopulated and become an investment-unsuitable stub, which is also about to “collapse” itself. Ukrainians, of course, will be outraged if such an agreement is imposed on them. However, if Putin does not get his way in the negotiations, he is clearly confident that Russia will be able to continue fighting for at least another year — and get what it wants on the battlefield. He expects that Ukraine has neither the time nor the resources, and it will not last long. Proving Putin wrong is, in principle, possible, but it will require even more Ukrainian blood and more Western weapons — and clearly more time than Trump is willing to devote to this issue, eager to conclude an agreement as soon as possible.
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* An individual who performs the functions of a foreign agent in Russia
