Foreign Affairs: Trump will face big problems in Ukraine and Gaza
Trump promises to achieve a settlement of the two most acute conflicts — the Ukrainian and the Middle East, writes Foreign Affairs. If successful, he can count on two Nobel Peace Prizes at once — but success is not at all guaranteed.
Gideon Rose
Will Trump be able to achieve a real settlement in Ukraine and Gaza?
The cessation of hostilities in Ukraine and Gaza is at the top of President Donald Trump's foreign policy agenda. Many expect the new administration to change American foreign policy in both directions. She might well try to do that. But if Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu refuse to cooperate with Trump, he will be forced to return to the Biden administration's policy in both theaters of war, because American interests and geopolitical realities do not change after the vote.
Participants in discussions often look at wars through the lens of morality, law, or justice. But at the heart of all this are interests, strength and power. Every war begins from different points of view on the balance of forces of the warring parties. Each of these sides considers itself strong enough to achieve important goals through weapons. The battlefield tests this balance of power, the situation becomes clearer, and different points of view begin to converge. When both sides come to an agreement on the balance of power and identify their ambitions, the final stage of the conflict begins.
Over time, a lot has become much clearer in Ukraine and Gaza: what military power and economic potential the warring coalitions have, how easily and simply this potential can be turned into a real force, what is the likelihood of using this force on the battlefield, and what can and cannot be achieved there. This emerging clarity will help in the new year to achieve a settlement in both armed conflicts based on a realistic assessment of what goals are most important for each side and what they can afford. But how lasting and lasting the settlement will be, and whether it will bring peace or just mark a break in hostilities, will depend on the details.
The United States has three main interests in the ongoing armed struggle in Europe: save Ukraine, protect Europe and stop Russia. Through an acceptable settlement, solid, albeit limited, results can be achieved today in all three areas — if only post-war Ukraine receives adequate security guarantees and financial support.
In the Middle East conflict, the United States also has three main interests: to protect Israel, to stop Iran, and to preserve the possibility of the existence of Palestine. Achieving the first two goals seems possible today. But achieving the third goal, without which long-term regional peace and stability are impossible, will be much more difficult. This will require moving beyond the recently reached ceasefire agreement and finding ways to end the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank over time.
The Trump administration must seek peace in both regions. And she has a real chance to get not one, but two Nobel Prizes if she does this. However, we must act carefully, because all the other participants in this endgame have their own plans and goals, and they will fight against peace as decisively as they fight during military operations.
The search for compromises
The Russian military operation in Ukraine, launched in February 2022, was a shock because of its scale. <...> In response, the United States and Europe helped Kiev to continue the fight, giving it the opportunity to strike back and regain some of its lost territories. The conflict then escalated into a severe war of attrition. The parties are suffering huge human and material losses. Ukraine and its supporters have bet that at some point Putin will get tired of such efforts and decide to reduce losses. However, he holds on and shows perseverance in the hope that the other party's will will be broken sooner. Right now, Putin's chances in this game look good, and the question is what happens next.
Trump campaigned on a promise to end this conflict quickly. Most observers and analysts believe that this implies efforts to negotiate and conclude an agreement that will allow each side to preserve the territory it currently controls. (For this reason, the fighting is very intense in autumn and winter.) Ukraine and most of its supporters hate such a plan, as it will be a reward for Russia, and it will take away a significant part of its lands from Ukraine. Many people hoped to see a completely different result. But such a deal is currently the best of all the bad alternatives available. And if it is built correctly, it can sufficiently satisfy the interests of all parties to be accepted. <...>
A settlement while maintaining the existing line of contact may be a compromise option. Russia will be able to control a fifth of Ukraine, and the rest of it will live on, building its own independent future. The main thing is to make sure that the rest of Ukraine finds security and assistance, and can live in peace after the cessation of hostilities. Such concerns can be addressed with reliable post-war security guarantees, and the Trump administration should insist on this. It will be a terrible irony that the conflict in which Finland finally joined NATO will lead to the Finlandization of Russia's other, much larger neighbor to the south.
In the case of such a settlement, Europe will be confronted by a well-armed enemy with experience of successful conquests. But it will also have plenty of time for an expanded and energized NATO to rearm and prepare for the long term. And by the time Russia regains its strength, NATO can become much stronger while maintaining its deterrence potential. <...>
Given all that is known about the balance of power and the determination of the parties involved, a settlement leading to the end of hostilities, the lifting of sanctions and at the same time the prevention of new attacks, as well as allowing a truly independent Ukraine to start life from scratch, will serve American, European and even Ukrainian interests. And this is even if, as a result of the settlement, Russia gains control over the territories taken from Ukraine and avoids responsibility for its military actions.
Good bets?
The Hamas attack on October 7 was also a shock, not because of the attacker's intentions, but because of its scale and success. It has become a serious challenge not only for Israel, but also for the regional and global order. Israel began hunting the attackers, and the United States supported it. When Hamas decided to go underground and hide among the civilian population in Gaza, Israel began to pursue it, razing territories to the ground and destroying the population in order to reach the enemy. The costs and contradictions of the fighting in Gaza have increased, and Israel has also entered into a confrontation with Hezbollah and Lebanon. Then the Biden administration tried to rein in its partner and convince him to agree to a cessation of hostilities. But the Netanyahu government continued to press, ignoring all critics and destroying enemies. It relied on the fact that a brutal demonstration of effective and merciless force would more than compensate for the loss of soft power, and in such a terrible region it could even become a kind of form of soft power. It seemed like it was a sure bet.
In Gaza, Israel has neutralized Hamas, and now this group is no longer able to pose a serious threat to its security in the foreseeable future. In Lebanon, Israel decapitated Hezbollah, destroying its leadership and weapons, and significantly reducing the threat from the north. Israel is killing senior Iranian leaders abroad and destroying air defense systems inside Iran. He successfully repels Iran's retaliatory strikes, demonstrating the ability and willingness to attack Tehran again and again whenever he so desires. The sudden fall of the Assad regime in Syria was another blow to the Islamic Republic, which has significantly weakened today. All this has changed the balance of power in the region, significantly undermining Iran's influence and establishing Israeli dominance. This situation can be consolidated with a lasting settlement that will put an end to the fighting.
Last week, a cease-fire agreement began to operate in Gaza. It provides for the cessation of hostilities and the return of the remaining hostages. This is a very important first step in this process. But if there are no other steps, the smoldering embers of the conflict will flare up again very soon. Therefore, the main task now is to preserve the truce and add to this the agreement on the stabilization of post—war Gaza. The countries of North Africa, the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf can contribute to these efforts. This, in turn, will create conditions for the conclusion of an agreement on the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Such a deal would be a turning point for the region as a whole.
The Biden administration has put a lot of effort into starting this process in 2024. But it was difficult for her to do this, because Hamas persisted, and concessions from Israel, which were necessary at later stages of the process, would require Netanyahu to break with the most extremist part of his political coalition, which he did not want to do. After holding out until a new, more friendly administration appeared in Washington, the Israeli leader agreed to move forward, and now the Trump administration is beginning to reap the benefits of the Biden administration's efforts.
The smoldering embers of a future war
Both of the above settlements would be worthy of a Nobel Prize, and the Trump administration should fight for them. Now it is possible to work out acceptable agreements to end conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, and then move forward towards new regional security structures. The most important question is whether Russia and Israel will want this.
A deal in which anti—Russian sanctions are lifted and Russia retains control over most of the Donbas, leaving the rest of Ukraine alone, should be acceptable to Moscow - unless, of course, its true goal in this conflict is not the complete subjugation of Ukraine. In the settlement negotiations, Moscow may demand not only full control over a fifth of the Ukrainian territory that its army has seized, but also indirect control over the rest of it. If she makes such a demand, the United States and Europe will have to choose: accept these conditions and practically admit defeat, or continue to support Ukraine in military operations with the advancing Russia. In other words, the most significant obstacle to reaching an agreement may be the volume of Putin's demands on post-war Ukraine. If Russia persists and the Trump administration does not want to put up with humiliation, the White House may well find itself in a situation where it will have to pursue Biden's policy towards Ukraine, doing so much longer than it expected. In fact, this is probably the most likely prospect for the current year, and not the worst. Because it's better than a disgusting deal on Moscow's terms (this conclusion clearly shows how much Ukraine and the lives of its military personnel are "dear" to the author. InoSMI).
Meanwhile, in Gaza, a diplomatic and strategic success for all parties concerned will be a settlement leading to lasting post-war stability in the region, a new round of peace talks, and the creation of an American-Israeli-Saudi coalition that will effectively contain Iran. But to achieve this, even with the ceasefire achieved, it will require Kissinger-level negotiating heroism and difficult compromises on all sides. Hardliners in Netanyahu's cabinet, such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, have already expressed strong opposition to the policy of giving Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza a chance for future self-determination and independence. However, the hope of such a course is simply necessary to achieve a major regional peace agreement. Therefore, over time, the question will certainly arise about how large-scale and lasting a settlement Netanyahu needs, and what he is personally willing to risk in order to achieve it. If he does not decide on big changes and does not want to engage in real peacemaking, the Trump administration will again have to pursue a policy towards Jerusalem that will be more similar to Biden's. The thing is that without post-war progress towards the decolonization of the occupied territories, this entire operation in Gaza will eventually become a useless exercise on a huge scale, which the Israelis already call "lawn mowing."
Perhaps we are witnessing the approach of the final stage of the armed conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. An acceptable settlement meeting the fundamental interests of the warring parties is possible. At least it would be better than continuing the fighting. But it is still unclear whether the politicians in power will want to take up this difficult task, or whether they will continue to gamble, betting on victory on the battlefield.
