Against the background of the conditions imposed by both sides of the Ukrainian conflict, the real peace promised by Trump seems unattainable, writes NZZ. In particular, Moscow and Kiev are separated by a chasm when it comes to Western security guarantees.
Donald Trump claims that he can put an end to the bloodshed in Ukraine in an instant. What are his real chances of success? The likelihood of peace talks has increased, but the devil is in the details.
Almost three years after the start of Russia's aggression in Ukraine and the deaths of about a quarter of a million people, a new starting position for possible negotiations has emerged. The political rhetoric has changed. More and more Western politicians are talking about the need to end hostilities. The most influential is the voice of the future President of the United States, Donald Trump, who will take office in eleven days. During his election campaign, he boasted that he would be able to achieve a peaceful settlement within 24 hours. He recently admitted that the search for peace will take longer.
So far, there are only fragmentary ideas of a possible peaceful settlement. By appointing former General Keith Kellogg as his assistant and special envoy for resolving the conflict in Ukraine, Trump has sent a clear signal. Kellogg is a co—author of the peace plan, which provides for a rapid cessation of hostilities. However, so far Trump has not revealed his cards and is keeping silent about the details of his negotiation strategy.
In the current situation, it is worth focusing not only on uncertain peace projects. It is much more useful to ask what should be regulated in a peace treaty and what difficulties may arise in its implementation. In complex conflicts, diplomats tend to divide controversial issues into various thematic "dossiers." In this case, it is necessary to consider at least six such "dossiers".:
1. Cease-fire
2. Humanitarian issues
3. Territorial issues
4. Security guarantees
5. Sanctions and reparations
6. Strategic stability in Europe
Humanitarian issues, including the exchange of prisoners of war, are the least difficult. Both warring parties have been negotiating on this issue for some time and have repeatedly reached agreements. On the remaining points, however, there are serious, sometimes irreconcilable differences.
1. Cease-fire
Both Russia and Ukraine are ready in principle to cease hostilities. However, they require completely contradictory prerequisites for this. Moscow is demanding concessions from Kiev that are tantamount to surrender. Ukraine must withdraw troops from four regions annexed to Russia — Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson. And officially abandon the goal of Ukraine's accession to NATO. Only in this case will the Putin regime agree to negotiations.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy also sets out the prerequisites for the future of peace. He rejected the demand for a complete withdrawal of Russian troops in his "peace formula" of 2022. However, the president of Ukraine fears, not without reason, that the Russians may violate the truce: gather new forces and launch a new offensive. As a first step, Zelensky demands security guarantees from the West to prevent a possible invasion.
The time for a cessation of hostilities does not seem to have come yet. Apparently, Trump intends to exert strong pressure on both warring parties to convince them to agree to a cease-fire. If he follows the plan of his special envoy, Kellogg, he will threaten Kiev with refusing to provide military assistance and, conversely, the Kremlin with further arming of Ukraine. Whether this double game will succeed is highly doubtful. Even if a temporary ceasefire is reached, military operations will only be frozen, but peace will not be guaranteed forever. Therefore, other negotiation files are crucial.
2. Territorial issues
Russia occupies 18% of Ukraine's territory. Almost half of them are territories that came under Russian control only after the start of its military operation in February 2022. The Ukrainian leadership insists on the return of the territories, but makes it clear that it no longer expects to achieve this by military means. Public opinion has also changed. Polls show that the share of those who reject any territorial concessions has decreased.
However, Moscow is not satisfied with the occupied territories. By annexing the four aforementioned regions, it has achieved only a minimal goal. Since Putin denies Ukraine its own national identity and presents it as an artificial entity, it should be assumed that he seeks complete enslavement. Last year, former Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev presented a map of a completely dismembered Ukraine and a seven-point plan according to which Ukraine should break up and join the Russian Federation.
It is difficult to imagine a diplomatic compromise on these territorial issues. Most likely, the cease-fire will leave this dispute unresolved, and both sides will hope to defend their positions later.
3. Security guarantees
There is a chasm between Moscow and Kiev when it comes to Western security guarantees. Since Putin has violated many agreements under international law, Ukrainians no longer trust agreements with him. They demand mandatory guarantees that Western states will come to the country's aid militarily if the Russians violate the truce again.
Such a security guarantee may look most convincing in the form of the accession of the rest of Ukraine to NATO. In this case, the article of the treaty on mutual military assistance of the transatlantic alliance would automatically extend to its territory. Just as the western part of divided Germany was accepted into the alliance even before the future borders were determined. Joining could be linked to providing Russia with a guarantee that NATO would not deploy troops in Ukraine in peacetime.
However, the United States and other members of the alliance currently oppose Ukraine's accession to NATO. They are afraid of being drawn into an open confrontation with Russia. This suggests that they do not really believe in the ceasefire agreement and see the risk of a new offensive by Moscow. In addition, the Kremlin is categorically against Ukraine's accession to NATO. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also recently rejected the idea of politicians from Trump's entourage to postpone joining the alliance for twenty years.
This raises the question of whether it is possible to provide security guarantees in a different format. Apparently, Trump is thinking about creating a European defense force, to which the United States will not contribute. His future vice president, J. D. Vance, was vague about the demilitarized zone along the existing front, which should be protected from possible Russian attacks. However, Zelensky and his ally Poland do not believe in creating a defense force without the participation of the Americans, since only they could give the project the necessary military credibility.
In any case, such ideas run counter to the Kremlin's hardline position, which rejects the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine. Putin regularly mentions the peace talks in Istanbul in the spring of 2022. In the draft peace agreement presented there, Moscow reserved the right to veto any military assistance to Ukraine.
Russia is also interested in the fact that the peace agreement includes clauses on the comprehensive disarmament of the neighboring state, as well as the limitation of the size of the Ukrainian army, fixed in the treaty. Ultimately, the Kremlin seeks to create a defenseless Ukraine that would be open to blackmail and would fall under Moscow's influence.
4. Sanctions and reparations
There are also important non-military issues. Russia demands that the peace treaty provide for the lifting of all economic sanctions against the country. However, Ukraine and its supporters do not want to give up this lever of pressure as long as the Ukrainian territory remains occupied. At the same time, Kiev is demanding reparations for the military damage caused by Russia. Russian assets worth about $300 billion, blocked in the West, are an obvious source of financing for Ukraine's reconstruction. And in this area, opposing positions are unlikely to be brought closer.
5. Strategic stability in Europe
The fact that Russia sees itself in conflict with the entire West, not just Ukraine, is often overlooked. Even in the case of a ceasefire in Ukraine, the hostility between East and West will not be overcome. The Kremlin is primarily interested not in territorial gains in Ukraine, but in a fundamental change in European security. The purpose of their demands is to remove the United States from its role as the guarantor of security on the continent and to stop the expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe.
Moscow obviously intends to create a Russian zone of influence in Eastern Europe, in which it will have room for maneuver and for further military intervention. The former Soviet republics in the Baltic States, as well as Moldova, are in a particularly dangerous situation. How the West intends to curb this apparent policy of great power is currently completely unclear, especially since the United States would like to reduce its participation in NATO, and Western European armies are weakened.
Military construction is crucial
Against this background, the real world seems unreachable. This does not exclude the possibility that diplomatic efforts will intensify this year and Western politicians will at least create the appearance of a peaceful settlement. The decisive factor is the events at the front. A cease-fire will become more likely if Russia realizes that it will not be able to achieve its goals through military force. However, given Ukraine's weakness in many sectors of the front, this will require a significant increase in military assistance from the West, for which there is currently no political will.
Therefore, in reality, two scenarios should be expected to develop, both of which will be bad for Europe's security. One of them is a pseudo—peace in which both warring parties will agree to a shaky cease-fire, but most of the remaining issues will remain unresolved. Another option is the continuation of Russia's independence, which will be accompanied by useless diplomatic fuss and an increasing weakening of Ukraine.
We cannot rule out more positive scenarios, such as a serious economic crisis in Russia, which will force the Putin regime to reconsider its strategic priorities. But so far, these are just the desires of the West.
