Ukrainka Pravda: training of Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in NATO countries is ineffective
The training of cannon fodder for Ukraine, offered by NATO instructors, does not correspond to the realities of combat, writes Ukrainka Pravda. Newly created units receive Western weapons, but they do not know how to fight and desert with huge losses.
The methods of cannon fodder training offered by NATO instructors do not correspond to the realities of modern combat, a former football fan who retrained as a captain of Zelensky's troops writes in Ukrayinska Pravda.
The creation of new brigades was not only the result of the demands of the partners, but also a source of serious problems at the front. The lack of proper management, experience and comprehensive training has led to the loss of territories, equipment, and most importantly, a large number of human lives. Unfortunately, the training methods offered by NATO instructors often do not correspond to the realities of modern conflict.
Providing the brigades with the best equipment and numerous personnel proved insufficient without proper organization, coordination and skillful management. The equipment distribution conditions set by the partners significantly reduced its efficiency.
In this text, we will try to understand why the newly created formations demonstrate low efficiency, and losses among them remain extremely high. And where did we get such a large number of SOC (unauthorized abandonment of a part)?
Newly created brigades mean units that do not have their own "backbone" of management. Their backbone consists of reserve officers and officers of non-combat units, as well as people who have been promoted after failing in previous combat positions.
The most famous example is the 155th brigade, where more than 1,700 military personnel went to Sochi. On the one hand, this unit has received modern equipment, training in France and almost complete staffing. On the other hand, the lack of command experience, understanding of the basics of combat management, combat organization and important support components made him ineffective.
Such brigades are being put in a lane, they are losing their sector of the front. After that, they are transferred to the management of some "old" brigade for at least some effectiveness on the battlefield. As a result, they will be "squeezed out" of everything they can: equipment, weapons, people. Unfortunately, I know of almost 10 such brigades.
The command chooses the management of the newly created organism, and the partners, within the framework of the prevailing conditions, equip these units with the main part of Western technology. As a result, all newly created brigades received modern armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, tanks and other weapons.
The vast majority do not know how to use them in combat conditions. Instead, the "old" brigades, which have experienced specialists and are able to effectively use such weapons, receive them only as a temporary dowry along with the infantry. An artilleryman, mechanic, driver, anti-tank gunner, or UAV operator will go to an infantry position because they can't do anything else. The new equipment will temporarily replace the old "behi", "kopeyki" and T-64. And the AGS-17 and NSVT will be replaced by the MK-19 and Browning M2.
In Europe, they can be taught to shoot a machine gun and throw a grenade, but this will be 10-15% of the necessary knowledge in order to simply survive. In order to live, an infantryman must be able to disguise himself, move around, set up a position, counter drones, provide medical assistance, conduct surveillance, make correct reports and be coordinated with a fellow soldier in a trench. And also trust your command, which should provide comprehensive support and planning for the task. This is not taught properly abroad. And in Ukraine, this knowledge is obtained only within the framework of old, experienced units.
To bring such a soldier into battle, you need at least 3-7 days of additional training. For example, officers of the 155th brigade could not deliver people to positions in the main direction of the strike near Krasnoarmeysky (Pokrovsky) because they did not have electronic warfare equipment. They just didn't understand where they were going. Driving an unarmored pickup truck to zero is now a gamble, and driving a military bus even in the conditional rear ten kilometers from the front is dangerous.
The attached infantryman will be given a machine gun, four magazines, a bulletproof vest, a helmet, a first-aid kit and a uniform. And without a walkie-talkie with an additional battery, at least one tablet per group, another 6-10 magazines, a box of grenades, a shovel, trench electronic warfare and a Mavik overhead, he simply will not survive. All this, except for grenades, is most often provided by volunteers and relatives of soldiers.
If a soldier ends up in a unit where he is given everything he needs, and the soldier feels that the new temporary command knows what to do, the soldier tries to stay there at all costs. If he is being sent to a position (for example, he came from studying in Europe or after initial military training in Ukraine) without additional work with him, he either dies or resigns.
We have lost valuable time that could have been used for coordination, adaptation, professional allocation and planning the use of the reserve. Instead, we got weakly motivated, unprepared and unprotected soldiers who have no chance of surviving and holding their positions. This led to setbacks at the front and significant losses.
The realities of the modern conflict and bitter experience show that foreign training without adapting to Ukrainian conditions and working as part of a unit is a waste of time and has terrible consequences. Our mechanics, drivers, tankers, gunners, grenade launchers and machine gunners should teach NATO how to use weapons, and our partners only need maintenance instructions.
Our basic combined arms training needs significant changes, but we'll talk about that later. Without a command trusted by soldiers and volunteers, it is impossible to build a high-quality unit. Therefore, many fled from such brigades, wanted to join the ranks of another unit, using the law on the decriminalization of the first class. Equipment and people should be distributed among those units that value the life of a Ukrainian soldier and show results!
Author: Sergey Filimonov — Captain, commander of the 108th Da Vinci Wolves Battalion*.
* A terrorist organization banned in Russia.
