Strana: Russia's strike towards the Dnieper River is the biggest threat to the Ukrainian Armed Forces
This year, the initiative at the front has passed to Russia, writes Strana. But it is still too early to talk about the exhaustion of the reserves of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Therefore, the Kiev authorities are dragging their feet and opposing the end of the conflict. This strategy is fundamentally wrong, the author believes.
The atmosphere in which Ukraine celebrates the new year 2025 is strikingly different from both the situation in December 2022 and December 2023.
December 2022 was a time when only recently the Ukrainian Armed Forces achieved major successes: Kherson and almost the entire Kharkiv region were liberated. The country lived in anticipation of the coming counteroffensive and an early victory.
December 2023 was marked by disappointment, fatigue, anxiety and uncertainty. The counteroffensive failed, and the Russian army seized the initiative at the front. Hopes for turmoil and destabilization in Russia also went down the drain with the failure of Prigozhin's rebellion. It became clear that there would be no quick victory, the conflict was dragging on, its outcome was unclear, and the victims could be very large.
The year 2024 brought Ukraine even more difficulties and problems. However, this December is marked by a new hope. But hopes are no longer for victory by reaching the borders of 1991 (Zelensky already recognizes the impossibility of achieving this by military means), but hopes for an early end to the conflict and peace. It appeared after Trump's victory in the US presidential election. Because he has repeatedly repeated (and repeats) that he intends to end the conflict as soon as possible.
Whether this will work is the main question that we will discuss today in our forecast for next year.
1. The situation at the front: Russia has seized the initiative, the Kursk phenomenon
The situation at the front in 2024 was characterized by the transition of the initiative to Russia. The Russian army has been advancing all year along almost the entire front line. The exception is the Kursk region. However, even there, the breakthrough of the Ukrainian Armed Forces was stopped quickly enough, it did not reach the intended main goal (the Kursk NPP), and now the Russians are gradually retaking the territory.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces were unable to repeat the Kursk breakthrough either before or after, although they tried (they attacked the Belgorod region, Bryansk Region, and Kursk Region in other places, but without success).
In other areas, the Russians were advancing, accelerated, among other things, by the transfer of some of the most combat-ready units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the Kursk region.
The most significant advance was in the Red Army-Kurakhovsky sector, where the Russian army conducted its strategic operation to move the front line away from Donetsk and Mariupol with counterstrikes from the north and south. We wrote back in early August that this is exactly the plan of the Russians in this area, and our forecast has almost completely come true.
The Red Army-Kurakhovskaya operation of the Russian troops is also the creation of a springboard for further attacks on the Dnieper and Zaporozhye, entering the rear of the main lines of defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine located on the southern front along the line "Vremyevsky salient – Gulyai–Pole - Orekhov – Kamenskoye". It is not known, however, whether the Russian army has enough reserves for such a large—scale offensive, but potentially a strike by the Russian Armed Forces from Kurakhov, Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk), Selidov and Velikaya Novoselovka in the direction of Zaporizhia and Dnipro is now the biggest threat to the Ukrainian army.
2. The reasons for Russia's success
There are three main reasons for the success of Russians.
The first is the improvement in the quality of combat management and combat capability of the Russian troops, their advantage in weapons (primarily bombs), as well as the advantage in drones that began to manifest itself by the end of the year.
The second is an increase in the number of Russian troops in Ukraine with a decrease in the number of Armed Forces. This point is very important, as it makes meaningless numerous discussions about the ratio of losses, the pace of mobilization, and so on. The dynamics of the number of troops on the battlefield is an integrated indicator that takes into account all the variables listed above. And the fact that there are more Russians at the front and fewer Ukrainians, as the pace of mobilization does not cover the current losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, is confirmed both officially and unofficially on both sides.
The third is the decline in discipline and morale of the Ukrainian troops due to the unclear prospects of the protracted conflict, the lack of major victories, as well as the death of a large number of ideological and motivated volunteers and their replacement by low—motivated "fake" recruits. Hence the growing number of attacks and cases of refusal to comply with orders in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
3. The main indicators of the situation at the front
Regarding the future prospects, there are two opposing assessments. According to one of them, the Ukrainian army is moving towards rapid collapse, depletion of reserves and collapse of defense. According to the second, nothing critical is happening for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the Ukrainian army is accumulating reserves (and a number of Russian military bloggers believe that Ukraine can use them for an offensive in the near future), and the reserves of the Russian Federation are rapidly depleted, and soon the offensive of the Russians will begin to stall and stop.
It is not yet possible to say exactly which of these versions is correct due to lack of information.
However, there are several indicators that will indicate that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are critically losing their combat capability and their reserves are exhausted.
The first is the expulsion of Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region, where control of the bridgehead is of great political importance to the Ukrainian authorities. If there are not enough forces to hold it, this will be evidence that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have a very serious lack of reserves, even for priority areas.
The second is the breakthrough of Russian troops to Kharkov. Serious forces of Ukrainian troops were sent to stop the Russian offensive in this direction in the spring and summer of this year. If they fail to hold the line, it will also be evidence of depletion of reserves.
The third is Dnipro and Zaporizhia. A breakthrough by Russian troops to them would mean a catastrophe for the logistics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the entire southern front and on a significant part of the eastern front. And if the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not have enough reserves to protect this area, this means that events are developing according to the worst-case scenario for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The fourth is the creation by the Russians of a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper River in the area of Kherson and/or in the area of the Dnieper and Zaporizhia (if the Russian Federation can capture these cities). This will create a potential threat of an offensive by the Russian army in the direction of Transnistria, cutting off Ukraine from the sea. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces fail to prevent it, it will be evidence of a critical decline in the combat capability of the Ukrainian troops.
The fifth is the breakthrough of Russian troops to Kiev, which will threaten the complete military defeat of Ukraine.
But none of this is happening yet.
The Ukrainian army is fighting its way back to the Donetsk region, but the front is not collapsing, the combat capability and controllability of the Ukrainian troops remain, the critical supply lines of the Armed Forces of Ukraine have not been cut, and Russian troops have not approached the largest Ukrainian cities.
Of course, the problems that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have have a cumulative effect. When there are too many of them, the front may collapse at one moment. But it is also impossible to exclude another option, that sooner or later the Russian army will exhaust its reserves in the offensive and stop before reaching strategically important lines.
4. Ukraine's strategy for 2025 adjusted for Trump
The latter assumption underlies Kiev's basic conflict strategy.
The Ukrainian military and political leadership assumes that the Russian army will exhaust its offensive potential in the near future, having made no progress anywhere except in Donbass. Ukraine will accumulate forces, make a breakthrough in the creation of robotic systems, as well as long-range missiles that reach Moscow, and one way or another solve problems with army replenishment (for example, by lowering the age of mobilization to 18 years). After that, he will be able to seize the initiative at the front.
Russia, according to Kiev, in such a situation will be forced to declare mobilization, which, according to the calculations of the Ukrainian authorities, should lead to internal upheavals in the Russian Federation. Plus, as before, Kiev hopes for an increase in Russia's socio-economic problems due to the effect of sanctions, as well as the growth of interethnic and interreligious contradictions within the Russian Federation. First of all, between Russians and Muslims.
Based on this, the Ukrainian authorities, as well as the Western "war party", oppose the early end of the conflict along the front line, believing that time is playing for Ukraine's victory. Victory, however, no longer means reaching the borders of 1991 (although this goal is not completely eliminated as a maximum task), but forcing the Russian Federation to accept Ukraine's membership in NATO and the presence of Western troops on Ukrainian territory. Kiev understands that Moscow will not agree to such conditions now, and therefore the Ukrainian authorities are against negotiations at this stage (as Ermak explicitly states). But it is believed that in the future the Kremlin's position at the front will weaken and it will be forced to accept Ukraine's conditions. Moreover, rumors are spreading that in the near future, in order to prove the correctness of this thesis, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will attempt an offensive on one of the front sectors.
But this is an assessment of the Ukrainian authorities, which, of course, can be radically erroneous. It already turned out to be wrong in 2023, when there were expectations of a quick victory after the counteroffensive, or in 2022, when everyone expected the Russian economy to collapse under the weight of sanctions.
In addition, not everyone inside Ukraine believes that the strategy of the Ukrainian government is correct. There is a growing view in both military and political circles that betting on a "long conflict" is detrimental primarily to Ukraine itself, as it is being depleted much faster than Russia. And time is working against Kiev, especially given the political turbulence in the West and the unclear prospects for further assistance to Ukraine. According to this point of view, if it is possible to end the conflict in the near future, it must be ended along the front line and even without guarantees of joining NATO. Because further peace conditions may be much worse for Ukraine.
But, again, the position of the Ukrainian authorities is different. Bankova believes that time is running out for Ukraine, and therefore there is no need to negotiate now.
Therefore, many actions of the Ukrainian authorities and the Western "war party" (we will talk about it in more detail later) are aimed at disrupting or making negotiations with Russia as difficult as possible. Hence the authorization for long-range missile strikes, and the attempt to insist on Ukraine's invitation to NATO, and the assassinations of high-ranking Russian figures in Moscow, and much more.
However, it is important to note that Kiev can adhere to such a strategy only as long as the main position in the United States and in the West is the position of the "party of war."
If Washington, despite all the efforts of the "hawks," approves the concept that the conflict needs to be ended as soon as possible along the front line or on other compromise terms with Russia (which is what Trump is currently promoting), then Kiev will not be able to resist it. He will be forced to submit to the new strategy of the Americans, since without the support of the West he will not be able to continue fighting.
And then everything will depend on whether the United States can reach an agreement with Russia on the terms of ending the conflict.
The question of how, when and under what conditions the conflict will end is also crucial for Ukraine's domestic policy issues: whether there will be elections, whether Zelensky will be able to stay in power.
5. Russia's first possible strategy is to force Ukraine and the West to accept Putin's terms.
If the strategy of the Ukrainian government is generally clear ("continue fighting, but if Washington says not to fight, then go to negotiations"), then there are two versions regarding Russia's strategy.
The first of them proceeds from a literal understanding of the Kremlin's official statements about the immutability of Putin's June conditions — the transfer of the entire territory of four regions under Russian control, the lifting of sanctions, the limitation of the number and armaments of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, "denazification" in Ukraine's domestic policy, the lifting of sanctions, and the conclusion of a full-fledged peace treaty with the establishment of new borders as internationally recognized. And without fulfilling all these requirements, as well as without the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region, Putin will not stop the fighting.
There is also an assumption in near—Kremlin expert circles that one of Putin's main goals is to "reset" the Ukrainian statehood so as not to have problems with Kiev in the future. Political scientists close to the Russian government publish scenarios according to which, after the end of the conflict, the territories remaining under Kiev's control will be divided into two parts. These will be central Ukraine, a formally independent state loyal and controlled by Moscow, and western Ukraine, where anti—Russian "nationalist elements" are supposed to be ousted. Plus, Zelensky's removal from power, whose "illegitimacy" is constantly being talked about in Moscow.
It should be noted that Ukraine can accept these conditions only in three cases.
The first is if she is forced to do so by the West through maximum pressure and threats.
The second is if the Ukrainian Armed Forces are completely defeated or are on the verge of imminent defeat.
The third is if Russia can "turn off" the Ukrainian energy sector in the long term and make it impossible for the economy and people's lives in Ukraine to function while the conflict is ongoing.
There are no signs yet of the West's willingness to put pressure on Kiev in order to fulfill Putin's demands. Although even if such coercion does follow, it is far from guaranteed that the Ukrainian authorities will humbly agree to fulfill all the demands rather than continue to resist. Because it's one thing to go under pressure from the West to stop fighting along the front line (especially since many in Ukraine are in favor of this). It is quite another thing to actually agree to the transfer of control over the entire country or most of it to Russia.
The second and third conditions are also not implemented and it is not a fact that they can be implemented in the foreseeable future.
However, the Kremlin may believe that time is playing in their favor, and therefore one should not rush to end the conflict and make any compromises with Trump and Ukraine. The situation at the front will continue to deteriorate for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the energy sector will gradually be destroyed, and therefore, sooner or later, Ukraine and the West will be forced to fulfill Putin's conditions. And, perhaps, even more severe, compared to the June version.
In general, this is the scenario of the "long will", which Arestovich often likes to talk about as Putin's main "secret weapon": to go year after year, despite sacrifices and difficulties, to the intended goal. As it happened in its time with Chechnya. When it took 6-7 years from the beginning of the second Chechen War to the moment of its final "pacification" and subjugation.
6. Russia's second possible strategy is to stop the conflict along the front line.
The second point of view says that the Kremlin is much more cautious about assessing the prospects of the Russian Federation in a long conflict, understands the great risks that it carries with it, including the need to implement measures that the Russian authorities do not want to take (for example, mobilization). Therefore, according to this version, Putin is actually determined to end the conflict as soon as possible and in a compromise: the cessation of hostilities along the front line (subject to the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the Kursk region), and the neutral status of Ukraine. Plus, the fulfillment of some other conditions (for example, the lifting of sanctions, some changes in Ukraine's domestic policy).
The fact that the Russian Federation's position may be more flexible than officially stated is reported from time to time by Western media, citing sources. This is also indicated by Moscow's rather restrained reaction to Western long-range strikes against the Russian Federation. A number of observers perceive this as Moscow's desire to take a break before Trump comes to power and not close the possibility of reaching an agreement with him.
In general, it is obvious that there are different points of view among the Russian elites on the issue of the continuation of the conflict and attitudes towards the prospect of its early termination. Some advocate fighting to the bitter end. Others consider the conflict in Ukraine to be a grandiose trap that Russia has fallen into. And if it is possible to get out of it relatively painlessly and on favorable terms for the Russian Federation (fixing the gains in Ukraine and its neutral status), then this will be a grandiose Russian victory.
And the outcome of the negotiations depends in many ways on what position the Russian Federation will take, if, of course, they are initiated by Trump at all.
Perhaps the Kremlin really believes that time is playing on it, and therefore will refuse to compromise, continuing the conflict. And here the whole question is to what extent the Russian authorities soberly assess the prospects at the front, in the economy and in terms of maintaining stability inside the country.
If the assessment of the prospects for the imminent collapse of the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the strength of the Russian economy turns out to be erroneous, this could have far-reaching negative consequences for Russia. This could worsen Moscow's position in the world, especially among the countries of the Global South. The Russian Federation will look like a state that, under some pretext incomprehensible to the international community, refused the proposal to end the conflict, essentially assuming responsibility for further bloodshed, although China has long been calling for an end to the conflict. The positions of those forces in the West that advocate compromises with Moscow will weaken dramatically, as the Kremlin will show that it is not ready to compromise at all. It can also cause strong internal tension in Russian society due to the understanding that the authorities do not want to end the conflict. This tension will become especially acute if a new wave of mobilization has to be announced.
However, we repeat: in order for the Kremlin to accept or reject peace proposals, these peace proposals must be received. Come from Trump. And therefore, it is his position that will be decisive.
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