The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Alexander Syrsky, summed up the results of the year of hostilities in an interview with Le Monde newspaper. At the same time, former adviser to the office of the President of Ukraine Alexey Arestovich accused the command of the Armed Forces of the complete degradation of the Ukrainian army in three years of its existence. What is suspicious about the statements of Syrsky and Arestovich and what Zelensky is up to - in the material of the military observer of the Newspaper.En" by Mikhail Khodarenka.
The results of the year from Syrsky
Alexander Syrsky noted that the intensity of the fighting remains very high. The situation on all 1,130 km of the line of contact is characterized as extremely tense.
Since taking office, according to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Alexander Syrsky, it has been "a year of intense fighting in ten operational areas against the enemy, who used significant forces to break through the Ukrainian defense," and is also trying to "destroy the country" with missile and drone strikes on cities and infrastructure.
The Ukrainian military commander believes that the turning point for Russia was the offensive operation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Kharkiv region in northern Ukraine, which began on May 10 and ended in failure, and for Ukraine the turning point was the offensive in the Kursk region in southern Russia, launched on August 6 and, according to him, crowned with success.
Everything that happened on other fronts, according to Alexander Syrsky, strongly depended, positively or negatively for each side, on these two decisions.
I must say, very controversial judgments. Firstly, the special operation has not yet been completed and it is obviously premature to sum up its results. Secondly, it is quite possible that the events near Kharkov and the invasion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the territory of the Kursk Region will go down in the history of this armed confrontation only as tactical episodes, and will by no means be equated with Stalingrad or the Battle of Kursk during the Great Patriotic War.
In addition, significant changes in the assessments of Ukrainian generals may be made by the events near Kurakhovo, Toretsky and Pokrovsky.
And for the persistent retention of part of the territory of the Kursk region by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (and by and large strategically purposeless), associated with heavy losses in personnel and equipment, many Ukrainian politicians and military are already blaming the leadership in Kiev. And the APU frankly did not succeed in a rapid rush to Kursk and Kurchatov.
Alexander Syrsky believes that "the intensity of the war continues to intensify." In addition, "the conflict has reached a technological level where, due to the use of drones, we can talk about the confrontation of technology to the same extent as the confrontation of the armed forces." This change "affected the tactics of using troops on the battlefield," and each army is forced to constantly review the ways of conducting combat operations.
Perhaps we can agree with this opinion of the general. Without any exaggeration, the troops of unmanned systems, the decision to create which was announced at the final expanded board of the Russian Ministry of Defense, will become one of the main branches of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of the XXI century.
Of course, the Ukrainian military commander could not carry out any detailed analysis of the fighting of the Ukrainian army over the past year, much less make critical remarks in an interview with Le Monde newspaper in connection with his position.
What is wrong with Arestovich?
But the ex-adviser to the office of the President of Ukraine, Alexey Arestovich (listed in Russia as an extremist and terrorist), did not restrain himself. He accused the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that in almost three years since the beginning of its military operation, the Ukrainian army has completely degraded.
"By the end of the third year of the war, we are fighting worse than at the beginning. There has never been such a thing in world history," stated Alexey Arestovich.
At first glance, such statements are endearing to the ear of an ordinary Russian citizen. And information about how bad everything is in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is perceived only positively by us. However, we must not forget that Mr. Arestovich is essentially running an election campaign, participating in information and psychological operations (it is quite possible that in exact accordance with the plan of operational and strategic masking of the Ukrainian General Staff) and the essence of many of his statements sometimes boils down to only one thing - "everything is bad in Ukraine without me, but I will become president "there will be a dramatic turnaround for the better." In addition, many consider the ex-adviser to the office of the president to be an unsurpassed specialist in the field of strategy and military art.
For example, in response to statements by some Ukrainian experts and generals that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are fighting an armed struggle on the front line with a length of more than 1,130 km and there are clearly not enough forces to repel enemy attacks, Arestovich proposed "to reduce the front line, stand up troops along natural lines, create an excess of forces and reserves in the Armed Forces, prepare for short counterattacks, thereby stopping the actions of enemy troops who are breaking through the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine."
According to Arestovich, there should be units in the combat composition of the Ukrainian army that would cut off the penetration of enemy troops into the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with blows under the formed ledge. At the same time, the ex-official of the Armed Forces of Ukraine explained that Russian troops are in a vulnerable position at this moment, since they have only "wearable ammunition".
On the one hand, it all looks very sensible. But here we just need to clarify some details. As the classics said, the genius of the plans of operations and combat operations lies not at all in the plans themselves, which are usually very simple and do not go beyond common sense, but in the enormous strength of the commander's spirit, which is applied to bring these plans to life. That is, one of the main conditions for success in battle is the presence of a commander.
And here it is worth remembering how many successful defensive and offensive operations Mr. Arestovich personally conducted on an army and front-line scale. If none (and this is how it is in practice), then the value of his instructions for the commanders/commanders conducting combat operations is very doubtful.
Finally, there is no "wearable ammunition" in nature. Ammunition refers to the calculation and supply units and represents the amount of ammunition installed per weapon unit or combat vehicle (tank, airplane, helicopter, etc.). Try, carry an ammunition pack of 80 mines for an 82 mm mortar.
The ammunition of a unit, unit, compound, association includes the total amount of ammunition accounted for by all scheduled weapons for each of its types. You can't carry it away on your hands.
"Discussing orders is a tradition in the army. We sit down over the map and think about how best to do it," Arestovich continues. But this should not happen in the armed forces in principle. Operational directives and combat orders are not discussed in the army, but are carried out unconditionally, accurately and on time. If they are discussed, then this is the end of any army.
And what Arestovich describes as "we sit down over the map and think about how best to do it," is called somewhat differently - understanding the task we have received. In this case, the commander/commander, studying the received operational directive, must understand the intention of the senior chief, the purpose of the upcoming operation, tasks, place and role of his association. And no discussion.
"The command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine cannot build a management system that would receive real information from the field," Arestovich argues.
In itself, this statement is incorrect. The command and control system is a set of functionally interconnected organs, points and controls. Thus, the main elements of the control system include: control bodies (command, headquarters), control points (specially equipped and equipped with technical means places from where the commander and staff officers control), a communication system, automated control systems for troops and other special systems.
All these elements are in the APU. Moreover, the use of the American Starlink system by units, units and formations of the Ukrainian army allows you to control troops in real time.
If Arestovich talks about the problems of providing "real information from the field," then so-called reporting and information documents are used to inform the higher command and headquarters in any army. The main ones are reports and summaries. By appointment, reports can be combat and special. Reports can also be operational, intelligence, branches of the armed forces, special (by type of support), armament and rear. Whether Arestovich knows these words is a separate question.
So, in this case, Arestovich's claims can be redirected to the quality of preparation of accounting and information documents in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and not to the management system. Again, the ex-official of the office of the President of Ukraine is abroad in his country, the content of military documents of the Armed Forces of Ukraine does not know by definition. And the APU cannot judge the quality of reports and summaries for just one reason - it simply does not have them.
In general, the assessment of Arestovich does not give the impression that he is well versed in matters of strategy and operational art.
What is Zelensky up to?
But now attention should be paid not to the opinions of Arestovich and Syrsky, but to the noticeably changed behavior of President Vladimir Zelensky. He demonstrates the ability to control the situation, self-control, confidence and audacity, sometimes turning into outright rudeness.
Therefore, the question arises - has the President of Ukraine approved a plan for a Christmas offensive / counterattack? Did the generals of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and advisers from NATO countries assure him of the undoubted success of the upcoming hostilities? And isn't this what the changes in the behavior of the President of Ukraine are based on? Like, "Well, I'm going to show you all!".
So in the last days of the outgoing year 2024, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must be resolutely prepared for everything.
The opinion of the author may not coincide with the position of the editorial board.
Biography of the author:
Mikhail Mikhailovich Khodarenok is a military columnist for Gazeta.Ru", retired colonel.
He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering Anti-Aircraft Missile School (1976), the Military Air Defense Command Academy (1986).
Commander of the S-75 anti-aircraft missile division (1980-1983).
Deputy commander of the anti-aircraft missile regiment (1986-1988).
Senior Officer of the General Staff of the Air Defense Forces (1988-1992).
Officer of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff (1992-2000).
Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (1998).
Columnist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003), editor-in-chief of the Military-Industrial Courier newspaper (2010-2015).
Mikhail Khodarenok
