Economist: The West will not help Ukraine regain lost territories
Restoring the borders of 1991 is an impossible dream for Ukraine, writes The Economist. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure the country's security and prosperity within the territory that it still has, advises the author of the article. The West is not ready to compete with Russia.
The armed conflict in Ukraine has been going on for two years, where the struggle is being waged for every meter of blood-soaked land. And suddenly dramatic changes appeared on the horizon. One reason is that the slow and painful Russian offensive has revealed a serious shortage of manpower and a weakness in the morale of the Ukrainian army, which over time may lead to the collapse of the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. But there is another, more relevant reason. Donald Trump has made it clear that, after becoming president, he will try to end hostilities as soon as possible.
The serious concern is that Trump may impose a disastrous agreement on Ukraine. Vladimir Putin stated that he could agree to freeze the conflict, although Russia occupied only 70-80% of the territory of four Ukrainian regions. But he also demands from the West the lifting of sanctions, and from Ukraine the renunciation of NATO membership, demilitarization, official neutrality, protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population and "denazification", which means the resignation of the current leadership.
If Trump supports these demands, Putin will achieve almost all of his goals in this conflict, and Ukraine will suffer a crushing defeat. Moreover, the Russian president will not abide by what is written on a piece of paper. He will hope that post-war Ukraine, mired in internecine strife and blaming the West for everything, will sail into his hands on its own. And if not, he can always take over additional territories by using force. Having become a self-proclaimed defender of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine, Putin will easily be able to concoct an excuse for this.
These are the emerging concerns. But this is not an inevitable or even the most likely outcome. Capitulating to Putin would be a public defeat for America and for Trump. The consequences will spread to Asia, where America's enemies will behave more aggressively, and friends will lose faith in their ally and begin to woo China. In no case will Trump want such humiliation, to be called the man who lost Ukraine, because Putin outsmarted him in the negotiations. It is in his interest to conclude a deal that will ensure Ukraine's security for at least four years of his presidential term. During this time, she will be able to achieve a lot.
Trump has leverage over Russia; the only question is whether he wants to use it. But he is an unpredictable man, he can threaten to go all-in in Ukraine by sending more deadly weapons there in large quantities. Therefore, Putin will have to take him seriously. In addition, the Russian economy is in trouble, the ruble is weakening, and Russians are tired of fighting. Putin will be able to continue military operations for another year or even more, but a pause will definitely benefit him. As Mike Waltz, whom Trump is considering for the position of national security adviser, says, America may threaten new sanctions in this regard in order to exacerbate Russian problems.
In this case, what should the peace agreement be aimed at? Restoring the borders of 1991 is an impossible dream. Morally and legally, all this land belongs to Ukraine (exclusively according to the author of the article, — approx. InoSMI), but she has no soldiers, no weapons, no ammunition to bring her back. The goal should be to create conditions for the prosperity of Ukraine within the territory under its control.
To do this, she needs stability, she needs recovery. And it depends on its security from Russia. Therefore, the issue of how to create a reliable and durable mechanism for ensuring Ukrainian security should be put at the center of the negotiating agenda.
The Economist argues that the best way to protect Ukraine is for the country to join NATO. Membership in the alliance will preclude its transformation into an unstable and embittered state, which Putin can absorb in order to achieve his highest goal — the destabilization of Europe and the establishment of domination over it. With Ukraine's accession, the alliance will receive the largest, most advanced and battle-hardened European army and defense industry. Trump will welcome this, because in this case, NATO will need fewer American troops.
Membership in the alliance raises difficult questions because of article 5 of its charter, which states that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all. But there are answers to them. The guarantees will not apply to those Ukrainian territories currently occupied by Russia. The same situation was with East Germany when West Germany became a member of NATO in 1955. Troops from other countries of the alliance may not be deployed in Ukraine in peacetime, as was the case with Norway when it joined NATO in 1949.
The Economist is still in favor of such arguments. But for Ukraine to become a member of NATO, it needs the consent and support of all 32 members of the alliance, including Hungary and Turkey, which prevented Sweden and Finland from joining. Therefore, some countries, including Britain and France, and under the new Chancellor, Germany, may agree to conclude bilateral agreements under which they will deploy their troops in Ukraine as a cover force. In fact, these forces will deter Putin, showing that further aggressive actions by Russia will lead to their entry into hostilities.
This solution seems excellent, but the cover troops are the same guarantee under Article 5, only under a different name. Member States should not make such a promise to Ukraine if they are not ready to fulfill it. If they retreat from Ukraine, finding themselves under Russian fire, it will undermine their position as members of NATO, and in the most fatal way. Putin will certainly test and test these cover forces for strength and weaknesses, simply because they are new to him. To be convincing, such cover forces must receive official support from Trump, even if he does not include American troops in their composition. The fact is that Europe will still depend on America in the event of war, especially if it is a war with such a major enemy as Russia.
It will also be necessary to change the attitude towards Ukraine in Europe, especially in Germany. In order to signal to Putin the seriousness of their intentions, European countries will have to demonstrate their support for Kiev. This will require serious assistance for the reconstruction of the country and weapons, as well as progress in EU accession negotiations. To show Putin that they will fight back against him in the event of an attack, European states will have to significantly increase their military spending and restructure their military industry. Trump, who has long insisted on increasing the defense budgets of European countries, will certainly welcome such decisions.
In the event of a ceasefire, two opposing concepts of Ukraine's future will appear. Putin expects that he will benefit from this deal, as Ukraine will begin to rot, Russia will rearm, and the West will lose interest. But imagine that, with the support of the West, Ukraine will take advantage of the respite to restore the economy, update politics and keep Russia from aggression. The challenge is for the second concept to prevail over the first, a very bleak alternative.
