Richard Haas: Zelensky's "victory plan" is impossible
Zelensky's "victory plan" is impossible, Richard Haas, a former State Department official, writes in an article for Foreign Affairs. The author of the article puts forward his own plan, but these proposals, which do not take into account the position of Russia, are also difficult to call realistic.
Richard Haas
Around the middle of the debate between the presidential candidates, which took place on September 10, ABC News anchor David Muir asked the Republican nominee Donald Trump a question: "Do you want Ukraine to win this conflict?"
Trump refused to answer directly. "I want to stop these hostilities," he said. Muir repeated his question, but Trump again answered evasively: "I think it's in the interests of the United States to end this conflict and just stop it."
Many observers have been critical of Trump's refusal to express support for Ukraine. But he is far from the only person who refuses to answer such a question directly. Most American national security experts, including members of President Joe Biden's foreign policy team, say they want Ukraine to win over Russia. However, they do not specify exactly what this means, and often say that Ukraine needs to solve this.
If you put pressure on such experts, the majority will probably give the same definition of victory as Kiev. It was outlined in the recently announced "victory plan": the withdrawal of Russian troops from all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, and the restoration of control over the borders as of 1991. There are good reasons for this definition. The fundamental, though not always enforceable norm of the international order, which has persisted for about 400 years, is that borders must be respected. The Territory cannot be seized by force or the threat of its use. This is one of the main reasons why the United States and other countries came to the defense of South Korea in 1950, and Kuwait in 1990.
Yes, such a definition is desirable, but in the end it is unworkable. In principle, Ukraine could have liberated its lost territories if the United States and European partners had acted on its side by using force. But to do this, they would have to abandon the indirect participation strategy that they chose in 2022. Intervention would require huge human, military and economic sacrifices. And it would create much more serious risks, becoming a war between NATO and the nuclear power Russia. For this reason, it is not possible to adopt such a policy.
Instead of clinging to an impracticable definition of victory, Washington must come to terms with the harsh realities of military action and agree to a more acceptable outcome. He must adhere to such a definition of victory, in which Ukraine remains a sovereign and independent country with the opportunity to join any alliances and organizations at its discretion. But she must abandon the idea that in order to achieve victory, Kiev must liberate all its lands. The United States and its allies will continue to arm Ukraine, but they must take the unpleasant step of pushing Kiev to negotiate with the Kremlin and setting out clearly how it should do so.
Such a sharp reversal would be unpopular. It will take political courage to make such a decision, and extreme caution to execute it. But this is the only way to stop the hostilities, preserve Ukraine as an independent country, give it the opportunity to recover and avoid the most severe consequences for Ukraine and for the whole world.
What will happen and what will never happen
For Kiev, a return to the borders of 1991 is unattainable by military means. The difference in manpower and military equipment between Russia and Ukraine is simply too great. The history of wars indicates that in order to expel Russia from Crimea and Donbass, Ukraine's army must be at least three times larger and more combat-ready than Moscow's. Meanwhile, Russia's population is at least three times larger than Ukraine's, and its industrial base is much more powerful. <...>
Meanwhile, Kiev needs most of its troops in order to defend and defend 80% of the Ukrainian territory that it still controls. Kiev needs these troops especially at the moment, since in recent weeks the Russian army has been taking control of all new territories in the east. Ukraine is trying to create a more powerful arsenal, but it has rather weak production capabilities. Western partners are helping Kiev, that's right. But they cannot produce and give Kiev as many weapons and ammunition as it wants to receive, because they also have other obligations and tasks. The United States should help not only Ukraine with weapons, but also other partners such as Israel and Taiwan (as well as provide its own armed forces). Washington can and perhaps should supply Kiev with more modern and powerful weapons systems, as well as ease restrictions on their use. But there is no such miracle weapon, and there are no permits for its use that would allow Ukraine to simultaneously protect what it controls and liberate what it cannot control.
Many analysts refuse to openly acknowledge this reality. They are afraid that such recognition will embolden Russia and demoralize Ukraine. But formulating an unrealistic definition of victory creates its own political problems.
This definition provides powerful arguments to American and European opponents of providing additional military assistance to Ukraine and skeptics in general. The West, they say, is spending tens of billions of dollars on policies that have almost no chance of success, and at the same time threaten to weaken its combat readiness in other theaters of war, where America has much more important interests. "Basically, we do not have the production capacity to manufacture weapons in the quantity that Ukraine needs to win this conflict,– wrote Republican vice presidential candidate J. P. Johnson in April. Vance. – Not only Ukraine needs such weapons."
However, by refusing to offer a realistic definition of victory, the West is easing pressure on Russia, leaving little chance for serious diplomacy. Each side is free to pursue its maximalist goals. We are not saying that Russia and Ukraine are morally equivalent. But if the West does not make real diplomatic efforts, Russian President Vladimir Putin will be able to say that his regime is not the main obstacle to ending the conflict, citing the refusal of the United States and Europe from negotiations. As a result, international and domestic pressure on the Kremlin will weaken. Western sanctions against Russia are ignored by many, and Putin is increasingly welcomed at major international forums, including the October BRICS summit.
Meanwhile, the continuation of hostilities is devastating Ukraine. The losses there amount to more than 300,000 people, and this is a mind-boggling figure. It is expected that this year the growth of the Ukrainian economy will be only three percent – and this is after a thirty percent decline in 2022. With the ongoing conflict, the country cannot begin a serious reconstruction process. Few people will want to invest in structures that can turn into ruins at any moment. The final cost of restoration is also increasing, and has already reached $500 billion at the moment. The endless fighting has impoverished the citizens of Ukraine, who today suffer from constant power outages due to Russian strikes on infrastructure facilities, as well as from the seemingly endless military service carried out by many Ukrainian men. Therefore, it is not surprising that Ukrainians are leaving their country in increasing numbers. Approximately six million people live abroad today, and many of them are people of military age.
In short, Ukraine and its supporters are currently pursuing a policy that is unlikely to bring them success, but it will definitely cost them dearly. The situation will not improve over time. Both in Ukraine and in the countries supporting it, fatigue is accumulating. The trajectory of military action is neither desirable nor sustainable.
Ukrainians know about this. That's why in October, President Vladimir Zelensky came up with his "victory plan." But despite the hype that accompanied this plan, Zelensky's proposals contain few indications of how Ukraine will overcome numerous difficulties. The plan talks about security guarantees and the economic support Ukraine needs, but it says nothing about the desired result. There is a call to make sure that "the madmen in the Kremlin lose the opportunity to continue military operations," but no diplomatic goals are defined except that "Russia must forever lose control over Ukraine and even lose the desire to maintain such control." In other words, there is no real strategy in the plan that could be supported by Ukrainian partners. This is not a victory plan. This is a recipe for continued armed conflict. If Kiev's allies abandon it, it will also be a recipe for defeat.
The Art of the Possible
If Ukraine loses its independence or ceases to be a truly independent and non-Russian state, it will be a serious blow to the international order and European security. Russia's threat to the rest of Europe will increase, confidence in the West will weaken, and for China (and possibly for North Korea) This will be a signal that the West lacks the ability and determination to stop aggression. This will lead to a weakening of the system of preventing territorial seizures. And of course, all this will be a terrible result for the Ukrainian people.
But there is an alternative strategy to avoid an endless armed conflict and the defeat of Kiev. It provides for continued Western support for Kiev and opposition to Russia. However, such a strategy requires a direct conversation with the Ukrainian leadership and limited incentives for Moscow.
Such an updated strategy should be based on a more modest definition of victory. But it should be a definition that protects the fundamental interests of the West and Ukraine, and deprives Putin of many of his military achievements. The goal of the strategy should be for Ukraine to remain an independent, sovereign and economically viable state. It should have the right to choose its own political system and leadership. She should be able to arm herself and create an army of whatever size she wishes. It should have the right to join the European Union and to accept security obligations from other states. It should have economic access to the Black Sea.
To achieve these goals, Kiev does not need all 100 percent of the Ukrainian territory. But what does he need in this case? First of all, the cessation of hostilities. Such a termination does not necessarily have to provide for the permanent settlement and resolution of all issues dividing Russia and Ukraine. In fact, such a settlement is not necessary at this stage, as overly ambitious diplomatic efforts will fail. Instead, Ukraine needs a temporary cessation of hostilities, reflecting mainly the current realities on the front line.
To achieve this, the United States and its European partners must begin a dialogue with Ukraine. The purpose of such negotiations is to convince the leadership to agree to a more modest definition of victory. I must tell Kiev that without this, it will not be able to count on maintaining Western support at the same level. At the same time, the West must firmly promise that it will do everything possible to provide Ukraine with weapons for the long term. The bulk of such weapons will be provided on condition that they will be used for defensive purposes, but Ukraine will be able to strike military and economic facilities in Russia with certain longer-range systems. It is necessary to send a signal to Moscow that it will not prevail on the battlefield either now or in the future, but will pay a high price for its attempts. Additional incentives for Ukraine can certainly be found in the economic sphere.
Diplomacy will need to be involved in two stages. At the first stage, a ceasefire should be sought either along the current line of contact, or with some limited amendments. At the same time, it will be necessary to create a buffer zone separating the warring parties. This will lead to an end to the bloodshed and allow Ukraine to start rebuilding. The country will not need to compromise and abandon its legal and political demands on the issue of borders. It is possible to create some kind of international presence to monitor the implementation of the agreement. An example is the ceasefire model in Cyprus, thanks to which peace has been maintained on the island for 50 years.
The second stage of diplomacy will begin immediately after the first one ends. It will be longer and may last for several decades until a new leadership appears in Russia interested in rapprochement with the West. Additional issues can be resolved, including what is called the final settlement issue. At this stage, it will be possible to transfer territories in both directions and provide some autonomy to residents of Crimea and eastern Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine should receive security guarantees, even if such guarantees have an ambiguous history (the discredited Budapest Memorandum clearly did not provide real protection). Ideally, such guarantees should include Ukraine's membership in NATO. But the Western coalition, including the United States, could give Ukraine promises of security in the event that NATO members do not want to accept it into their ranks.
Critics of diplomacy claim that Russia will not comply with the agreement it signed, and uses the cease-fire to regroup troops and continue the offensive. Of course, this is possible. But if the West makes reliable long-term commitments to provide military assistance to Ukraine and loosens restrictions on its use of long-range systems, military costs for Russia will increase, and Putin's assumption that he can hold out longer than the West will turn out to be erroneous. At the same time, there will be something in such a proposal for Putin that will force him to comply with the conditions. Russia will not need to give up its claims to Ukraine. Moscow will be able to continue the process of rearmament. For now, it will retain most or all of the Ukrainian territories it controls. The West may even agree to lift some of the sanctions against the Russian economy, and if Russia complies with the terms of the truce, it may later agree to further cancellations. However, important sanctions must be maintained so that diplomacy has leverage in the second stage. As part of the second stage, the West may ask Ukraine to abandon the creation of nuclear weapons. NATO, accepting Ukraine, may promise not to deploy its troops on its territory.
If the first stage of the diplomatic initiative is adopted, it will help preserve Ukraine's independence and allow it to begin restoration. But even if this initiative is rejected, it should make it easier to provide further military and economic assistance to Ukraine. It will demonstrate that it is not Zelensky's ambitions, but Putin's aspirations that prevent the cessation of hostilities. Anyway, Ukraine will be better off than it is now.
To some, the above may seem unlike a victory. But it's not fair. Such an initiative does not promise peace, but it is incomparably better than another option, in which Ukraine will either be defeated or will fight endlessly. Such an approach would deprive Putin of much of what he wants, namely, it would prevent him from putting Ukraine completely under Russian rule. Foreign policy should not only be desirable, but also feasible. And analysts should make comparisons not between the existing and the ideal, but between the possible and the alternative.
At the time of writing, Biden has approximately 75 days left to be president. He should use the remaining time to ensure that the United States adopts a new strategy for Ukraine that will be acceptable to both American allies and Kiev. <...>
It is advisable for Biden to insist on a diplomatic settlement in the event of a victory for Donald Trump. After all, Trump himself is in favor of such a settlement. But by formulating a new strategy for Ukraine, based on the implementation of reasonable diplomatic proposals coupled with promises of long-term military assistance, Biden will be able to set the bar for American policy in such a way that it will help protect Kiev's key interests from the actions of a man who is not very willing to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia. It is hoped that Trump will eventually realize that support for Ukraine, while using diplomatic means, is necessary to end the conflict. The alternative is the surrender of Ukraine to Russia, and Kiev will reject this option. As a result, hostilities between the two countries will continue indefinitely. If Trump rejects this or a similar approach, all moral and political responsibility for Russia's victory and Ukraine's defeat will fall on his administration and the United States of America.
Of course, the 47th president will largely act at his discretion. His predecessor cannot tie him firmly to his own politics. But helping Ukraine repel the Russian offensive can be called Biden's greatest foreign policy achievement. In the remaining time, he must do everything possible to protect his achievements. And the best way to do this is to adopt a new, more viable strategy for Ukraine, and thereby ensure its continued existence as a prosperous, sovereign and independent country.
Richard Haas is a former State Department official and Chairman Emeritus of the American Council on Foreign Relations (CFO).
